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This thesis is about working time and the economy. For more than a century economists have been
analysing the impact of reductions of working time on (unemployment and the performance of the
economy. Although the tone of the debate has been consistently sceptical towards the merits of
reductions on working time, actual hours have been reduced gradually by almost 50 percent since
1870: our ancestors would claim that nowadays everybody is working part-time.
The first section describes in some more detail the international evolution of annual working time
in industrial nations over the last century. I also look at the relations between working time and other
relevant economic variables, such as productivity, GDP per capita and unemployment. As one might
expect, these relations are not very robust, nor is their causality clear. Against this background, the
second section presents the aim and structure of my thesis.
1.1 THE EVOLUTION OF ANNUAL WORKING TIME
During the 20"* century annual working hours declined steadily in capitalist countries: starting from
roughly 2700 hours a year in 1900, see Maddison (1982), to somewhat below 1600 hours in 1992.
Table 1.1 illustrates the development for a few large Western countries and the Netherlands. The
decline is obvious, although the timing has been different for the various countries.' In 1936, under
Blum's Front Populaire, France was the first country to introduce the 40-hour week. The New Deal
policy of the 1930s in the United States also involved a reduction of working hours.
During the period of reconstruction after the Second World War, working hours remained rather
high in most European countries, whereas the 40-hour week was introduced in the USA. During the
high growth period of the 1960s and early 1970s, however, working times were substantially
reduced in (continental) European countries. So before the oil shocks of the 1970s, standard
working times were fairly harmonized in Western industrialized countries, just as in the beginning of
the 20* century.
1 For a more detailed account of the development of working time in industrialized countries, see e.g.,
Bosch, Dawkins et al. (1994), Hunt (1998), OECD (1998) and their update Evans, Lippoldt ct al.
(2001) or Roche, Fynes et al. (1996).Chapter 1




























































Source: Maddison (1982), Maddison (1991) and Maddison (1995).
After 1973, annual hours worked declined further. The smallest decreases are found for the USA
and the UK, larger reductions are observed for the continental European countries, with the
Netherlands at the top. Figure 1.1 based on estimates of Maddison (1995) - illustrates the
development of annual hours during the second hal f of the last century for a wider set of developed
countries. The countries are ordered according to their 1992 levels of annual working hours. In all
countries working hours have fallen, although the decrease is not uniformly distributed. English
speaking countries typically started at rather low levels, with subsequent small decreases. Other
countries had longer hours in 1950, but then, hours declined substantially afterwards.
Up to the 1970s the reduction of annual hours can be attributed to a decline in full-time hours.
After 1973, however, the trend of falling working time can be explained by two separate factors:
first, a decrease in full-time hours; and second, an increase in part-time work. Tables 1.2 and 1.3
give some indication of the size of both effects. For the UK and the USA, part-time incidence has
slightly increased, whereas annual full-time hours almost remained constant.' This suggests that for
these countries the observed decrease since 1973 in annual hours worked of Table 1.1, is mainly
2 In the USA. for example, the 1995 full-time hours of Table 1.3 are roughly at the same level as the
1950 average annual hours worked of Table 1.1. Schor (1991) even claims an increase in working
time. Colcman and Pencavel (1993) conclude, however, that median weekly hours were virtually
constant from 1940 to 1988. The debate is still going on and focusses on measurement issues.Introduction
Source: Maddison (1995)
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Figure 1.2 Annual working hours full-time employees
due to an increase in part-time incidence. Indeed Figure 1.2 - based on estimates of Eurostat






3 The different numbers in Table 1.3 and Figure 1.2 illustrate how hard it is to find international
comparable data for annual hours. Definitions are different, methods of collection differ, some
sources include overtime and deduct absenteeism, others don't, etc. Unfortunately, there are some
missing observations for the Netherlands in Figure 1.2.Chapter I



























































Data are from the Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen







Freeman (1995) and Hunt (1998).
The incidence of part-time employment also increased in the three continental European
countries, the largest increase being observed forthe Netherlands, see Table 1.2, by now the world
champion part-time employment. But, as Table 1.3 illustrates, there has been a simultaneous
reduction in full-time hours: a modest one in France, but larger reductions in the Netherlands and
Germany/ This pattern can also be observed in Figure 1.2.* So for these continental European
countries, both part-time incidence and reductions in full-time hours played a role in the observed
decline of annual hours since 1973.
For this thesis, the main stylised fact to be distilled from the above discussion is that full-time
hours have declined substantially throughout the previous century. Although there is some evidence
4 The data for Germany typically refer to the former Western Germany.
5 The sharp reduction in working hours in the Netherlands in 1986 was bargained by the unions, see
Section 1.1.2.Introduction
Table 1.4 Annual growth rates hourly productivity and hours
France Germany Netherlands UK USA
prod hours prod. hours prod hours prod hours prod hours
1929-1938 2.8 -2.4 1.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.8 0.1 1.6 1.4
1938-1950 0.5 0.3 -0.8 0.0 0.3 0.1 2.3 -1.2 3.2 0.8



























Source: Calculated from Maddison (1995).
that the reduction has levelled off for English speaking countries, this does not seem to be true for
continental European countries. Moreover, at least in Europe, reductions in working time were not
confined to high growth periods, but also occurred during the high-unemployment era after the oil
shocks.
1.1.1 Hours and productivity
The long-term evolution of full-time hours worked is typically attributed to the increased
productivity, see e.g., Bosch and Lehndorff (2001). The gains of productivity growth have been
allocated between wage increases and increases in leisure time. The data of Table 1.1 illustrate, for
example, that annual hours fell by roughly 30% since 1929. During the same 1929-1992 period,
hourly productivity tripled in the USA and the UK and was 5 to 6 times higher in France and
Germany. Table 1.4 illustrates this pattern of increasing productivity and reduced hours with the
annual growth rates of these variables. Whereas hourly productivity increased on average by 2 to 3
percent, annual hours decreased on average by 0.6 to 0.8 percent. Looking at the sub-periods, it is
once again clear that the timing was dissimilar in different countries.
Instead of looking at the time series behaviour, Figure 1.3 illustrates the negative correlation
between annual working times and hourly productivity for a cross-section of OECD countries. The
first panel uses the hours data by Maddison (1995), the corresponding correlation coefficient is
- 0.62.' Notice, however, that the countries with annual hours between 1600 and 1700 hours
6 The correlation coefficients for 1950 and 1973 are -0.56 and -0.61, respectively. So the cross-
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Figure 1.3 Annual hours and hourly productivity (1992)
exhibit a fairly large variation in hourly productivity. So, there are presumably many other factors that
determine annual hours worked. The second panel of Figure 1.3 uses the Eurostat (1995) estimates
of full-time annual hours. Once again there appears to be a negative correlation, the correlation
coefficient being 0.46.' So part of the negative correlation in the first panel can be attributed to the
occurrence of part-time labour in the more productive countries. Finally, the figure illustrates that
there is a large variation of full-time working hours even within the European Union. So there may be
other factors explaining this.
According to OECD (1998) collective bargaining, and thus unionisation, is one of these factors,
as in countries where collective bargaining is more developed working hours have shown a faster
decline. Figure 1.4 illustrates the correlation between Maddison's annual hours and two OECD
indicators of collective bargaining. The correlation coefficient between the 1990 trade union density
and 1992 annual hours is - 0.24, whereas this coefficient is - 0.27 for bargaining coverage. Using
7 The Southern European countries Portugal and Greece have rather low productivity and relatively










































Figure 1.4 Annual hours and collective
bargaining
the full-time Eurostat hours, rather similar results are found. So indeed, unions appear to have an
impact on annual hours worked.
1.1.2 The work-sharing debate
Besides institutional factors as unionisation, the unemployment rate could be another candidate for
explaining the observed difference in hours worked. Indeed, in times of high unemployment, there is
often a call for reduced hours, the so-called work-sharing strategy, i.e. 'ra/w/riZ>wf/ng wortfc
amoMgj/ /?eop/e 50 as /o reduce mvo/MWfary Mflem/j/oy/wertf", Dreze (1986, p. 562). Two early
examples were already mentioned: French introduction of the 40-hour week in 1936, under Blum's
Front Populaire; and the reduction of working time as part of the New Deal policy of the 1930s in
the United States.
After the Second World War, work-sharing was no longer an issue, but it reappeared in Europe
after the oil-crises ofthe 1970s when unemployment increased dramatically. In the USA it remainedf Chapter 1
a non-issue, however. Among others, Bosch, Dawkins et al. (1994), Bosch and Lehndorff (2001),
Hunt (1998), Kaptcyn, Kalwij et al. (2000) and Roche, Fynes et al. (1996) provide an overview of
countries involved and the various approaches taken.' For example:
• Towards the end of the 1970s, Belgium was one of the first countries to try to reduce the
workweek from 40 to 36 hours, in combination with some wage moderation.
• In 1981 the French socialist government aimed at a reduction from 40 to 35 hours a week and
increased holidays. The first year the workweek was reduced to 39 hours, with full wage
compensation, but the program was stopped as a failure, as competitiveness fell dramatically.
• In the UK the unions bargained for the 39-hour week in the engineering industry around 1981.
• In the Netherlands unions bargained for the 38-hour week between 1983 and 1986, reducing
their wage claims.
• Finally, in (icrmany, after major strikes, weekly hours started to decline during the second half of
the 1980s.
With France as the prime example, some countries tried to reduce hours by legislation, whereas in
other countries especial ly (icrmany and the Netherlands unions bargained for shorter standard
workweeks (and longer holidays).
More recently, there appears to be a revival of the work-sharing debate. Again France is the
prime example of government involvement. In 2000, the socialist Jospin government enacted the law
'Aubry' reducing the statutory workweek to 35 hours, although longer hours are allowed but at the
cost of an overtime premium. But in Germany and the Netherlands unions tried - and succeeded in
most cases to implement standard workweeks of 35 or 36 hours.
Whether these reductions in annual hours were successful in reducing unemployment or increasing
employment is debated. Layard, Nickell et al. (1991, Ch. 10) are very sceptical. They illustrate their
position by a scatter diagram relating changes in the unemployment rate to relative changes in
working time. The correlation is negative and their interpretation is that countries that reduced
working hours most had the strongest increase in unemployment." Figure 1.5, using the standardised
OECD unemployment rates, replicates such a graph, although using levels for 1973 and 1992,
respectively. As in Layard, Nickell et al. (1991), the 1973 panel suggests a negative correlation
between hours and unemployment, the correlation coefficient being - 0.32. The 1992 panels seem to
8 Most of the these countries also implemented measures for carry retirement. In the anticipation of
the greying of the labour force during the 21" century, these countries now try to reverse the trend
of lower participation of older workers. In this thesis, however, 1 will only focus on a reduction of
(full-time) annual hours.
9 Mind you, the causality may also work in the opposite direction: the countries with the highest
(increase in) unemployment had most incentives to reduce hours.Introduction
1973
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Figure 1.5 Annual hours and unemployment
suggest a positive correlation, however.'" In the middle panel, using Maddison's (1995) average
hours, the correlation coefficient is 0.27, but it turns negative, - 0.17, once Spain with its high
unemployment and long hours is eliminated from the panel. Finally, the lower 1992 panel uses
10 Similarly, changing the period from the original 1975-1988 to 1983-1993, the correlation between the
changes becomes positive.10 Chapter 1
Eurostat's (1995) estimates of full-time hours, resulting in a correlation coefficient of 0.25.
Eliminating the high unemployment countries Ireland and Spain, the coefficient drops to 0.08. All-in-
all Figure 1.5 yields no clear-cut evidence in favour of or against work-sharing. The relation between
unemployment and hours appears to be more complex.
Looking at empirical evidence with respect to employment, the results are mixed. Hunt (1999) is
rather sceptical, and concludes that the negotiated reductions in working time in Germany have
reduced employment. Similarly, Kapteyn, Kalwij et al. (2000) do not find evidence for the
proposition that work-sharing would promote employment. On the other hand, Bosch and Lehndorff
(2001, p. 227), surveying the literature, conclude that 'mm/ t7n/?/nca/ s/u</j'e5 con/irm /fart
co//«ft7/w iforA/nx-rime m/i*c7iom caw />e expec/ec/ to /law pos/7/ve em/>/o>7ne«/ e^ectt'. But
they continue to state that 7/K? m».W /m/wrfon/ //u/ig /o agree on « on f/ie ft/jo" O/CWK//7/OTO //«a/
/« /><? crea/tt/ // f/jc tm/j/«>7n«?n/ /»o/icy /JUTIM.«/ « /o ft? as swecess/u/ as /Jo.v5//>/e in
///«#/»/w\ More or less similarly, Freeman (1998) co icludes from the empirical literature that
work-sharing generated by market forces can increase employment, but that government legislated
policies tend to have limited or negative effects So the evidence seem«; to inHirate that work-sharing
might work, at least under certain conditions. However, the estimates also indicate that the increase
in employment is typically less than proportional, reducing total worker-hours.
In any case, work-sharing is in general not a popular measure among professional economists to
cure unemployment. The major argument is the so-called lump-of-labour fallacy, see Layard, Nickell
et al. (1991, Ch. 10)." Krugman (1997) called this the global-glut doctrine. The lump-of-labour
fallacy refutes the idea that there is a fixed amount of work that can be redistributed at will. On the
contrary, employment and thus unemployment - is determined by demand and supply factors -
or in a more modern context by price and wage setting behaviour. Reductions in working time, may
affect both price setting and wage setting, and the final impact on unemployment is uncertain.
Moreover, even when employment increases, worker-hours and output tend to decrease, so work-
sharing makes a country poorer. Figure 1.6 illustrates the latter effect: ODP per capita tends to be
lower when annual hours are lower, the correlation coefficient being 0.34. This is not a purely
arithmetic observation. Obviously, at given hourly productivity and participation rate, GDP (per
capita) is lower; but, as was illustrated in Figure 1.3, hourly productivity tends to be higher for
countries with lower annual hours. Moreover, employment may increase due to work-sharing,
increasing the participation rate. But these effect are insufficient to fully compensate the direct impact
of fewer working hours.
The decrease in GDP per capita need not to be welfare decreasing, however, as individuals in
countries with shorter working times have more leisure time available. Therefore, there is a choice to
11 Walker (2000) provides a critique on this critique of work-sharing.introduction 11
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Figure 1.6 Annual hours and GDP per capita (1992)
be made, and countries - at least their citizens - may differ in their preferences to this respect.
Indeed, Bell and Freeman (1995), show that even though Americans tend to have longer hours than
Germans in 1989, United States employees showed a relatively strong preference for "more hours
and more pay", whereas German workers showed a relatively strong preference for "less hours and
less pay".'^ Sousa-Poza and Henneberger (2000), using the same ISSP 1989 data set, consider a
wider set of nine OECD countries, and conclude that the length of the working week does not
explain differences in hours constraints. On the other hand, the OECD (1998, p. 166) presents
evidence based on a 1994 Eurostat survey that within Europe 'cown/r/e.9 /'n W/I/C/J average awm/a/
/jours q/" wor£ per per«?« are a/reaay re/af/ve/y /ow /ena" /o fte /Aase /M w/j/c/z /Ae average
pre/erewceybr/ewer Aowrs w re/a//ve/y s/roMg, ana" /Aa^yör /j/gAer earnrngs re/a/ive/y
So there is pervasive heterogeneity in the preferences for leisure and income.
1.2 THE PRESENT STUDY
1.2.1 Aim
The previous section illustrated a number of important relations between working hours and other
economic variables: hourly productivity, employment, unemployment, GDP per capita and union
involvement. Their causal links remained rather unclear, however. Take productivity, for example.
On the one hand, it has often been argued that the length of the workday or workweek may affect
hourly productivity: start-up times leading to a positive correlation; fatigue having a negative impact.
12 Bell and Freeman (1995) suggest that the underlying reason is the higher earnings inequality in the
USA. Bell and Freeman (2001) provide some new evidence if favour of this hypothesis.12 Chapter I
On the other hand, increased productivity through technological progress makes us richer, and
provides room for reduction in working hours. The causality may thus run either way, even though
the mutual relations between these two variables are fairly obvious.
For the other variables the relations with working time may be less obvious, however. Take
unemployment, as another example. One of the issues in the literature is how working hours do
affect unemployment, but the work-sharing debate illustrates that increased unemployment may also
affect the determination of hours. Again, the causality may run either way, but the mechanisms
behind these links arc more involved than for productivity.
ITic aim of the thesis is to get a better understanding of the relationship between working time and
a number of other economic variables, in particular employment and unemployment. For both
variables, the system of wage determination is an important ingredient. Against the background of
continental European labour markets, this also raises the issue of the impact of unions on wages and
working time.
To investigate the relations between the various variables, the thesis mainly uses a theoretical
approach. The core of the book consists of two or three parts, depending on the approach taken.
Regarding causality, the first four chapters consider the impact of a given reduction in working
time on variables such as employment (Chapter 2), overtime (Chapter 3), shiftwork (Chapter 4) and
wages and unemployment (Chapter 5). The next two chapters basically reverse the causality.
Chapter 6 provides an overview of models of hours determination. This is followed in Chapter 7 by
an empirical study of the joint determination of wages and annual working time in the Netherlands.
Alternatively, the chapters can be classified according to their partial or equilibrium approaches
used. Chapters 2 to 4 focus on labour demand, ignoring interactions with wage setting and labour
supply. As from Chapter 5, however, union wage determination is incorporated in the model, leading
to equilibrium labour market results in Chapters 5 and 6. The third part is the empirical investigation
of a wage and hours equation in Chapter 7.
1.2.3 The chapters
In some more detail the contents and structure of the chapters is the following. In Chapter 21 start
with the relation between working time and labour demand. This has been studied before, but too
otten the impact of hours worked on capital services is ignored. Taking the impact on capital
services into account, reduces the scope for work-sharing policies, as productivity is more adversely
affected. Moreover, in the long run capital is now affected by the length of the workweek.
Nevertheless, the model identifies a critical level of hours for which work-sharing may increase
employment. The labour demand model of this chapter, is used throughout the thesis.Introduction 13
Most labour demand models allowing for overtime, predict adverse effects of work-sharing on
actual hours worked, at least when overtime is worked. On the other hand, empirical work suggests
that actual hours and standard hours move (almost) proportionally. Chapter 3 takes up this issue,
extending the model of Chapter 2 with overtime. Part of the explanation may be found in
measurement errors, where observed overtime may overstate actual hours worked. That being the
case, we might end up in the corner solution, where actual hours coincide with the standard working
week. Another reason may be that overtime is due to factors outside the standard model. In Chapter
3 1 investigate the role of demand uncertainty and uncertain absenteeism. Indeed, the stochastic
nature of attendance and demand, increases average hours. A brief empirical analysis for the Dutch
manufacturing industry confirms that absenteeism and demand are important factors explaining
overtime. No impact was found for the standard workweek. As I focus on long-run issues, I assume
in the remainder of the thesis that hours worked correspond to standard hours.
Chapter 4 considers issues of shiftwork. Even though the weekly working time of employees has
decreased, the operating time of capital has remained rather constant. A logical extension of the
model in Chapter 2 including capital services is thus to investigate the link between shiftwork and the
standard workweek. Indeed, the model illustrates that work-sharing provides incentives to increase
shiftwork.
An important determinant of the effectiveness of work-sharing policies is the impact on hourly
and annual wages. Chapter 5 uses a union bargaining set-up to analyse this issue. The model
predicts a U-shaped relation between hours worked and hourly wages. Moreover, annual earnings
tend to fall. As a consequence, there is also a U-shaped relation between hours worked and the
unemployment rate in the equilibrium. Hence, the effectiveness of work-sharing policies depends on
the initial length of the workweek.
It then is important to understand how the standard working week is determined. This is the topic
of Chapter 6. There are many models in this regard, varying from labour supply to hours set by
firms. I focus on the impact of unions on hours worked. With higher unemployment unions tend to
bargain for lower hours; in other words, in times of high unemployment unions have an incentive to
put work-sharing on the agenda. With regard to the level of hours, the institutional detail and the
bargaining power of each party may lead to a wide variation in outcomes. Given the U-shaped
pattern between unemployment and working time, the effectiveness of work-sharing policies
depends on the institutional characteristics of the economy.
Notwithstanding the large variety of models of hours determination, the equilibrium models of
Chapter 6 can be used to investigate the impact of productivity growth on hours worked and wages.
The general prediction is that hours worked tend to decline and wages tend to increase, even when
hours supply is moderately increasing in wages.14 Chapter 1
Chapter 7 presents an empirical investigation of the joint determination of wages and annual hours
in the Dutch market sector. Using cointegration techniques, I find that hourly wages do not increase
significantly when hours worked are reduced. So reduced working hours have lead to wage
moderation in the Netherlands. Hourly wages on the other hand, have a quite significant negative
impact on annual hours. I lowever, no impact could be found for unemployment on annual hours. So
the observed downward trend in hours should be attributed to productivity growth, and not to
work-sharing.
Che study concludes in Chapter 8 with a brief summary.
1.2.4 Place in the literalure
This is certainly not the first book on the impact of working hours on the labour market and the
economy. An early Dutch example is Verdoom (1947). Hart (1987) focusses mainly on labour
demand issues and Owen (1989) takes an American perspective. More recently, Contensou and
Vranceanu (2000) survey the literature."
The structure of the book more or less follows the history of the literature. When the work-
sharing debate came up in the 1970s and 1980s, the first set of papers investigated the impact on
labour demand, Hart (1984b) being a typical example. Chapters 2 to 4 provide extensions to this
literature, emphasizing the role of capital. Starting with Calmfors (1985), the second set of papers
studied the impact of work-sharing on wages. This is the topic of Chapter 5, where I broaden the
results to incorporate capital services and extend the results to various bargaining structures. More
recently, see Marimon and Zilibotti (2000) and Rocheteau (2002), the debate includes the
determination of hours worked. In Chapter 61 provide an overview of varioushours determination
models and show that many outcomes are possible.
Finally, empirical models describing the time-series behaviour of standard hours, as in Chapter 7,
are scarce. Dur (2001) has a model for the Netherlands and Kapteyn, Kalwij et al. (2000) present
some international evidence.
13 Although their title suggests a general treatment. Rubin and Richardson (1997) mainly consider a
case study in the UK shipbuilding and engineering industry.2 Labour Demand: Workers versus Hours
2.1 INTRODUCTION
During the 20* century the industrialised world has witnessed a long-term decrease in annual hours
worked per employed person. In the beginning ofthat century the annual working time was around
2700 hours, see Maddison (1982), whereas in 1995 full-time annual hours of industrialised countries
vary somewhere between 1700 and 1900 hours, see Hunt (1998). Around 1700 hours seems
typical for northern continental European countries like Germany and the Netherlands, whereas
American workers tend to work around 1900 hours a year. The strong reduction in working time
over the last century has had an enormous impact on the demand for labour. Similarly, the
differences in working times between countries may affect labour demand. This is the topic of this
chapter, where I analyse the impact of exogenous changes in working time on the demand for
workers.
The standard textbook analysis of labour demand typically ignores the distinction between the
number of workers and the number of hours worked by these workers. Labour input is then
typically synonymous to worker-hours, the product of the number of workers and their average
number of hours worked. In such a simple world, firms are not interested in the division between
bodies and hours, and labour supply decisions govern hours worked. In such an ideal world,
reductions in working time lead to proportional increases in the demand for the number of workers.
For some issues this overly simplistic view is innocent, but for many questions the distinction is
important. This is obviously the case when analysing the impact of hours worked on labour demand,
i.e. the number of workers. It is highly unlikely that two workers each working eight hours a day
produce the same output as one worker working 16 hours, or eight workers working two hours a
day. Therefore, it is often recognised in labour economics that the distinction between the in-ensive
margin (hours) and the extensive margin (workers) of labour input is important. This is not only true
for the revenue side, but also for the cost side. For example, labour costs are not simply equal to the
hourly wage cost multiplied by worker-hours as overtime commands a higher remuneration.
Moreover, some labour costs such as paid holidays do not vary with the length of the working day,
but only with the number of workers. Hart (1987) gives an extensive survey of these and related
issues and provides further references.16 Chapter 2
This chapter elaborates on these issues and derives the impact of changes in working time on
employment, measured by the number of workers. It serves two purposes: first, it provides an
overview of the main issues involved; and second, it introduces the main labour demand model used
throughout the book. Traditionally, the question is dealt with in models focussing on labour services,
with capital playing no role whatsoever. The main contribution of this chapter is to illustrate how a
proper account of capital services affects the results. The model is deliberately kept as simple as
possible: it encompasses the structure of most existing models, but also allows for a basic
introduction of capital services. Extensions are dealt with in the next chapters.
The static model of firm behaviour describes a representative profit maximising firm, facing a
known downward sloping demand curve for its product. The firm produces a single product with
two production factors: capital and labour. The services obtained from these inputs depend not only
on the homogeneous stocks involved the capital stock and the number of workers but also on
the utilisation of these stocks the operating time of capital and the working time of workers. In the
absence of shiftwork, operating time and working time are equal. From a long-run perspective,
actual hours worked follow normal hours quite closely. Therefore, this chapter also ignores overtime
and treats working time as exogenous to the firm. Changing working time influences labour costs,
which include quasi-fixed costs of labour.
The chapter is organised as follows. In Section 2.2 I discuss the impact of working time on the
production function. Thereby it is important to distinguish between labour services and capital
services. Section 2.3 considers the case of cost minimisation. At given output, working time
reduction leads to higher labour demand, but the impact on unit costs is ambiguous. This leads to a
discussion of the optimal demand for hours in Section 2.4. Profit maximisation at given hours is
discussed in Section 2.5, followed by a brief extension to partial equilibrium effects in Section 2.6.
Section 2.7 gives a simple numerical illustration, followed by the conclusions in Section 2.8.
2.2 LABOUR AND CAPITAL SERVICES
2.2.1 Labour services
In labour demand models it is increasingly recognized that labour services depend not only on the
number of workers, but also on the working time of each worker employed. This has led authors
such as Ball and St. Cyr(l%6) and Ehrenberg (1971) to specify labour services i according to
/. = £(#.//), 0 <!*,!„ (2.1)
where A/ represents the number of workers and W average hours worked per employee. Partial






labour services Z, by worker-hours £ = AT/, the sum of all individual hours. A drawback of this
specification is that it ignores productivity effects of hours worked. This can be remedied replacing
clock hours by so-called efficiency hours e(//), see e.g., Andersen (1987) and Booth and Ravallion
(1993), leading to
(2.2)
What can plausibly be said about efficiency hours e(//)? Figure 2.1, panel (a), depicts a typical
locus and follows arguments presented among others by Chapman (1909), Barzel (1973), Feldstein
(1967) and Lewis (1969).'For small values of//increasing returns may prevail, for example due to
non-productive hours such as morning start-up times and coffee breaks. Eventually, however,
lengthening the workweek will have diminishing returns because of increased worker boredom and
fatigue. For still longer hours physical exhaustion dominates and efficiency hours fall. With the
present moderate levels of working hours in industrialized countries, the latter situation seems
unlikely to prevail. Thus in the relevant range, efficiency hours will be assumed to increase in hours,
e'(-) > 0, though probably at a decreasing rate, e"() < 0. This corresponds to the concave part
between //„,„ and //„„, in panel (a).
Panel (b) depicts the same properties in terms of average and marginal efficiency hours. Due to
start-up times, marginal productivity e'(//) first increases up to //„,„, then it declines and eventually
becomes negative at //^,. As a result hourly productivity, i.e. average efficiency hours e(//)///,
follow a hump-shaped pattern, with a maximum at //^ (with //„,„ < //, < //„„). For longer hours
average productivity falls, though total efficiency hours e(//) rise up to //„,„, where output per
worker is maximised. In Section 2.4 I will show that the relevant range of hours for firms is
1 See also Contensou and Vranceanu (2000, Ch. 5), Hart (1987, pp. 73-74) and Walker (2000).li Chapter 2
Let IT s //e'(//)/e(//) denote the elasticity of efficiency hours with respect to clock-hours.* At
A/, average efficiency hours are maximised and hence iy £ 1 for //$//,,: the elasticity of efficiency
hours exceeds unity only ifhours worked fall below //,,. Moreover, T)' = 0 at //^,. This suggest that
the elasticity of efficiency hours with respect to working time T)' is decreasing in working time (at
least locally). Accordingly, I assume that the elasticity of efficiency hours with respect to working
time iy is decreasing in working time, so y« = -ÜUl > 0.' This sets an upperbound to <?"(•),
illustrating that efficiency hours should not increase too quickly/
Efficiency hours will remain unspecified in the sequel, but it may be useful to consider some
examples. In applied work the constant elasticity case e(//) = //*, 0 < y < I, is mostly used. This is
best seen as a local approximation of a more general specification. To incorporate fixed non-
productive time 5> 0. Hart (1987) uses <?(//) = (// -S)». This specification implies iy = Y///(// S),
so //, • ,V/( I y) and Y« '^C~S) > 0. Another example satisfying all the above criteria, is the
translog efficiency hours function
lne(//) = Y. In//- Vi Y: On/tf. 0<Y..YJ
This yields r|" = y, - Y2 In //and Y« = Y2 > 0-'
2.2.2 Capital services
To obtain a relation between output and working time, labour services are typically substituted into a
standard neoclassical production function. With capital and labour as the only two production
factors, the typical production function used is, see Hart (1984b), for example,
), 0<F,,/v (2.3)
2 More generally, 1 will use the notation T|* = xg'(xVi?(*) for the elasticity of an arbitrary function
3 The estimates presented in Galeotti, Maccini et al. (2002)"suggest that the hours elasticity T|° falls
with output. As long as hours are positively correlated to output, this is consistent with my
assumption.
4 Notice that ^^ = 1- n* +*^ffi. hence the upperbound is given by ^22< «•- 1 - v„. At
()
optimal hours //* for the firm the elasticity satisfies iy < I, see equation (2.10) below. So e"() < 0
and efficiency hours arc concave in the optimum.
5 Moreover, In //.*, = '*' 'v"'**', In // = (y,- 1)/Y2 and In //^, = Y/Y:-Labour Demand: Workers versus Hours 19
where £> is output and A' is the homogeneous capital stock. There appears the be a serious omission
in this specification of the production function (2.3), however: the flow of capital services is
proportional to the capital stock, which ignores the operating time of the capital stock, i.e. the
number of hours a plant or a machine is in operation. But obviously, given a fixed capital stock,
capital services fall when the duration of operations is reduced, see also Georgescu-Roegen (1970)
and Learner (1999). The production function should not fail to incorporate this.
The problem is easily remedied introducing capital services, instead of the capital stock, as an
input in the production function, see for example Abel (1981). Bosworth (1981). I-'air (1969).
Nadiri and Rosen (1969) or Winston and McCoy (1974). Analogous to labour services, the flow of
capital services A/can be modelled as a function of the capital stock A and the operating time of
machinery. As shiftwork will not be considered in the present chapter, but see Chapter 4. the
operating time of capital and the working time of labour are of identical length. Hence capital
services can be written as
A/ = M*. #)• 0 < A/«. A/,,
As in the labour services function (2.2), operating time, and thus working time //, is used as a
conversion factor, transforming the inputs from stocks to flows, see Leslie and Wise (1980).
Following similar arguments as in Ehrenberg (1971), capital services are further specified to be
multiplicative separable, compare (2.2),
0 </«'(//) (2.4)
It is hard to be very specific about efficiency operating time /n(//). On the one hand, a straight-
forward alternative is simply to use the operating time //, equating capital services A/to total capital-
hours AT/. On the other hand, similar arguments as presented for efficiency hours could hold, for
example due to maintenance time and wear and tear. A useful benchmark may be the case of fixed
factor proportions. For example, if there are fixed factor proportions in the technology f(•), it seems
appropriate to use the same functional form for efficiency operating time m(//) and efficiency hours
e(/f). In general any positively sloped function satisfying e(//) ^ >n(//) ^ // might be
appropriate.
In de Regt (1988) the general specification /«(//) is used. Here I simplify the analysis, however,
assuming wj(//) = e(//)", with 0 ^ K. This assumption reduces the algebra, without changing the
qualitative comparative static results.20 Chapter 2
2.2.3 Production function
Replacing th\e capital stock K in the production function (2.3) by the above capital services A/, the
production function becomes (^ - F(A/, Z.) - F(e(//)"/T, ^/Z)^. Assuming as usual that fX') is
linear homogeneous in its arguments, the production function can be written as
ß = AT «(//)/*), (2.5)
whereA e(//)*''/CW is the capital-intensity, i.e. the capital-worker ratio in efficiency hours, and
/*'(*, I) is the per capita instantaneous production function, satisfying/"(A) < 0 </*(£) <
ITM: instantaneous production function/U) characterizes the substitution possibilities between
the stocks, the substitution elasticity being
The specificat ion (2.5) looks like a kind of putty-clay assumption. At the beginning of the day (or
week), the capital-intensity /t is chosen and, even though it may depend on working time //, this is
maintained throughout the day. Output (per capita) depends on the duration of operations, see
Cieorgescu-Roegen (1970) and Contensou and Vranceanu (2000), as characterized by efficiency
hours. Finally the scale of operation is determined by the number of workers M
Accordingly, using working time as a conversion factor from stocks to flows, I am able to impose
more structure on the general production function £> = G(/T, N, //) used by Feldstein (1976) and
Bernanke (1986). For K = 0, the model reduces to the often used, but I my view misspecified,
labour services model. For K = 1. £ corresponds to the capital-labour ratio measured in bodies.
This corresponds basically to the model recently advocated by Learner (1999).
Comparing (2.5) with the original specification (2.3) illustrates that the elasticity of hours worked
in the production function changes. Let lY = jt/*(£)//(£) denote the elasticity of output with respect
tocapital services and 1 T^the elasticity of output with respect to labour services, then the elasticity
of output with respect to hours increases from (1 - ty)r|' in (2.3), to (1 - (I - K)ty)Ty in the preferred
(2.5). The reason is simply that, as working hours also affect capital services in the latter, working
hours have a larger impact on output in that model.''
6 This is most easily illustrated in a Cobb-Douglas production function, combined with a constant
elasticity specification e(//) - //* for efficiency hours. The labour services specification (2.3) is £?
= .-I A.'' "(.V //*)\ whereas for K =1 (2.5) corresponds to y = ,4/L' "#«//*. The elasticity of hours
in the production function increases from ay in (2.3) to y in (2.5). Notice that both specifications
arc observational equivalent. This equivalence ceases to hold for production functions with a non-
unitarv elasticity of substitution O.Labour Demand: Workers versus Hours 21
2J COST MINIMISATION
Having specified the production function, let me briefly introduce the cost structure. With respect to
capital costs, it is simply assumed that the firm faces the familiar user cost of capital #. This user cost
is assumed to be known and fixed. Possible links between the user cost of capital and working time,
as suggested by Bosworth (1981) and Nadiri and Rosen (1969). are ignored. It complicates the
algebra without virtually changing the comparative static results. They will be introduced when
discussing shiftwork in Chapter 4, however.
With respect to labour costs, it is well documented since the seminal papers by Becker (1964)
and Oi (1962) that firms face quasi-fixed labour costs besides their variable labour costs. These
non-wage labour costs vary only with the number of workers, not with the average working time.
Hart (1984a) and Hamermesh (1993) provide extensive discussions. These non-wage costs F
consist of such things as fringe benefits, (discounted) hiring, firing and training costs and
administrative costs or clothing expenditures. Moreover. Bell (1982) has argued that, due to ceilings,
part of the social security contributions may be included. In the present paper, quasi-fixed labour
costs are assumed to be proportional to the number of workers. For a more general specification,
see Plessner and Yitzhaki (1983) and Hashimoto and Zhao (2000).
The second component of labour costs consists of wage payments, the remuneration depending
on the hours of work of the employed. In this chapter working time is considered fixed for the firms.
It is best interpreted as standard hours either set by the government or, more realistically, determined
in the bargaining between firms and unions, see Chapter 6. Moreover, I assume here that firms do
not use overtime. Although the impact of reductions in working time on employment may depend on
the use of overtime, see Chapter 3, the evidence seems to suggest that actual hours vary
proportionally with standard hours, see Hunt (1998).
Let ff denote the hourly wage cost, then each worker's remuneration corresponds to K = H7/.
As the firm also incurs fixed costs, labour costs per worker are F + K The share of fixed costs in
labour costs is denoted <Pc= F/( F+y). The distinction between hourly wages Wand remuneration X
will be important when discussing working time reductions. Two extreme cases will be considered:
with full wage compensation, remuneration K will remain constant; without wage compensation the
hourly wage rate W is fixed.
23.1 Short run
Ignoring overtime, the firm can not adjust hours in the short run. Hence the only variable factor is the
number of workers. Any exogenous reduction in working time reduces capital and labour services,22 Chapter 2
which has to be compensated by an appropriate increase in the number of workers, see (2.5). In
terms of elasticities this can be expressed as'
^ - tr<0. (2.6)
The second part of the elasticity illustrates that the number of workers have to increase more than
proportionally (except for K 0), as the reduction in hours reduces both capital and labour services.
Potential hourly productivity gains are reflected in the first part, reducing the impact of working time
on the demand for workers, at least if hours do not fall below //,,. This accounting expression forms
the basis of the basic intuition of many layman that a reduction of working time boosts
employment.
Obviously, this is not a convincing story, because most of the crucial variables are considered
fixed and exogenous. Hven if I do not consider general equilibrium repercussions, equation (2.6)
directly shows that one should consider the impact on output and on the capital stock. I start with
the latter and will deal with the output effect in section 2.5.
2.3.2 Long run
In the long run, the firm can adjust its capital stock, leading to substitution effects. The cost
minimisation problem of the firm then corresponds to
mil C = /?*
subject to (2.5).
The first-order conditions for cost minimisation reduce to the output constraint (2.5) and
(2.7)
The left-hand side corresponds to the marginal rate of substitution between capital and workers and
the right-hand side is the marginal cost ratio between capital and the numbers of workers. The
second-order condition is satisfied for O > 0.
7 1 will use the notation e^ to denote the elasticity of the endogenous variable Z with respect to the
exogenous variable .V. Similarly, £^, denotes the same elasticity, but conditional on variable KLabour Demand: Workers versus Hours 23
Figure 2.2 Capital-labour substitution and reduced hours
Figure 2.2 illustrates the model in the capital-worker space. Using the production function (2.5),
the isoquants can be represented in per efficiency hourterms. Suppose that originally //Q hours are
worked. In the equilibrium £Q> the slope of the isoquant @/e(//o) equals the slope of the isocost
curve C«, satisfying the first-order condition (2.7). This equation defines the capital-intensity * as a
downward sloping function of the generalized cost ratio ****** . In the figure this is represented by
the ray *<).*
Consider a reduction of the working time from //Q to //,. As a consequence efficiency hours fall,
shifting the isoquant upward to £)/e(//,). This raises both the capital stock and the number of
workers, see £' in panel (a) of Figure 2.2. For K = 1 or o = 1, a reduction of hours at given
remuneration Kis similar to neutral technical regress and raises costs. For K < I (and O < 1) as in
panel (b), however, reduced hours affect labour services more than capital services, and is thus
similar to biased labour using technical regress. This is illustrated by the rotated isoquant ß/e(//|) and
lower capital-labour ratio at £".
Finally, there is an effect from the cost side. With constant hourly wages labour costs per worker
decline. In Figure 2.2 this is represented by the flatter slope of the isocost curve C,. According to
(2.7) this triggers a substitution effect towards more employment. The new equilibrium is £,, with a
lower capital-labour ratio *,. For the number of workers the effects work in the same direction and
employment increases. However, the impact on the capital stock is ambiguous, as the effects
8 These rays correspond to the capital-labour ratio in bodies (AW), which is different from the
capital-intensity *, unless K = 1.24 Chapter 2
operate in opposite directions. In terms of the figure, it is not clear whether the capital stock at £, is
higher or lower than its initial level £^,. For rather long hours the isoquant will not shift out very much,
accordingly the substitution effect through lower remuneration dominates and the capita] stock
declines.
Appendix A presents the derivation of the comparative statics. The elasticity of the number of
workers with respect working time is equal to
(2.8)
The first part reflects the reduction in efficiency hours, including the possible labour using bias; the
second part measures the substitution effect. The latter part corresponds to the elasticity of worker
demand with respect to remuneration e^y (1 (p, )<Jiy. The higher the non-wage costs, the
lower is the absolute value of this elasticity of labour demand.
The impact of a reduction of hours worked on unit costs is ambiguous. The outward shift in the
isoquant increases costs, but at constant hourly wages the remuneration per worker declines. Let c
* C7(> denote the unit costs, then using (2.5) and (2.7) the elasticity of unit costs with respect to
working time is given by
Ec//=-n'[i(i K)iy) + (i-(pK)(i-no. (2.9)
The sign depends typically on the size of the elasticity of efficiency hours, and hence on the length of
the working time.
2.4 HOURS DEMAND
So far the analysis treats working time //as exogenous to the firm, but the model can also be used to
determine the optimal demand for hours. The corresponding cost minimisation problem is
mn C = ÄA: + (K
subject to (2.5).
The first-order conditions of this problem reduce to the production function (2.5), optimal capital-
intensity (2.7) and the additional hours equationLabour Demand: Workers versus Hours 25
Figure 2.3 Second-order condition hours elasticity
The firm chooses the number of workers JV and their hours of work /V* in order to equate the ratio
of marginal productivities to the ratio of marginal costs.*
In short-hand the hours equation can be rewritten as T|' = (I - qvXl lW[ I (1 - K)T/J. Using
(2.9) it is obvious that unit costs are minimised at hours demand //*. Moreover, it is easily checked
that 0 < T)' < 1 - qv < 1 in the optimum and hence //,, < //* < //^, as predicted earlier.
The second-order condition can be expressed as fj' < r|„, where
]' and
The adjusted elasticity of efficiency hours with respect to hours fj* takes into account that the
elasticity of efficiency hours T)' varies with the level of working time (Y// > 0). The second-order
condition sets an upperbound T|„ to the (adjusted) elasticity of efficiency hours. This upperbound is
a decreasing function of the elasticity of substitution O, as is illustrated for K = 1 in Figure 2.3.
Consider, for example, a Cobb-Douglas production function (a = 1), let efficiency hours be such
that TT is constant and let K = 1. The second-order condition then implies that the elasticity of output
with respect to hours is smaller than the elasticity of output with respect to the number of workers.
This is the usual condition, see Hart (1987). However, in case of lower substitution possibilities (O <
1), TJ' may be higher. This could reconcile the empirical observation of many studies, see the surveys
by Contensou and Vranceanu (2000), Hamermesh (1993) or Hart (1987), that returns to hours are
9 Strictly speaking both the left-hand side and the right-hand side should be multiplied by JV, for this
interpretation to be valid.26 Chapter 2
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larger than the returns to workers, with the theoretical requirements. However, even in the limiting
case of fixed factor proportions, O 0, the (adjusted) hours elasticity may not exceed one.
The first-order condition (2.10) adds a substitution effect within labour services to the mode).
Figure 2.4 provides a graphical illustration, the original equilibrium being £„• It is fairly standard,
except for the fact that both the isocost line Co and isoquant go are convex curves. The second-
order condition guarantees that the isoquant is more convex than the isocost line.
As argued by Ehrenberg (1971), it seems plausible to assume that hours are invariant to scale in
the long run. Figure 2.4 also illustrates the impact of an exogenous increase in output from go to g,.
This shifts the isoquant outwards. In Appendix A it is shown that hours are indeed invariant to output
in the long run, the new equilibrium being £,, implying a vertical expansion path. However, the
capital stock increases along this expansion path, say from A"o to £,. Conditional on the old capital
stock A'o, the new solution would be something like £', where both employment and hours worked
increase.'"
In the labour services model (K = 0), the long-run invariance to scale of working time even holds
in the short run. This is easily seen setting K = 0 in (2.10), yielding
(2.10')
10 The impact on working time // depends crucially on the elasticity of substitution O, as e^, ^ 0 forLabour Demand: Workers versus Hours W
orT]* = 1 - (pi-. As a consequence working time only depends positively on f7 Wand is independent
of the capital stock. Hence short-run and long-run demand hours are the same and hours are always
independent of output. This rather implausible result stresses the importance of incorporating
working time in capital services.
Ehrenberg (1971 )also showed in his labour services model that, within the class of mulplicative
separable labour services functions, hours are invariant to output if and only if labour services can be
written as Z. = ;Ve(//). This condition is no longer sufficient in a model where hours are allowed to
influence capital services. It can be shown, however, that within the class of multiplicative separable
labour and capital services functions, hours are invariant to scale in the long run i fand only if labour
and capital services can be written as I = /V **e(//) and A/ A^m(//)." These conditions are
satisfied (with |i ~ I) in the production function (2.5).
Having determined that optimal hours are independent of scale in the long run, consider the
properties with respect to the factor costs. As usual in factor demand analysis, hours demand is
linear homogeneous in all factor prices. Hence the demand function can be written as
H*«Ä(F/»;ÄW). (2.1!)
The comparative statics are derived in Appendix A, differentiating the first-order equations (2.7) and
(2.10). The partial derivatives satisfy
>0and
The first term is rather obvious as an increase in non-wage labour costs makes the isocost curves
flatter in Figure 2.4. This entails a substitution effect towards longer hours.
The impact of an increase in the user cost of capital Ä on hours worked is ambiguous, however.
In the labour services specification (K = 0) capital costs don't matter, recall equation (2.10'). In
more general specifications the impact depends on the size of the substitution elasticity a. As
Winston and McCoy (1974, p. 424) argue:
7f//ie e/asf/cj/y [of substitution] /s /ess /«an owe ... //pays /o economize on ca/7/7a/ s/oc£
Ay ta/ng // more o///?e //me. A/ore s/jecZ/jcaZ/y, a /i/g/ier re/af/ve ca/?//a//?/7ce /«creases
/Ae /mpor/awce /« cos/s - /Ae re/a//ve s/wrre - o/cap//a/, /Aereoy /ncreas/ng /Ae /«cew//ve
/far A/gA ca/7/7a/ u//7/za/ion ... V/"/Ae e/as/ic/Ty /s grea/er //jaw one ... //pays /o econom/ze
11 An even more general statement is that long-run hours are invariant to scale if the generalized
production function 0 = G(£ JV, //) is homogeneous of an arbitrary degree H in the capital stock /C
and employment JV. In that case the production function can be written as £? = A^G(Ä/W,1, //)2t Chapter 2
o« /aAor 4« //je /low-Zar/jer s/u/re o^cew/sy even //zoug/j // mea/is us/ng f/ie cap/7a/ sfocit
/e.f.v u/V/»e //me.
Almost all of the empirical evidence, see e.g., Hamermesh (1993, Ch. 3), suggests that O < 1 .'* For
the Netherlands, recent evidence suggests that O is rather low, see Broer, Draper et al. (1999). So
the expected impact is positive. In terms of Figure 2.4, the labour for capital substitution induced by
an increase in Ä tends to make the isoquants steeper (as long as O < I and K > 0), leading to
substitution within labour services towards longer working times.
The impact of hourly wages Won the long-run demand for hours combines the two effects
above: substitution within labour services and substitution between capital and labour for K > 0. As
long as O • I both effects tend to reduce the demand for hours. So working time is negatively
related to hourly wages for any reasonable value of O." Moreover, using the first-order condition
(2.10), in 11' == 0 and hence in//' = //«„. Figure 2.6, see p. 34 below, illustrates these
no no
properties. Hours demand is decreasing in the hourly wage, but will always be between
To illustrate the long-run demand for hours, consider the CHS production function /it) =
(a^' '* Jk ' • a^' '**) "* , where p - (I - O)/O . Moreover let efficiency hours be given by e(//) =
(// -.Sy, where S £ 0 represents non-productive start-up time. Combining the first-order conditions
(2.7) and (2.10) gives the following implicit equation for hours
Y[a/K+ra)iKfl^' °(F+ff7/)°(#-£)*<'""*'~">] = a^FF(//-5). (2.12)
Unfortunately this equation cannot be solved analytically, except for a few specific parameter
constellations. For the limiting case of a Cobb- Douglas production function (O = 1), the demand for
hours is given by the familiar
where 0C s a^, /(%+Ka^) ^ 1. The same expression follows for the traditional labour services
specification (K = 0, implying a = 1). With fixed factor proportions (O = 0) and no differences
between efficiency operating time and efficiency hours (K =1) hours demand is given by
12 However, see Caballero and Hammour (1999) for a different opinion. Using a putty-clay approach
they argue that the value of the substitution elasticity could well be about 4.
13 The substitution within labour services dominates as long as O < O, s i + ?! i—
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Finally, the model can also be solved explicitly for K = S= 0 (at least if O ' I and K * 0) yielding
These examples illustrate that the long-run demand for hours //* is increasing in quasi-fixed labour
costs F, decreasing in hourly wages Jf' and most likely increasing in user cost of capital /?.
2.5 PROFIT MAXIMISATION
Hours demand establishes a benchmark for the impact of reduced working time on unit costs t\
Since //* is determined as to minimise costs, equations (2.9) and (2.10) imply that e, „ £ 0 for // ^
//*. Hence an exogenous reduction in working time increases unit costs if hours fall below hours
demand. The possible impact of a reduction of working time on unit costs, may trigger a scale effect
in a profit maximising framework. In this section I will establish the size of this effect, assuming that
the output market is characterized by monopolistic competition.
The downward sloping demand curve for firm / is given by the constant elasticity specification
ß, = (/»,-//VA T>1 (2.13)
where />, is the price set by the ;-th firm, /> is the average price in the market and /) is a demand shift
variable, which may depend on the average price /*. Substituting out the firm-specific price /', using
(2.13), the profit of a typical firm can be written as
]!, = /»/)' "0"- (F+07/)JV- /?£. (2.14)
The parameter 0 < V = 1 - 1/T < 1 is positively related to competitiveness of the output market.
Perfect competition corresponds to the limiting case V = I, and for lower values the firm specific
demand curve becomes steeper.
As the qualitative results for short-run and long-run profit maximisation are similar, I will
concentrate on the latter and discuss the short-run results in footnotes.1
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Maximising profit (2.14) with respect to the capital stock A: and the number of workers Af, using
the production function (2.5), gives the first-order conditions
v/»Z)'"«(/')• *""'#" '/(*)"'/'(*) = *. (215)
' ' '' (2.16)
The left-hand sides correspond to the marginal revenue product of capital and workers, respectively.
The second-order condition is satisfied for O > 0 and v < 1. Dividing (2.15) and (2.16) gives the
first-order condition (2.7) of the long-run cost minimisation problem. The comparative static results
arc derived in Appendix A.
The long-run remuneration elasticity of worker demand is given by
An increase in remuneration obviously reduces the demand for workers. Because of the negative
.»cjil/'jtfliry.t .tto'j»Lwtifii}«'^f.lrthnii'airtnMfu^.iiwoie«/y^iraib^Ua"^
minimisation case (E^,- < Ey^p < 0). The first term in the right-hand side of £,VKmeasures the impact
of remuneration on labour costs; labour costs increase less then proportionally through the existence
of quasi-fixed costs F. The second term between brackets measures the elasticity of labour demand
with respect to labour costs. As usual in Marshallian rules of factor demand, it consists of a scale (T)
and a substitution effect (O).
The downward sloping labour demand function is depicted in the north-east and south-west
panels of Figure 2.5. The figure uses small letters to denote natural logarithms of the corresponding
variables. The north-east panel uses remuneration K as the relevant labour cost variable. The south-
east panel is the employment identity, and the south-west panel depicts once again labour demand,
but now in terms of hourly wages W. As working time is given exogenously, this makes no difference
for labour demand. The north-west panel of the figure links remuneration to hourly wages. In log's
this corresponds to a 45°-line. where the intercept on thejy-axis corresponds to the log of hours A.
The higher curve in the north-west quadrant thus corresponds to longer hours. Using hourly wages
and remuneration in one graph, provides the opportunity to compare two extreme cases of working
time reduction: with full wage compensation, thus constant remuneration K. and with constant hourly
wage H\
Given the use of logarithms, the slope of the labour demand curve is the reciprocal of the
elasticity E^. The logarithmic labour demand curve is concave in Figure 2.5. This is because the
absolute value of the labour demand elasticity £*,- increases with the level of remuneration )'. The
reason is twofold: first, with higher remuneration the share of quasi-fixed costs in labour costs (p,,
falls; second, higher remuneration changes the optimal share of labour costs in totalLabour Demand: Workers versus Hours 31
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costs. The sign of the latter effect depends on the size of the elasticity of substitution O. This is best
illustrated assuming that the substitution elasticity is constant." The relative change in the labour
demand elasticity is then given by
1* =
Considering O < I. both terms are positive and 0 < <p^ i Y* < 1 •" Accordingly, the logarithmic
labour demand function is concave to the origin. This is also true for the short-run labour demand
curve.'*
Next, consider the impact of a working time reduction on labour demand. Due to the inclusion of
efficiency hours and their impact on capital services, I am able to get more specific results than
Calmfors (1985). who basically assumes that employment will increase at constant hourly wages.
The present model allows me to derive the condition for this to be true. Moreover, the model al lows
for a neat decomposition into a productivity effect (at given remuneration) and a cost effect (at given
efficiency hours).
At given remuneration K, a reduction in working time is similar to technological regress. With
imperfect competition on the goods market, this leads to a negative scale effect on output. So in
terms of the earlier Figure 2.2, the profit maximising isoquant shifts downward, reducing the impact
on the number of workers. It is easy to derive from equations (2.7) and (2.16) that the
corresponding labour demand elasticity with respect to hours is given by"
14 Strictly speaking, this only holds for CES instantaneous production functions. For the more general
case, I need to impose restrictions on /"(*) to derive definite results on the concavity of the
logarithmic labour demand function.
15 Proof: For oi (0. 11. we have cty* /do < 0. As Y.X o = <P> + (' ~ <Pr)lY < I and Y.Jo i = <P. > 0,
this implies Y,\ f [<p^ D
16 For the short-run labour demand, at given capital stock A', the conditional labour demand elasticity is
given by E^ ~ ~0 ~*P«) • Hence Cv, < E.VHA < 0. The relative change in this
Tn/o(ln/)
elasticity is given by YAW - «Pr-'wrr ~°"*~°'^ ~*" > 0. As a consequence, the
[•cn/+o(l-n/)]o
logarithmic short-run labour demand function is also concave.
17 In the short-run model, with capital fixed, the elasticity is e„„__ = n - — ^
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This is the productivity effect. When efficiency hours affect capital services and labour services in the
same way, so for K = 1, a reduction in working time at given remuneration is tantamount to neutra!
technical regress, reducing labour de.nand. The north-east panel of Figure 2.5 illustrates: the
logt hmic labour demand curve in the upper-right panel shifts inward, but keeps the same slope."
So at remuneration yo, a working time reduction reduces the number of workers from «o to n,,. As
the elasticity of efficiency hours T)' is decreasing in working time, the productivity effect is larger for
shorter hours. Moreover, the impact is also larger in more competitive goods markets (T large).
When labour services are affected more than capital services (K <- 1), as for example in the
labour services model in the bulk of the literature (K 0), a labour using bias is added compare
panel (b) of Figure 2.2 working in the opposite direction. As long as goods demand is sufficiently
I on/
elastic (X > to = — ä 1) the productivity effect still reduces labour dei Jid. But for rather
inelastic demand curves (T < To) the labour using bias dominates if (and only if) K • K„ =
— < 1/T < 1. So in the labour services specification, the labour using bias could, in
(t - oj»/
principle, dominate. However, for reasonable parameter values it seems most likely that the
productivity effect reduces labour demand." In terms of the north-east panel of Figure 2.5, the
labour using bias implies that the labour demand curve sti II shifts in, but less, and also becomes more
elastic.™
At given hourly wages, the impact of reduced hours on labour demand is ambiguous. First, we
have the technical regress effect as above, but second, total remuneration falls, increasing labour
demand. This cost effect corresponds to a move along the new labour demand curve in the north-
east panel of Figure 2.5, for example from £,,to £„. Calmfors( 1985) assumes that employment will
increase at constant hourly wages, as for example in «„,, but in general the impact is ambiguous;
whether employment increases or falls depends on the length of working time. More speci fical ly, the
productivity effect dominates for short working times and the cost effect for long working times.
This can be shown as follows. The net elasticity of working time on labour demand at given
hourly wages is given by £#„ = EM/D- + E^y, which cannot be signed a priori as both terms are of
opposite sign.^' However, this net elasticity is negatively related to working time, see Appendix B for
18 For K = I the labour demand elasticity e^, only depends on hours // through its impact on
remuneration K.
19 For example, let iY= 0.3 and o = 0.25, then T„ = 1.32, which is rather low for a firm specific goods
demand elasticity. For higher values of the substitution elasticity O or wer values of the capital
share T/, T„ is even lower.
20 The change in the labour demand elasticity is —— = (l-K)(l-<p„)(l- O)(T -O)T/(1-n/)r|*
£ 0. As e^y is negative, working time reduction makes labour demand more elastic.
21 Except for the unlikely case that T < T„ and 0 < K < K„, ''here the productivity and the cost effect
both lead to higher demand for labour.34 Chapter 2
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details. Define //„ as the working time where, given the hourly wage, the demand for workers is
maximised. So the critical level of hours //„ is defined implicitly by e*« ^ 0. AsdEjv/,/d//<0, then
*W ^ 0 for // $ //„. In words, employment is positively (negatively) related to hours worked for
ahortrrJ]«Bm7\ wtwk.iBu.titQcs.than// -,So„9t*''Vftn.bonr/v)*gce«: Jaboiit.dRtnaa'tnpJv.ior.rease«
with a working time reduction, if hours are not too short.
Appendix B investigates the properties of critical hours //„. First, one can show that //„ < //*, so
in the neighbourhood of hours demand a working time reduction leads to higher demand for
workers. Second, //„ increases with the demand elasticity T, so the critical level of hours increases
with competitiveness. Third, //„ depends on the hourly wage rate. The sign of this effect depends on
the parameter K. As long as the labour using bias is not too strong (K £ 1/X or O = 1), //„ is
downward sloping in terms of the wage rate ff, as is illustrated in Figure 2.6.^ The graph also
illustrates that //„ typically falls below fy for sufficiently high hourly wages.
As long as //„ is negatively related to the hourly wage rate, the condition e,vw ^ 0 can also be
formulated as W £ W„. In other words, working time reduction increases labour demand at given
hourly wages only if hourly wages are high enough. The intuition for this result is that for low wages
the quasi-fixed labour costs become the bulk of labour costs. A reduction in working time still
reduces productivity, and thus employment, but labour costs are no longer sufficiently lowered to
compensate for this. This can also be seen from the south-west panel of Figure 2.5; working time
reduction rotates the labour demand curve around the critical hourly wage ff„, becoming less elastic.
For higher wages employment is increased, for lower wages employment will fall. Notice that the
22 If the labour using bias is stronger (0 £ K < 1/T and O < 1), W. is no longer monotonous in If: it is
decreasing for low wages and increasing for high wages.34 Chapter 2
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2.7 A NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
To illustrate the working of the model, this section provides a brief numerical illustration of the main
effects of a work-sharing policy in the labour demand models. I use a rather crude calibration of the
parameters of the model.
For iy, which corresponds to the share of capital costs in total costs, I took 0.3, as in Pissarides
(1998). Hart (1984a) documents that the share of quasi-fixed costs in labour costs qv is non-
negligible. In line with I (art and Kawasaki (1988), I set <p> = 0.2. As suggested before, the evidence
indicates that the substitution elasticity between capital and labour O is below one, so I adopted 0 =
0.5. This is higher than the recently found low estimate of Broer, Draperet al. (1999) for the Dutch
economy. Kstimates of the elasticity of output with respect to hours are rather imprecise, see
Contcnsou and Vranceanu (2000, Ch. 4), Freeman (1998) and Hamermesh (1993). but the
empirical results seem to indicate that returns to hours exceed returns to workers. DeBeaumont and
Singell (1999) suggest, however, that this finding is due to aggregation bias, and they provide
evidence that return to hours may be lower than returns to workers. As a benchmark. I assume that
tfie flours tftasffcffy rrt tfic production ftmction is equal' to the worker elasticity, fi'ence IT" =
(! - tyV[ I - (I K)tyi and the value of T|' depends on K. For this parameter. I use two distinct
alternatives: K = 0 corresponds to the traditional labour services specification; K = 1 corresponds
the specification used in most of the other chapters. Incorporating the impact hours on capital
services, Shepard and Clifton (2000) find that a 10% increase in overtime hours decreases hourly
productivity in the 2 to 4 per cent range. The value rf = 0. 7 for K = 1, implies 30% productivity
gains, corresponding with the middle of this interval. For the firm specific elasticity of goods demand
T, I used 5.0 as the benchmark. For the corresponding market demand elasticity T| I used the lower
value of 1.5 These last two values are within the range adopted by Bovenberg, Graafland et al.
(2000) in their applied general equilibrium model for the Netherlands.
Table 2.1 gives the implied working time elasticities. First, consider the cost minimisation case.
An exogenous reduction of working time leads to an increase in employment (i.e. the number of
workers) and in the capital stock. The impact on employment is larger than on the capital stock, due
to the implied reduction in wage costs, as was illustrated in Figure 2.2. For the labour services model
(K = 0). the impact on employment is larger and almost proportional to working time, whereas
capital remains almost constant. Notice, however, that unit costs increase in any case. This is due to
the choices of the hours elasticity T|', which imply that //< //*and firms would like to have longer
hours.-' As firms tend to oppose working time reductions, this seems a rather natural situation to
consider.
23 The parameter values imply ni*./,' = 0-56 < 0.7 for K = I or iH„.„, = 0.8 < 1 for K = 0.Labour Demand: Workers versus Hours 37
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Other parameter values: T)' 0.3, O - 0.5. <p, 0.2, T - 5 and r| 1.5.
Next consider the profit maximisation case. Besides the long-run results discussed in Section 2.5.
the table also includes short-run numerical elasticities at given capital stock. The productivity effect
e.v/f>- of reduced working time reduces employment, but as was to be expected less in the short run
and also less in the labour services model (due to labour using bias). At the same time the
productivity effect reduces the capital stock in the long run, the most in the labour services model
(again due to the labour using bias).
The labour demand elasticities E,y> are rather high, compared to the range of empirical estimates
in Hamermesh (1993). This is due to the choice of T, leading to rather large scale effects. The same
parameter also implies that the mark-up of prices over marginal (and average) costs is 1.25, which is
rather high compared to observed profit rates. To reduce this mark-up, T should be increased, but
this would further increase the absolute value of the labour demand elasticities. Notice, however, that
the partial equilibrium labour demand elasticity is more in line with the empirical estimates. As most
of these estimated elasticities are based on industry or more aggregated data, thus including the
partial equilibrium effects of Section 2.6, this supports the numerical calibration.
Combining the productivity and cost effects, the latter dominates, leading to an increase in
employment at given hourly wage rate. This is again due to the choices of the iy elasticity, which
also imply that //> //„.** In all cases labour demand increases less than proportionally, so worker-
hours decrease. The capital stock also declines. In the partial equilibrium the scale effect is much less
dominant, as all competitors face the same increase in unit costs. Nevertheless, the increase in
employment remains less than proportional compared to the reduction in working time.
24 The parameter values imply ti«|„„„ = 0.73 > 0.7 for K = 1 or n*l„.„ = I1O> 1 for K = 0.3t Chapter 2
Comparing the labour services specification K = 0 with K =1, the impact of working time
reduction on employment is smaller in the latter case. This is due to the larger productivity effect, as
capital services are reduced in line with labour services.
2.8 CONCLUSION
One of the key determinants of the impact of work-sharing policies on employment, is the direct
impact on the number of workers. This has been the main focus of this chapter. In most of the
existing literature, the focus is on so-called labour services models, where hours worked influence
labour services, but not capital services. I have argued that these models may be misspecifled: in the
absence of shiftwork, the operating time of capital and working time of workers are clearly linked.
Therefore, I have allowed for such a link in my labour demand model. F.xcept for the Cobb-Douglas
case, it matters a lot in theoretical work whether hours worked are allowed to influence capital
services or not. The numerical calibration, suggests, however, that the impact on the corresponding
elasticities may be rather small.
The impact of hours worked on capital services reduces the scope for wwk-sha/j/ig poJicies, as
productivity is more adversely affected. Nevertheless, the chapter shows that there is a critical
working time above which work-sharing policies tend to increase the number of workers employed.
This critical level typically depends negatively on the hourly wage rate. It then becomes an empirical
question whether reduced working times increase employment. Reviewing the experience of the last
15 years, Bosch and Lchndorff (2001) conclude that there is a broad range of results, but that most
studies confirm that working time reductions can be expected to have positive employment effects.
This chapter ignores a number of issues that will be taken up in the subsequent chapters. First,
although I discussed the long-run demand for hours, I did not incorporate the possibility of overtime
hours in the model. Overtime hours will be dealt with in Chapter 3. Second, reductions in working
hours may lead firms to introduce shiftwork or to change the number of shifts. This will be covered in
Chapter 4. Third, the current chapter takes the hourly wage rate as given. This assumption will be
dropped in Chapter 5. Finally, the normal level of working time was exogenously given. Chapter 6
will elaborate on the determination of working hours.3 Overtime
3.1 INTRODUCTION
In the previous chapter, working time was considered to be given for the firm. In practice this is not
the case. Standard hours may be fixed by collective labour contracts, but the firm may use overtime
to differentiate actual hours from standard hours. Indeed most indicators suggest that on average
overtime is used. Hence, for an adequate analysis of the impact of a reduction in standard hours on
employment, it is important to incorporate the possible effects on both the extensive margin the
number of workers - and the intensive margin actual hours per worker. This has been done a
number of times in the literature, see e.g., Calmfors and Hoel (1988), Hart (1984b) or Hunt (1999).
The general conclusion is that, given that overtime is actually worked, a reduction in standard hours
tends to increase actual hours. The reason simply is that a reduction in standard hours does not
affect the marginal cost of (overtime) hours, but increases wage costs per employee, as more hours
have to be remunerated with an overtime premium. This leads to a substitution of more hours for
workers and reduces the potential of work-sharing policies.
The available empirical evidence on the impact of standard hours on actual hours seems to
indicate, however, that actual hours follow standard hours fairly closely. For the UK Hart and
Sharot (1978) found an elasticity of actual hours with respect to contractual hours of 0.92. More
recently, Kalwij and Gregory (2000) also have found an elasticity close to one for Britain. Using
German micro-data Hunt (1999) has estimated the elasticity to be between 0.88 and 1.14. In a time
series analysis, de Regt (1988) found an elasticity of 0.89 for the Dutch manufacturing sector. Thus,
actual hours seem to move (almost) proportionally with standard working time. This is illustrated in
Figure3.1 forthe Dutch manufacturing sector and confirmed bythe empirical results of this chapter.
The conclusion must be that the available empirical evidence contradicts the above mentioned
basic theoretical predictions. The challenge for this chapter is to reconcile the theory with observed
stylised facts. Besides a measurement problem, the main argument will be that although we typically
observe overtime, this is not due to a structural cost minimising choice. It is the uncertain
environment which leads firms to the use of overtime. The main sources of uncertainty considered,
are stochastic demand shocks and fluctuations in absenteeism. Contrary to the claim by Ehrenberg
(1970), it is the stochastic nature of absenteeism (and demand) that leads to increased overtime.40 Chapter 3
Figure 3.1 Weekly hours Dutch manufacturing
The chapter is set up as follows. In Section 3.21 briefly illustrate the main characteristics of Dutch
overtime. Section 3.3 presents the basic model under certainty. It is an extension of the standard
models to include absenteeism. The impact of the two sources of uncertainty is modelled in Section
3.4. Section 3.5 then presents a time series analysis of Dutch manufacturing overtime. (conclude
with a few remarks in Section 3.6.
J.2 OVERTIME IN THE NETHERLANDS
Figure 3.1 illustrates that for Dutch manufacturing, actual hours follow standard working time quite
closely. In the long run they appear to be proportional. The figure also illustrates that in the
Netherlands, average overtime is rather low. Since the late seventies, weekly overtime is just above
one hour per week. Moreover, overtime incidence is rather low. Although there are no time series
available. Table 3.1 gives some recent data. Overtime incidence is only about 10% in the
Netherlands. This is lower than the 20% in 1993 for Germany or for the UK recently reported by
Bell, I lart et al. (2000). Overtime incidence in the Netherlands is concentrated among male full-time
workers. It is the highest in the manufacturing sector and especially in transport. Table 3.2 gives the
overtime hours worked for the same years as in Table 3.1. Except for transportation, average
overtime for all workers is about 1 hour per week, but those working overtime tend to work about 5
hours overtime per week. This is about the same number as for Germany, but in the UK overtime
workers tend to work almost 10 hours of overtime per week, see Bell. Hart et al. (2000). Only in
the Dutch transport sector overtime hours are of the same order of magnitude.
All in all, these observations suggest that overtime is not a major structural phenomenon in the
Dutch labour market, except perhaps for a few sectors such as transportation.Overtime 41
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Figure 3.2 looks at the cyclical properties of overtime in manufacturing. The first scatter-diagram
illustrates that relative overtime, i.e. weekly overtime divided by standard hours, is positively
correlated to the utilisation rate. Indeed the corresponding correlation coefficient is 0.74. The second
diagram uses the vacancy duration in months as an indicator of labour market tightness.' Again, there
appears to be a positive correlation, the partial correlation coefficient being 0.67. Notice, however,
that with 0.61 the correlation coefficient between the utilisation rate and vacancy duration is also
rather high. The last diagram correlates relative overtime with absenteeism. There is no clear
correlation and the correlation coefficient is small but negative (-0.21). Although not shown,
changes in relative overtime seem to be positively correlated with changes in absenteeism (0.45).
The bottom line is that there is an important cyclical component in overtime hours. This is even
more obvious in Figure 3.3. which presents the time series of relative overtime and the utilisation rate
of I )utch manufacturing. I Jptums, peaks and downturns of both series correspond rather well, but
the troughs of relative overtime are less clear-cut, especially in the deep recessions after the first oil
crisis. This can be corrected by subtracting observed short-time hours from reported overtime
hours, see the dotted line.* The aim of the Dutch short-time working scheme is to enable firms with
temporary economic problems to maintain their work force, while their employees get partial
unemployment benefits. The regulation concerning short-time is rather strict, however, see Delsen
and Jacobs (1999). On average over the period 1960-1994, weekly short-time hours per operative
in manufacturing amounted only about 0.07 hour (thus less then 5 minutes),' whereas on average
1.25 overtime hours were used.* During the deep recessions after the oil shocks, short-time became
much more important, however, with a maximum of 0.56 hour per week in 1975. Since the second
half of the eighties, the quantitative impact of short-time is again negligible.
The discussion on short-time reveals the importance of measurement issues for overtime. As already
suggested by Fair (1969) and Mendis and Muellbauer (1984), observed overtime is likely to
overstate actual hours worked. The basic idea is that observed hours typically correspond
1 Using the vacancy rate yields a rather similar picture, but there seems to be no correlation when 1
use the unemployment rate. This difference can probably be explained by the well-known shifts in
the Bcveridgc curve in the seventies and the eighties. So overtime behaviour seems more related to
labour demand than to labour supply.
2 Figure 3.2 also uses the overtime hours corrected for short-time.
3 Excluding the peak years of 1%7, 1974-1978 and 1981-1983. where short-time per operative
exceeds 0.1 hour per week, the average is about 1 minute per week.
4 As for overtime, it would be interesting to distinguish between the incidence of short-time and the
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Figure 3.3 Overtime, short-lime and utilisation rate
to paid hours, and most overtime hours are paid.' But typically no corresponding information is
available for undertime actual hours below normal hours since most workers still get paid for
their standard week. Short-time is the exception, as firms have to register in order to be eligible. Due
to the strict eligibility conditions, see Delsen and Jacobs (1999), short-time is likely to underestimate
actual undertime.
To cope with the measurement problem of overtime hours, Mendis and Muellbauer (1984) use
the so-called 'aggregation by integration' approach, as used in the aggregate disequilibrium models of
Kooiman (1986), Lambert (1988), Sneessens (1983) and others. Assuming undertime is not
observed and assuming that relative overtime hours in firms follow a Student /-distribution, Mendis
and Muellbauer (1984) argue that the aggregate actual relative hours // and observed relative hours
// are related as
£ = #-£/(//-!) < tf. £>0 (3.1)
where £ reflects the spread of the distribution of relative overtime hours. Estimating British
production functions, they find £ = 0.016. This estimate implies that if actual hours correspond to
standard hours (// = 1), we still would observe a significant amount of overtime (// = 1.126, which
corresponds to 5 hours overtime for a normal week of 40 hours). Remember, however, that British
observed overtime is much larger than in the Netherlands.
An alternative specification uses the more common CES approximation of Lambert (1988) and
Sneessens (1983). Although the CES-function is typically used as an approximation of the minimum
5 Bell, Hart et al. (2000) stress the role of unpaid overtime, however.re-
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of two variables. Appendix C shows that it is also applicable for the maximum of two variables.
Assuming again that observed hours correspond to the maximum of actual and standard hours and
assuming that relative hours are lognormajjy distributed with standard deviation o, the aggregate
observed relative hours are given by
# = (1 • //**)< > //. 0 < £ < 1 (3.2)
For small values of o, the parameter £ roughly corresponds to 0.6O. To mimic the example of 5
hours observed overtime in equilibrium, £ should be 0.17, implying a rather large standard deviation
of O = 0.29 for relative hours.
In Dutch manufacturing, the average observed relative overtime for the period 1960-1994 was
only 0.03. This would correspond to zero actual overtime hours for £ 0.043 or o 0.07.
Although I am not aware of any evidence in this respect, this standard deviation does not seem
unreasonably high. So even if small amounts of overtime are observed, this could be attributed to
measurement errors, as undertime is typically not reported (paid hours often corresponding to
standard hours in such cases). Hence one should be careful with predictions based on models
assuming that overtime is a structural phenomenon.
3.3 OVERTIME AND ABSENTEEISM
Ignoring the measurement issues, this section develops a model which allows for the possibility of
structural overtime. The model serves as a benchmark for further discussion. There are two lines of
research that are combined in my model. First, there are papers that focus on the employment
effects of work-sharing policies if overtime is allowed for, as in Calmfors and Hoel (1988), Hart
(1984b) or Hunt (1999). Second, Ehrenberg (1970) is the classic reference for the impact of
absenteeism on overtime.* Although their focus is different, the basic set-up of these models is rather
similar. Overtime is determined by firms to minimise costs and workers are always prepared to work
overtime.
Compared to the first class of models, the main contribution of this section is to include
absenteeism in the analysis. Moreover, I take a long-run perspective, allowing the capital stock to
adjust. This is also the main difference with Ehrenberg (1970). Such a long-run perspective may
seem odd in an analysis of overtime, but the model presented here is one of structural overtime,
typically based on relative cost considerations. The next section will introduce short-run demand
fluctuations.
6 Brown and Sessions (1996) provide a survey of the economics of absenteeism, most of which is
related to labour supply considerations.46 Chapter 3
Chapter 2 stressed the importance of incorporating the impact of hours worked on capital
services. Calmfors and Hoel (1988) is one of the few papers analysing overtime that includes this
possibility. Nevertheless, they keep the capital stock fixed. As a consequence optimal working time
is no longer independent of scale, but varies with output/ To focus on the structural determinants I
take a long-run perspective in this section and allow the capital stock to adjust. As a consequence
optimal hours arc independent of scale, which allows me to consider acost minimising framework.'
3J.I The model
The production function is a variant of the production function of Chapter 2. First of all, I confine
myself to the case where capital services and labour services are affected in the same manner by the
duration of operations." Second, following Mart and McGregor (1988), I allow for a distinction
between normal and actual hours in efficiency hours. The idea is that overtime hours may be more or
less productive than normal hours. A temporary increase in hours worked more overtime may
have different effects on hourly producti vity than a permanent reduction in normal hours. An increase
in overtime may, for example, induce workers to provide more effort.'" Alternatively, workers may
have different work attitudes towards standard hours and non-standard hours. To incorporate this,
efficiency hours are modelled as t?(// ')/P, where //* is the exogenous standard working time, //is
actual hours worked and # = /////" denotes relative hours. This specification may be viewed as a
log-linear Taylor approximation of efficiency hours e(//) around normal hours //". In that case the
parameter y corresponds to the elasticity of efficiency hours at standard hours iy, and may vary
with the length of the standard workweek. Figure 3.4 illustrates this interpretation, where an increase
in overtime is more productive than the same increase in standard hours.
Although the previous section illustrates that it is important to distinguish between overtime
incidence and overtime hours per operative, this is beyond the scope of this chapter. Kalwij and
Gregory (2000) and Trejo (1993) include this distinction in their empirical analysis, but I am not
aware of any theoretical model dealing with this distinction. Therefore, I follow the literature
7 See also Chapter 2. the exception is a Cobb-Douglas production function.
8 See also Chapter 2, the exception is a Cobb-Douglas production function.
9 So K •= I in terms of Chapter 2.
10 Recently. Basu, Fremald et al. (2001) and Galeotti, Maccini ct al. (2002) have used observed hours
to eliminate unobscrvablc effort from their model. Following Basu and Kimball (1997), they used
the insight that a cost minimising firm operates on all margins simultaneously, implying a positive
relationship between the observable hours and unobscrvable utilisation variables such as effort. As
a result, the observed elasticity also captures variations in effort.Overtime 47
Figure 3.4 Overtime and efficiency hours
assuming that all workers work the same number of hours.'' However, for exogenous reasons such
as illness some workers may be absent. Only a fraction >4 of the workforce /V is available for the
productive process. Finally, I allow forteamwork effects in the specification of labour services. 'I"he
key characteristic of teamwork is that the productivity of a worker is enhanced by the working hours
of its colleagues, see Alchian and Demsetz (1972). I analyse the corresponding labour services
function in Appendix D. Teamwork effects lead to increasing returns of attendance /4.'^
Combining all this, the production function is given by
0<tsl,0<Y<l (3.3)
where £? is output, N is the number of workers, £ = /WV is the capital-labour ratio, £ is the capital
stock and 0 < ,4 < 1 is the exogenous attendance rate of the workers. Combining capital A" and
labour JV, the instantaneous output isy(£) per worker. This function^*) summarises the technology
in terms of the stocks: it has positive but decreasing marginal productivities, so/'(£) < 0 </(£) <
X^V^, and the corresponding substitution elasticity between capital and labour O is assumed not to
exceed one.
Output also depends on the duration of operations and attendance of the workers. The first
aspect is captured by efficiency hours e(//")/T* , whereas the second is incorporated by the term
11 In simple models with homogeneous workers this also appears to be the optimal strategy for firms:
teamwork effects and increasing overtime premiums provide an incentive to spread overtime hours
over the workforce. If workers have heterogenous preferences an offsetting effect will be that
overtime premiums also have to increase with overtime incidence, as more workers have to be
lured into overtime.
12 Additionally, heterogeneity of hours worked by attending workers reduces labour services when
teamwork is important.4« Chapter 3
/4"*. The parameter X captures teamwork effects: the lower this parameter, the more important
teamwork is; teamwork is absent for t I. Although in the long run output is proportional to the
workforce, teamwork effects may lead to increasing returns of attendance-4. Notice, however, that
the production is of the putty-clay type, as the capital-labour ratio is fixed independent of the
attendance rate. So absenteeism also leads to idle capital in the production function (3.3).
The cost structure generalises Calmfors and Moel (1988) and Ehrenberg (1970), and is also an
extension of Chapter 2. Total costs C are given by
p • Ä*. (3.4)
with
o(/y) * //.«(I) l,o'(/})>0. o'(fl)£1 for//£l.o"(//) * 0, (3.5)
where # is the given user cost of capital. Fare the quasi-fixed costs per worker, ff is the normal
hourly wage cost and p is the replacement rate for absent workers. The fixed costs per worker K
are independent of attendance and working time. Standard hours are paid according to the basic
hour/y wage rate #'. Contrary to fchrenberg ^ f 970), absent workers get a fraction p of the normaf
compensation W7A. This reflects the Dutch institutions, where firms must continue to pay at least
70% of the salary of sick employees during the first year of sickness (and collective agreements may
even stipulate payment of the full salary). These sickness benefits increase the fixed costs per
worker.
The compensation schedule o(fl) summarises the relation between relative hours worked and
their remuneration. Deardorff and Stafford (1976) have shown that, if the compensation schedule is
to compensate for the disutility of hours worked, the average wage rate should be roughly U-
shaped. This condition is met in (3.5), the minimum occurring at standard hours //. Their argument is
essentially based on the assumption that the labour market can be characterised as a spot market,
where firms always have to provide the outside reservation utility for their workers. The
corresponding properties of the compensation schedule are derived in Appendix E: the
compensation schedule should be increasing and convex in relative hours.
An alternative and perhaps more reasonable assumption might be that the labour market is
characterised by implicit contracts. In Appendix EI also develop the implications of this assumption.
Very definite results can not be obtained, although the slope of the compensation schedule is smaller
in implicit contract models compared to the spot market model.
The compensation schedule may also reflect institutional aspects, as legislation in many countries
imposes premium pay for overtime. These legislated overtime premiums are typically in the order of
25 to 50%, see OECD (1998). The Netherlands is one of the few exceptions, with no legislated
overtime premium. Some rough calculations based on observed overtime for Dutch manufacturingOvertime
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give an average overtime premium of 0.24 for the period 1985-1997. This is in line with the more
elaborated estimates by Hart and Ruffell (1993) for the unregulated British industries, lhe existence
of (legislated) overtime premiums suggests that the compensation schedule may be kinked at
standard hours. As a consequence the compensation schedule o(//) may not be differentiate for //
= 1, although it remains continuous.
To incorporate these various possibilities I use the following parameterisation of the
compensation schedule (3.5)
„ax 1+ „•
l ^ 6, <; 0 s 0„, n (3.6)
It encompasses a number of alternative specifications. For p. = 0, it results in a piece^-wiae line<u
specification, where 0„ is the overtime premium and 0, the undertime premium. When 6, = 0,
undertime payment per hour is just the normal hourly wage, but when 6, I, undertime always
leads to full payment of the normal nours. Figure 3.5, panel (a), illustrates the intermediate case,
where - 1< 0, < 0. This could correspond, for example, to the short-time regime mentioned earlier,
where firms may reduce their wage bill, although not proportionally.
Figure 3.5, panel (b), illustrates tht smooth case where ^ > 0 = 0„ = 0,. Apart from the absence
of the kink, it looks rather similar: undertime reduces the compensation, although less than
proportional, and overtime commanc. t. premium. An important difference, however, is that it leadsSO Chapter 3
to an increasing overtime premium." Hart and Ruffell (1993) and Hart, Malley et al. (1996)
conclude that there is little empirical evidence for increasing overtime premiums as a function of
overtime hours. Equation (3.6) combines both panels. Concentrating on overtime, Toedter (1988)
for example, considered the case 6„ = }i > 0.
Minimising the costs (3.4) at given output with respect to capital /T, labour A'and (relative) hours #
gives the production constraint (3.3) and the first-order conditions
-Ä * , (3.7)
TA*> , ^^W forÄM, (3.8a)
for//= l.(3.8b)
Equation (3.7) equates the marginal rate of substitution between capital and labour to the ratio of
their costs. Equation (3.8a) gives an interior solution for hours and basically equates the marginal rate
of substitution between hours and workers to the ratio of their marginal costs, compare (2.10) in
Chapter 2. Equation (3.8b) allows for a corner solution at standard hours, see Bodo and Giannini
(1995) and Calmfors and Hoel (1988).
Let T^denote the elasticity of/(*) with respect to *, then (3.7) implies that r/is also equal to the
share of capital costs in total costs. Moreover, 1 f/ corresponds to the elasticity of output with
respect to the number of workers. The second-order condition for an interior solution can now be
written as
(3.9)
see Appendix F. It restricts the elasticity of (relative) working time in the production function. For |i
= 0 it corresponds to the second-order condition for hours demand derived in Section 2.4. When
the compensation schedule in strictly convex, |i > 0, the elasticity of efficiency hours may be larger,
as the increase in productivity is offset by higher marginal costs.
13 The overtime premium 0 corresponds to 6 = —^— .
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3J.2 Interior solution
First consider the interior solution given by (3.7) and (3.8a) for a given premium rate 6.'* Jointly
these equations determine the optimal capital-labour ratio and (relative) hours independent of output.
There are basically three (sets of) determinants: first, r = Ä/(,4fW) the capital costs relative to
normal remuneration of attending workers; second, v s [K+pff/f (1 -y<)]/(/< W'W) the total fixed
costs per worker relative to normal remuneration of attending workers; and third, the parameters of
the compensation schedule 6 and p..
The comparative statics are derived in Appendix F. Focussing on relative working time, the
solution is of the type
#,= A(v, r.e.n), (3.10)
where the subscript c refers to the solution under certainty and where the signs of the partial
derivatives are given below the variables. The impact of the first two variables is the same as for
hours demand in Chapter 2. As expected, fixed labour costs increase the demand for hours, see e.g.
Hart (1984b). The impact of capital costs is due to the assumption that working hours also aflect
capital services, but the effect disappears for the Cobb-Douglas case. The premium 0 reduces
relative hours, as it increases the marginal costs of the intensive margin (hours) more than the
marginal costs of the extensive margin (workers), see e.g. Calmfors and Hoel (1988) and Trejo
(1993). Finally, the impact of |i depends on the size of relative hours: if overtime prevails, hours are
reduced; but when undertime is relevant, hours worked increase. In both cases deviations from
standard hours become more expensive.
Using the definitions of v and r, the following results can be derived: ö/09p > 0, d/#3/4 < 0 and
ö/#ö/f '< 0. The sickness replacement rate p adds to the fixed costs per worker and therefore
increases hours. Increased attendance ,4, or in other words lower absenteeism, reduces hours. The
impact occurs through a reduction of relative fixed costs v, as in Ehrenberg (1970), and a reduction
in relative capital costs r. A reduction in standards hours /f operates through the same channels: as
it reduces normal remuneration, v and r increase and as a consequence relative hours increase.
The impact of reduced standard hours on actual hours is less than proportional, as relative hours
increase. In general the sign is ambiguous and depends on the parameter constellation, see Appendix
F for details. For p, = p = 0 and 0 = 0„ > 0, as in Calmfors and Hoel (1988), Hart (1984b) or
Hunt (1999), hours worked increase. A more convex compensation schedule, |i > 0 as in Toedter
14 This could be either 6„ or 0„ depending on the prevalent regime. The determination of the regime
is discussed in the next sub-section.52 Chapter 3
{1988), or a higher sickness replacement rate p, may lead to a reduction in hours per worker." For
reasonable parameter values, however, the adverse effect through the overtime premium rate 0„ is
most likely to dominate.
3.3.3 Corner solution
It remains to be determined under what conditions the interior solution (3.10) applies and when the
corner solution £ =• I is relevant. Define ^ = A(v. r, 0„, jl) and //,- A(v, r, 6,. |i). as the
solutions at given overtime and undertime premium, respectively. Then // « // asd/ifäS <0and
0, • ö„. Moreover. //^ (//^) is only relevant as long as //^ > I (//^ 1. respectively). This is most
easily expressed in terms of the premium 8.1-et 6, correspond to the virtual premium that equates
actual and standard hours in (3.10). so 8< is implicitly defined by A(v, r. 6,- ^) " 1 • As the right-
hand side of equation (3.8a) is zero for 0 = - I, the virtual premium 8, exceeds I. Because
relative hours arc decreasing in the premium rate, overtime (undertime) is only relevant as long as 0„
< 0, (0, < 0„ respectively)."' For intermediate values of 0,, the comer solution W 1 applies.
Figure 3.6 illustrates: the regime depends on the value of the virtual premium 0,, relative to the
overtime ami undertime premiums 0,, and 0,. Indeed, it is easily checked that the condition 0, £ 0«.
£ 0„ corresponds to(3.8b). So the full solution for relative hours is given by the following equation
// = //,= *(v,r,e,ii) for 6, <6,,
= 1 for 6, s 9, * 6^, (3.11)
= //„= *(v,r,e„,|i) for 6„ <; 6,.
The likelihood of the corner solution thus depends on the spread of the overtime and undertime
premiums. To get a rough idea of the size of 0,., use equation (3.8a). For 0 = 0,., the solution is # =
1. Using the compensation schedule (3.6) and evaluating at #= 1, condition (3.8a) can be written
as y/( I" HO ~ (I +0rV( 1 + v). Using the parameter values of Chapter 2, we roughly have Y ~ ' ~ */
= 0.7 and F/(W7/) = 0.2." Dutch absenteeism is currently about 5%, so ,4 = 0.95. The Dutch
sickness replacement rate is at least 70%, so p = 0.7. These values give 0,. = 0.25, which is about
the same as the mean overtime premium mentioned earlier. Small variations in the calibrated
parameters may lead to 0, < 0„. Accordingly, the comer solution is not merely a curiosity, but may
15 Hours worked also fall for 0 = 6, < 0, that is when undertime prevails.
16 For the overtime regime // > I, or A(v, r. 0„. }l) > 1 = A(v, r, 6^. H). As dA/c>6 < 0. this implies 0
17 In Chapter 2 the share of fixed labour costs in total labour costs <p, = K/( K+ W7f) was calibrated at
0.2. implying WWW = 0.25. If correctly measured, (p, includes payment for hours not worked, such











Figure 3.6 Overtime premium and corner solution
well be relevant for reasonable parameter values.
The virtual premium 0, is positively related to vand r. As a consequence, it depends negatively
on standard hours // and the attendance rate /<. Thus reduced standard hours and higher
absenteeism increase the likelihood of structural overtime.
3.4 UNCERTAINTY
Ehrenberg (1970, p. 357) concluded that "/7 /s «or a/ways //je s/oc/ias/Zc «c/fi/re o/a/wen/emm
WA/C/J /s r&spons/A/e /or /«crease*/ over//>we /io«r.v". In this section I come to a different
conclusion, and I will show that stochastic demand and stochastic absenteeism can indeed lead to
increased overtime per worker. This corrects two flaws in Ehrenberg's analysis: first, he looked at
hours conditional upon average absenteeism; second, he ignored the possibility of undertime at low
absenteeism rates.
The only difference with the previous section is that demand and attendance are assumed to be
stochastic. Notice that Ehrenberg only considered the latter. Let <y > 0 denote the stochastic
demand, with probability density functiong(g) and expected value £> = £(<?). Similarly, let 0 <a £ 1
denote the random attendance rate, with probability density function/?(a) and expected valued =
£(a) < 1. For simplicity, attendance and demand are assumed to be independently distributed.
The timing in this stochastic framework is as follows: the firm chooses the capital stock and the
number of workers before the realisations are observed; then the realisations of the stochastic
variables are observed and hours worked are to satisfy the production function. Accordingly, the
corner solution of the certainty case is unlikely to be observed: even if firms would aim at normal
hours on average, hours actually worked depend on the state of the world.
Using equation (3.3) hours worked are given by c/ = a''VV/(yt)e(/y)//* . Define^ = c/a "* and
), then the production function can be written succinctly as
(3.12)34 Chapter 3
The problem for the firm is to minimise its expected costs with respect to capital £ and labour W.
Using the expression for the costs in (3.4) and using the definitions of* and >^ expected costs can
be expressed as
£(O
Minimising with respect to the transformed variables * and jv> the first-order conditions under
uncertainty can be rearranged as
/'(*)
p »W'(1 - /<) •
(3.13)
The second-order condition is again y < Y*- ^h^ interpretation of (3.13) and (3.14) is similarto the
first-order conditions (3.7) and (3.8a) under certainty: marginal rates of substitution are equated to
the ratio of expected marginal costs. Equation (3.13) considers capital and labour, whereas (3.14)
describes the choice between the intensive and extensive margins of labour.
In the next paragraphs I will argue that the solution for expected hours is given by
£(£) = Ö*(v + A„,r,e„,|i). (3.15)
The parameters 6», A„ and 8, identify the impact of uncertainty on expected relative hours.
In Appendix F it is shown that the expected values can be expressed as
^'*''^] + ^-^ + A.^ (3.16)
1 + ji 1 + u,
and
£[«io'(Ä)Ä| = O + e^aO^***], (3.17)
where A. > 0 and the virtual premium 6„ is a weighted average of the overtime and undertime
premiums 6, and 0,,, satisfying 6, < 0. < 0„. Strict inequalities apply for 0, < 0„.
Given these expressions for the expectations, the first-order conditions (3.13) and (3.14) jointly
determine /t and >'„. Using the compensation schedule (3.6) and comparing with the first-orderOvertime 55
conditions (3.7) and (3.8a) under certainty, the equations have the same structure, but with 0. as the
relevant premium, {£[a(y/v,/' ***^ ]A4} '*'*•** as the argument of the compensation schedule «(')
and v + A, as the fixed costs per worker. As a consequence, the interior solution (3.10) of the
certainty case can also be used to solve (3.13) and (3.14). More specifically, the solution is
characterised by
(3.18)
As 6. and A„ depend ony„ this is an implicit equation
Using the production function (3.12) expected hours also depend on y», as E(W) £Ky/y
Ehrenberg (1970), on the other hand, considered the solution tf, = [0d ' "*/yj"* [£(yyyj"*.
i.e. hours worked conditional on the expected values. Due to the decreasing returns to hours (y <
1), >>"* is a convex function. Jensen's inequality then implies £(#) > //^, and Bhrenberg
underestimated expected hours under uncertainty.
Combining the expression for expected hours with the implicit solution (3.18) for>»„ the solution
under uncertainty can finally be written as equation (3.15), where"
The parameters 0„ A„ and 6, identify the impact of uncertainty on expected relative hours, but each
is related to a different channel.
The virtual premium rate 0„ is due to the kink in the compensation schedule. Due to stochastic
fluctuations in demand or attendance, sometimes overtime will prevail and sometimes undertime. As
the undertime premium is lower than the overtime premium, the average premium is reduced to 6„.
The result is an increase in relative hours.
The kink in the compensation schedule also leads to A„ > 0. The consequence is that, for a given
premium rate 0„ the expected marginal costs of the extensive margin - the number of workers - is
increased relative to the expected marginal costs of the intensive margin - the number of hours. This
leads to a substitution effect towards more hours and less workers.
The two effects of the kink in the compensation schedule thus work in the same direction. In
Appendix F it is shown that //^ ^ /J(V+A„ r, 0„ |i) ^ i/^, so relative hours increase compared to
18 Evaluating at the expected values, as in Ehrenberg's analysis, the result would be
< min (1,6).56 Chapter 3
the certainty overtime case ^, but decrease relative to undertime Ä,. These two effects are absent
in Khrenberg (1970), as he ignored the possibility of undertime, implicitly assuming 6, = 6„ > 0.
The parameter 6 captures the effects of uncertainty that do not operate through the overtime
premium. Demand uncertainty tends to reduce expected hours (6 < 1), at least when the
compensation schedule is strictly convex (^1 > 0)." To reduce the risk of increasingly high marginal
overtime costs in a boom, employment is expanded beyond the certainty level. This reduces
expected hours relative to the solution /»(v* A„ r, 0^ |i). However, as the empirical evidence in
favour of an increasing overtime premium is thin, this effect is likely to be small.
Next, consider the impact of a stochastic attendance rate u, but a certain level of demand ^ = £>.
This is the case considered by Mhrenbcrg (1970). Using Jensen's inequality twice, the result is 1 < 6,
see Appendix P. Beside the effect mentioned for demand uncertainty, there is another effect, as the
attendance rate directly influences the relative marginal costs of the intensive and extensive margins.
As elaborated in !• hrenberg (1970), the corresponding substitution effect increases the number of
workers and reduces hours. Simultaneously, however, expected hours increase as they are a convex
function of attendance, due to diminishing returns to hours and teamwork effects. The net effect is
uncertain. Khrcnberg showed that the first efTect dominates at expected attendance (6. < 1). The
results here illustrate that the latter efTect dominates for expected hours (Ö > 1), however.
Summarising, random fluctuations in absenteeism (and demand) increase overtime above the
certainty absentee level /^. So if structural overtime is observed in the certainty case (6,. > 0„),
expected hours under random absenteeism will even be higher. If the corner solution without
overtime prevails under certainty (0, ^ 0, ^ 0„), the comparison is less clear cut. however. There
are opposing effects: through the impact of 6 and A„ expected overtime increases, but the expected
premium 0„ reduces expected overtime. As long as 0, ^ 0„ expected overtime is unambiguously
positive, but for lower values of 0, the impact is uncertain. This is also the case if structural
undertime would prevail under certainty (0, < 0,): the increase in premium from 0^ to 0„ reduces
expected hours; this is partially compensated by the higher fixed costs A„; but again, 6 increases
expected hours. However, at expected demand and absenteeism hours worked decrease (as ö„ <
1).
3.5 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
To conclude, this section gives an empirical analysis of the determinants of observed relative hours in
Dutch manufacturing. The annual data cover the period 1960-1994 and are the same as used in
Figures 3.2 and 3.3. Details are provided in Appendix G.
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The idea is to estimate a reduced form equation for relative hours. In such a reduced form, the
estimated parameters cannot directly be linked to underlying structural parameters of. for example,
the production function or the compensation schedule. Therefore. I do not use a non-linear method
to correct for measurement errors in observed hours."" Observed overtime data are corrected for
short-time hours, however.
The models of the previous sections identify the main determinants of relative hours. The
structural effects occur through v, r and 0. Beside absenteeism r = 1 -.4 and standard hours Af",
quasi-fixed costs are the most important determinant of the relative labour costs v. I experimented
with three crude indicators. Surveys on the structure of labour costs provide information on the
mark-up on hourly wages to arrive at total labour costs per hour. As this mark-up also includes
social security premiums, I also used the mark-up elements related only to hours not worked.
Finally, in the same line but from another source. I used the share of holidays in potential working
days. Unfortunately, neither variable was found to have any significant impact on relative hours.*' To
the best of my knowledge, there is no time series evidence available for the overtime premium.
Probably it is best considered as being rather constant over time. Finally, to account for the variable
r, I tried to include the price of investment goods, relative to the wage costs per worker, and the real
interest rate, but without any success. So, given the usual difficulties in measuring user costs of
capital, these variables were further ignored in the analysis.
The model under uncertainty stressed the role of fluctuations in demand and attendance. The first
is captured by (variations in) the utilisation rate 0, the second by (variations in) the rate of
absenteeism. As argued above, the latter may also capture structural effects.
From the interrelated factor demand literature, see Nadiri and Rosen (1969) and Hart and Sharot
(1978), it is well known that hours may respond to slow adjustment of employment. To allow for
such an effect, I tried to include a labour market tightness variable in the overtime equation. Figure
3.2 indeed showed a positive correlation between vacancy duration and relative hours. Although
there was some weak evidence that vacancy rates or vacancy durations affect overtime, the effect
was never significant. Apparently the correlation in Figure 3.2 is due to the cycl ical behaviour of both
variables, represented by the utilisation rate in the estimated equation.
20 However, if measurement errors are important as suggested in Section 3.2, the estimated
elasticities underestimate the corresponding elasticities of actual hours.
21 In de Regt (1988) I found some influence for the total mark-up. The sign, however, varied
































As Bodo and Giannini (1995) I used a log-linear specification, except for the rate of absenteeism z.
As a consequence, the endogenous variable A*, using small letters to denote natural logarithms, is
approximately equal to relative overtime.'" Therefore. I label it as an overtime equation.
To allow for dynamics and slow adjustment, first lag's of each variable were included." The
resulting equation can be written as an error-correction specification, identifying the short-run
dynamics and the long-run solution. Such an error-correction mechanism is only warranted if the
variables are non-stationary and cointegrated, see Engle and Granger (1987). Table 3.3 gives the
time series properties of the data, using augmented Dickey-Fuller tests. All variables appear to be
non-stationary, including relative hours, the utilisation rate and absenteeism. First-differencing yields
stationary variables, however, so the variables seem to be I( 1).
To cope with the potential endogeneity of the current explanatory variables, the equation was
estimated by instrumental variables." For the utilisation rate, it is clear that high overtime may lead to
high measured utilisation. As variations in the utilisation rate are meant to capture demand
fluctuations, the change in world trade is used as an instrument. For absenteeism. Brown and
Sessions (1996) have documented that structural overtime may lead to increased absenteeism.
Recently, Yaniv (1995) has incorporated this in a theoretical labour demand model via burn-out
problems. To deal with potential endogeneity of the current increase in absenteeism, it is
instrumented by its own lag.
22 As. A = In//Zff'= h
23 Second lag's were not significant, neither jointly nor separately.
24 The OLS estimates do not differ much, however.Overtime 59
Table 3.4 presents the final estimation results. Insignificant variables have all been omitted. This
also applies for standard hours. There was no evidence whatsoever that relative hours are influenced
by standard hours. The p-val ues of omitting this variable (current, lagged or its first difference) were
never below 0.5, independently of the additional variables included. The typical estimate for lagged
standard hours was a highly insignificant small positive coefficient of about 0.01, whereas the theory
would predict a negative impact. This suggests that at a structural level, the corner solution is most
relevant. Corroborating evidence is the fact that no influence could be found for any of the indicators
of quasi-fixed labour costs.
The only significant determinants of relative overtime appear to be the utilisation rate and
absenteeism. In the short run, both have a positive impact on overtime. This is consistent with the
short-run production function (3.12). An unexpected result may be the rather small elasticity of
changes in the utilisation rate, both compared to the Italian estimate of 0.38 by Bodo and Giannini
(1995) and compared to the large impact of absenteeism. Besides measurement errors in observed
hours, this may be due to the measurement of utilisation: rather large variations in demand may lead
to relatively small changes in the utilisation rate.
Turning to the long-run impact of utilisation and absenteeism, column (1) of Table 3.4 suggests at
first sight that the lagged levels of these variables are not significant. Jointly they are significant,
however. In the columns (2) and (3) one of them is omitted and then the other turns out to he
significant. Encompassing tests in PcGive comparing the specifications (3) and (2) do not reject one
model in favour of the other. For example, both models are acceptable against the joint model (1),
although the p-value for model (3) is much lower than for model (2) (0.167 and 0.770,
respectively), reflecting the lower residual sum of squares in (2). The misspecification tests reported
in the table neither allow for discrimination between the two models, although first-order
autocorrelation could be a more serious problem in column (2). To provide some weak evidence on
the cointegration of the variables, I also computed Dickey-Fuller tests on the equilibrium correction
mechanism. Except for column (2), which is only significant at the 10% level, they confirm that the
variables are cointegrated.
First, consider specification (2), removing the utilisation rate from the long-run solution. As in
specification (1), absenteeism turns out to have the wrong sign in the long run. Both from a
production function perspective and from the structural model, absenteeism and overtime are
expected to be positively correlated. A possible explanation for the observed negative sign could be
another measurement error in overtime hours: if actual hours are calculated as total worker-hours
divided by the number of workers, instead of dividing it by the workers in attendance, measured
overtime would be negatively related to absenteeism. This should then also be the case in the short













































































a. Standard errors between parentheses.
b. Potential endogenous variable: the instruments used are A A,_,, Ar,.,,
A.v, and Ar,.,, where A* is the growth rate of world trade.
c. DW is the Durbin-Watson statistic; Ö is the equation standard error;
RSS is the residual sum of squares: LMA is a Lagrange multiplier test
for first-order residual autocorrelation; ARCH is a LM-test for first-
order autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity: HET is a White
test for heteroscedasticity; NORM is PcGive's normality test of the
residuals. CDF is an Dickey-Fuller test without trend for non-
stationarity of the cointegrating vector. Significance levels test
statistics: • at 5% and •• at 1%.Overtime 61
In view of the wrong sign and the lower significance of the CDF statistic of column (2), my
preferred specification is (3), removing absenteeism from the long-run solution. The long-run
elasticity of relative hours with respect to the utilisation rate is 0.13 (-• 0.068/0.519) and thus rather
similar to the short-run impact. For the Italian case Bodo and Giannini (1995) also found a
permanent effect of utilisation on relative hours, but with a higher elasticity of 0.28. Although
plausible at first sight, it could be argued that this long-run relation is not in line with the prediction of
the theoretical model, where hours are independent of scale. Hence a permanent increase in demand
would be accompanied by an increase in employment (the number of workers) and the capital
stock, but not in hours. Insofar as variations in the utilisation rate reflect such increases in demand,
no corresponding increase in relative hours should thus be expected. On the other hand, adjustment
of the capital stock may take quite a long time, and in the mean time short-run demand for hours
would depend on demand shocks.
All in all. the number of explanatory variables is rather limited, only absenteeism and demand
appear in Table 3.4. So the link with the theoretical model is at best rather week. The observation
that hours worked are proportional to standard hours and that mainly temporary factors such as
variations in absenteeism and demand determine the pattern of overtime, can be seen as evidence
that the corner solution prevails in many situations. A lternatively, one could argue that this is a result
of other omitted variables, like relative prices. Further research in this respect is needed.
3.6 CONCLUSION
The objective of this chapter was to investigate the impact of weekly standard working time on
weekly actual hours per worker. The theoretical analysis under certainty showed that if overtime is
worked, actual hours respond less than proportionally. By definition they are proportional in a
corner solution, and work-sharing policies reduce the probability of such a corner solution. From an
empirical point of view, the relevance of corner solutions is illustrated by the low incidence of
overtime. Moreover, I have argued that due to measurement errors, observed overtime data may
well overstate actual overtime. Models starting from the assumption that overtime is the dominant
regime, may thus give misleading predictions.
Instead of being induced by structural cost minimising factors, overtime may also result from
variations in demand and attendance. Indeed the theoretical analysis illustrated that the stochastic
nature of attendance, and to a lesser extent the stochastic nature of demand, increases average
(overtime) hours.
The empirical analysis confirmed the importance of the utilisation rate and absenteeism forthe
determination of relative overtime. No evidence was found for other structural determinants, such as
the structure of labour costs and standard hours. In other words, at least in Dutch manufacturing,62 Chapter 3
actual hours appear to be fully proportional to standard hours. As a consequence, it is reasonable to
ignore overtime in the remaining chapters of this thesis.
Further research is needed, however. From a theoretical point of view, it seems important to
incorporate limited overtime incidence in labour demand models. Similarly, the distinction between
overtime incidence and overtime hours is important for empirical analysis. So there is a need for
more comprehensive data, This may also shed more light on the relation between overtime and
absenteeism.4 Shiftwork, Operating Time and
Working Time
4.1 INTRODUCTION
The maintained hypothesis of the previous two chapters was that the capital operating time
correspondes to the working time of workers. Hence any reduction of working time is matched by a
corresponding decrease in the operating time of machinery, worsening the capacity constraints of
firms. In an international comparative study Anxo and Taddei (1995) conclude, however, that for the
last thirty years the capital operating time in manufacturing industry remained more or less constant
despite the reduction in hours of work. For the USA, Foss( 1997) found that manufacturing plants
where operating 25% more hours per week in 1976 than in 1929 and increased by another 4% until
1988. The main factor behind the diverging behaviour of working and operating times is the
increased incidence of shiftwork. For Europe, Evans, Lippoldt et al. (2001) present some evidence
for an increase in shiftwork during the 1980s and the 1990s.
For the Dutch manufacturing sector a similar pattern can be observed. Table 4.1 provides the
incidence of shiftwork for selected years since the sixties: it increased from 10% in the sixties to
almost 18% in the eighties, although it seems to have levelled off a bit during the nineties. The
increased shiftwork incidence occurred both for the discontinuous 2-shift system and for the
continuous 4- or 5-shift system. The semi-continuous 3-shift system remained roughly constant,
however.
In general there is almost no direct evidence available on the capital operating time. Bosworth
and Cette (1995) discuss the measurement issues of the operating time. Although they suggest that it
may be prudent to work with more than one statistical measure, they conclude that shiftwork based
indicators seem to offer the broadest scope. Table 4.2 illustrates the effect of the increased shiftwork
incidence on the weekly capital operating time, using an arithmetic average over the various shifts.'
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Figure 4.1 Operating time and working time in Dutch
manufacturing
Even though the normal working time declined with more than five hours per week, the operating
time remained more or less constant at 52 hours a week. As a consequence, shiftwork intensity -
defined as the ratio between operating time and normal working time - increased from around 1.2
to 1.35. Figure4.1 provides a graphical illustration of these trends inoperating and working times.
This provides corroborating evidence for the near stationarity of operating times found by Anxo and
Taddei(1995).
Compared to the results presented in Anxo and Taddei (1995), the Dutch manufacturing
operating time is at the lower end of the spectrum. For France and Germany the weekly operating
time seems to be around 60 hours, whereas they report values of around 80 hours for the United
States. The levels of the operating times presented should be viewed with care, however, see
Bosworth and Cette (1995). For example, the results presented in Table 4.2 may be biased for at
least two reasons. On the one hand, it is assumed in the calculation that tli: working time is
independent of the shiftwork system. However, scattered evidence suggests that workers working in
shifts have shorter workweeks, compared to their colleagues working only regular hours. This
provides an upward bias of the operating time. On the other hand, the shiftwork incidence data of
Table 4.1 may not cover all situations where operating time exceeds the normal working time of
workers. For example, part-time employment might be used to lengthen the operating time beyond
the working time of regular workers. The use of flexible labour might work in the same direction.*
More important perhaps, is the use of partial shifts. Consider, for example, a firm where workers
2 Evans, Lippoldt et al. (2001), for example, provide some evidence that the incidence of so-called
'unsocial working hours' has increased during the 1990s.66 Chapter 4
work 36 hours in a compressed workweek, divided in 4 days of nine hours. The operating time can
easily be equal to 36,45, 54 or even 63 hours a week, simply by extending the number of days in
operation and varying the days in attendance over the workforce. For instance, suppose that capital
stock is operated for 6 days a week: the weekly operating time equals 54 hours a week, and every
day only 2/3 (= 36/54) of the total number of workers is present. This type of job rotation or partial
shifts is unlikely to be covered by shiftwork incidence data, and hence the operating time of Table
4.2 may be biased downward.'
The above obscrvat ions on the stationarity of operating times and increasing shiftwork lead to the
following two questions: what incentives do firms have to change the operating time as a response to
changes in the work ing hours of their workers; and what is the consequence of the adjustment of the
operating time on the demand for labour. These two questions form the core of the current chapter.
They have been discussed before by Calmfors and Hoel (1989), but in a framework with a given
capital stock. When discussing shiftwork, however, it seems important to incorporate capital
adjustment. Shiftwork and the optimal choice of the capital stock are closely related.
Surveys of the literature on capital utilisation and the duration of operations are given by
Bosworth and Heathfield (1995) and Oi (1981). A main theme ofthat literature is that higher
utilisation increases output, but simultaneously raises some of the factor prices.'' Optimal utilisation
rates balance these two opposing forces. This may involve several dimensions. For example,
Betancourt and Clague (1981), Mayshar and Halevy (1997) and Winston (1974) analyse the
(discrete) choice of the number of shifts due to shiftwork premiums. Lucas (1970) and Winston and
McCoy (1974) focus on the timing of operations due to rhythmically varying labour costs, evening-
or night-shifts being more expensive than work during the day. Recently it has been acknowledged
that there may be multiple rhythmically varying prices, the tariff structure of electricity prices being
another example, see Bosworth and Pugh (1985). Another dimension of utilisation is the speed or
intensity of use of capital. Madan (1987) provides an example where the speed influences wear and
tear, and thus raises capital costs.
In the present chapter 1 consider only the duration of operations, and ignore any problem arising
from timing during the day or week. Beside a simplification of the analysis, the main reason is that the
duration depends on the average costs of operating, whereas the timing during the day or week
depends on the rhythmic variations around this mean. A further simplification is that working hours of
labour are assumed to be given exogenously. So, contrary to the previous chapter, firms can not use
3 Indeed, Mayshar and Halevy (1997) provide evidence, based on a survey conducted in 1989 for the
Commission of the European Union, that weekly plant operation in the Netherlands was 74 hours,
compared to an EL) average of 66. Correspondingly, their shiftwork intensity of 1.90 for the
Netherlands (1.69 for the EU) is higher than the numbers reported in Table 4.2.
4 Another theme is the cyclical behaviour of capital operating hours and the implications for labour
productivity, see Dupaigne (1998) and Shapiro (1993) for recent contributions.Shiftwork, Operating Time and Working Time 67
overtime. Nevertheless they can adjust the operating time of machinery by an appropriate choice of
shiftwork.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 presents the specification of the
model. Section 4.3 analyses the short-run behaviour of cost minimising firms, choosing between
employment and shiftwork. Section 4.4 turns to the long-run cost minimisation problem, where the
capital stock is adjusted as well. The next section 4.5 briefly discusses the sensitivity of the numerical
results. Section 4.6 then turns to the problem of profit maximisation in a monopolistic competitive
market. Finally, Section 4.7 concludes with a brief discussion.
4.2 THE MODEL
The model considers a cost minimising firm producing its output £), with capital and labour as its
production factors. Obviously it is important to distinguish between the stocks of capital A.' and
labour N and their services rendered. As argued in Chapter 2, this is done by the incorporation of
the duration of operations, see also Georgescu-Roegen (1970). With shiftwork, however, the capital
operating time £/ no longer corresponds to the working time // of workers. A straightforward
extension of the production function (2.5) in Chapter 2 is the summation over all .9 shifts:
(4.1)
where the subscript 5 refers to the shift (s = 1,..., S) considered, /T, is the capital stock in use during
a shift, JVj is the number of workers being present, in other words the crew size, and ^ is an index of
labour augmenting technological progress.
Essentially the production function (4.1) is additive and separable overtime, as in Lucas (1970),
Mayshar and Halevy (1997) and Winston and McCoy (1974). The technology is characterised by
the instantaneous production function F(), only involving the stocks of capital and labour. This
function is assumed to be linear homogeneous in its arguments. The instantaneous production can be
replicated over time, but is subject to efficiency gains or losses of working time, see Chapter 2.
Therefore output in each shift is multiplied by efficiency hours e,(//,), instead of working time //,.
These efficiency hours might depend on the shift, as for example night shifts can be less productive.
Finally, equation (4.1) is also additive over the number of shifts. Shifts can thus be replicated,
although this may affect efficiency hours.68 Chapter 4
To further simplify the analysis, I focus on symmetric shifts. This implies that within each shift the
full capital stock A' is used, that the crewsize /V, is constant and that each shift has the same duration
//, thus'
MS (4.2)
With respect to efficiency hours it is assumed that shiftwork may shift the whole efficiency hours
curve, but for symmetry reasons, independently of the shift under consideration. Using an iso-elastic
specification, this yields
<?,(>/) = (•(//. 5) = *//)^. (4.3)
On the one hand, when ^1 .• 0 shiftwork negatively affects efficiency hours, for example because
shiftwork implies work at rather unsocial hours, reducing productivity. On the other hand, some
production processes might need longer operation times than the working time of workers. In that
case shiftwork enhances productivity of hours per shift. Therefore the shiftwork productivity
parameter p, can not be signed a /ww/.





is the capital-intensity of the production process. In equation (4.4) the instantaneous production
function is written in its intensive format) = /fyt,l) to reduce notation.
It is tempting to treat the number of shifts 5 as an integer, but that needs not to be so, as the
introductory examples on partial shifts or compressed workweeks illustrate. Therefore, ignoring any
possible discontinuities, I shall simply treat 5as a continuous variable. This is admittedly not the most
accurate or realistic description, but focusses attention on the underlying incentives. Ignoring
maintenance time, the operating time cannot fall below hours worked, so 5 = 1 is the logical lower
5 Mayshar and Halcvy (1997) allow the second shift to be operated by less workers and during a
shorter period than the first shift. This eould be optimal when the costs for the second shift exceed
the costs for the first shift. For example, when hourly wages for the first shift are lower than for the
second shift. Even though the number of shifts may affect the hourly wage in my model, the implicit
assumption is that wages do not vary between shifts. In other words, a night-shift commands the
same wage as a day-shift.Shiftwork, Operating Time and Working Time 09
bound. Finally, the total available time per day, week or month T, sets an upper bound to the
operating time and thus, given the working hours //, to the number of shi fts. Hence, shi ftwork should
satisfy the condition
// <; t/ = S// <; r. (4.6)
Increasing the amount of shiftwork, keeping the capital stock and employment constant, raises
the operating time, reduces the crew size, see equation (4.2) and might affect efficiency hours, see
equation (4.3). Due to the declining marginal productivity of labour, the increase of the operating
time dominates the reduction in crew size for output. So the elasticity of output with respect to
shiftwork in the production function (4.4) is equal to t/- |i, where T/ ^ jfc/*(*)//(A:) corresponds to
the elasticity of the instantaneous production A*) with respect to the capital-intensity, but also to the
elasticity of output with respect to the capital stock.*
Obviously, there are also costs to the use of shiftwork. 1 consider the following specification of
labour costs per worker F + WHic^S), where ff is the normal hourly wage rate and Fare the quasi-
fixed costs per worker, see Chapter 2 for a discussion of the latter. Typically, a larger amount of
shiftwork involves less convenient working hours, or more irregular schedules. The disutility of
shiftwork is likely to be compensated by increased hourly wages; this is modelled by the rising
shiftwork schedule o(5), with 0 < o'(5). For simplicity 1 use the same iso-elastic specification as
Calmfors and Hoel (1989), o(5) = 5^ with 0 < 6 < 1. It implies that a rise in the number of shifts
leads to a less than proportional increase in remuneration. Calmfors and Hoel (1989) argue that this
is consistent with the 'empirics' - this is confirmed in Anxo and Taddei (1995).
Beside labour costs, shiftwork might also affect capital costs. A first possibility is that increased
utilisation, in our case longer operating times, increases the wear and tear of capital, see Basu and
Kimball (1997), Madan (1987) and Oi (1981). Secondly, Hart (1984b) suggested that there may
be hourly operating costs that vary only with working time of workers, but not with the number of
workers. His examples related to the working environment, such as lighting, heating and canteen
facilities. On closer inspection, these costs seem rather related to the operating time, and not to the
average working time. Moreover, even if they do not vary directly with the number of workers, they
are likely to vary with the scale of operations. This scale dependence can perhaps be captured by
the capital stock. To include this possibility, the capital costs per unit of capital are specified as
6 As far as possible, this chapter uses the same notation for elasticities as in Chapter 2. Accordingly
the elasticity of efficiency hours e(//) with respect to hours is denoted by T|'. Moreover, the
elasticity of substitution of the instantaneous production function is o. In line with the observations
in Chapter 2,1 assume that ö < 1.1
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/? + Zf/, where A? is the usual user cost and Z is the variable hourly operating costs per unit of
capital. The latter may well depend on energy prices. Suppose for example that every machine hour
needs a fixed amount of energy, then Zf//f simply reflects these energy costs.*
Combining capital and labour costs, the firm's total cost C is expressed as
C - (K + »WS*) # + (/? + ZLO K. (4.7)
The firm tries to minimise its costs given the output constraint (4.4).
4.3 SHORT-RUN COST MINIMISATION
First consider the short run, where the capital stock is fixed, but the firm can still lengthen its
operating time by using more shifts. This short-run model thus focuses on the choice between
employment and shi ft work. This corresponds to the case considered by Calmfors and Hoel (1989).
The formal cost minimisation problem can be written as
nin C = (K + W-Y/S**)JV + (/? +
subject to (4.4) and (4.6),
so besides the output constraint (4.4), we have to take account of the logical boundaries of the
shiftwork variable in equation (4.6); Table 4.1 suggests that the majority of firms decides not to use
any shiftwork (S 1); whereas a minority chooses to operate on a continuous basis (5 = 77//).
The first-order conditions for a solution are given by
*/(*) -
/(*)-*/(*) S
and the two complementary slackness conditions
7 More generally, instead of including hourly operating costs, we could include energy as a separate
production factor in the production function. Contrary to capital AT and labour .V, however, energy
should be viewed as a flow variable.Shiftwork, Operating Time and Working Time 71
Figure 4.2 Employment and shiftwork
A.„;>0.
(4.9)
The non-negative multipliers A.^ and A.^ are associated with the two inequalities of (4.6).
4J.I Interior solution
Consider the interior solution (A.$=A.^=0) first. This implies shiftwork (5> 1), but not around-the-
clock (5 < 77//). The first-order condition (4.8) reduces to
*/(*) - err/re"'AT •
-*/*(*) s
(4.10)
The left-hand side represents the marginal rate of substitution between employment and shifts, the
right-hand side is the corresponding ratio of factor costs. The marginal costs of shifts in the
numerator consist of two parts, the first part representing the higher shift premium to be paid and the
second part corresponding to the additional hourly operating costs. The marginal costs of
employment obviously includes the fixed costs F.
Since working time is given exogenously in the present analysis, the optimisation problem is the
same as minimising the costs per efficiency hour given the output per efficiency hour. This is
illustrated in Figure 4.2 for an interior solution, see Calmfors and Hoel (1989) for a rather simi lar
graph. The Co-curve is a downward sloping convex isocost curve. It will be steeper the higher the72 Chapta-4 1









shiftwork premium©, the higher the hourly operating costs Zor the lower quasi-fixed labour costs
K l"hc (Ve(//,,)-curve is the isoquant per efficiency hour. It is downward sloping as long as the
adverse productivity effects of shiftwork are sufficiently small (^l < ry). This is assumed to hold, as in
the opposite case there wouldn't be any shiftwork, the left-hand-side of (4.8) being negative. In the
optimum A',, the slopes of both curves should be equal, as stated in equation (4.10).
Obviously this is only the least-cost combination if the isoquant is more convex than the isocost
curve. This is guaranteed by the second-order condition. Appendix H provides a general expression:
it amounts to an upperbound o y for the elasticity of substitution 0 of the instantaneous production
function." It can be shown that the upperbound is always larger than one, hence the second-order
condition is assumed to be fulfilled."
The comparative statics of the model are also derived in Appendix H. It includes rather involved
expressions, therefore I will concentrate on some numerical results. The parameter values of the
model have largely been chosen in line with Chapter 2 and are summarised in Table 4.3. Only the
share of fixed costs (p^ = K/(K+»7/o(^) is reduced from 0.2 to 0.175, as, due to the shiftwork
premium, wage costs should account for a larger part of labour costs. Compared to Chapter 2,
three additional parameters are introduced in the model. First, it is assumed that there is a small
adverse productivity impact of shiftwork (^l = 0.1). Second, the hourly operating costs are assumed
to be relatively small but non-zero, as the share of operating costs in capital costs (p^ = Zt//(Ä+Z£7)
is set equal to 0.05.1 am not aware of any evidence for both parameters. Finally, to allow for an
interior solution, the elasticity of the shiftwork premium is set in accordance with the first-order
condition (4.10). implying a value of 0 ~ 0.32. This is somewhat higher than the value of 0.2
calibrated by Calmfors and Hoel (1989) for Sweden.'" The current value implies that workers
working two, three or four shifts obtain a 25.42 and 56 per cent shift premium, respectively. This is
within the range mentioned by Mayshar and Halevy (1997).
8 For large values of the shiftwork premium 0, the critical value 0^ may be infinite.
9 With the parameter values of Table 4.3 below the second-order condition iso <o„= 1.II3.
10 The other parameters used by Calmfors and Hoel (1989) are iy* = I. o = 0.5, <p, = 0.1 and (p, = |JL
= 0. They set Tf' at the rather low value of 0.153 to satisfy the first-order condition (4.10). Including
non-zero values for H and (f>^ the capital share r)' can be set more realistically in the present
analysis.Shiftwork, Operating Time and Working Time 73































































Table 4.4 provides the numerical comparative static short-run elasticities for the interior solution.
The key results are in the last column and relate to a policy of reduced working time. To get a feeling
for the model, however, 1 first briefly discuss the other columns of the table.
• An increase in output Q shifts the isoquant in Figure 4.2 out towards £>,/e(//,,), and increases
both employment iV and shiftwork 5 along the expansion path £o^"-" Employment increases
more than proportionally due to the declining marginal productivity, although the crew size A//5
increases only slightly.
• Labour augmenting technical progress ^4, shifts the isoquant in Figure 4.2 inward, making it
steeper at the same time. As a consequence employment decreases almost proportional in the
short run and there is only a small reduction in shiftwork.
• Obviously capital costs /? do not matter in the short run, but hourly operating costs Z raise the
marginal costs of shifts and induce a substitution effect towards more employment.
• An increase in the capital stock AT shifts the isoquant inward, but makes it flatter. Moreover,
through the hourly operating costs, the isocost curve becomes steeper. All three effects reduce
shiftwork, whereas for employment the latter two effects tend to increase it.
• An increase in the quasi-fixed costs F raises the marginal costs of workers relative to shifts.
Hence there is a substitution effect towards more shifts, the elasticities being rather modest,
however.
11 The slope of the expansion path in Figure 4.2 changes if the elasticity of substitution exceeds 1. So,
in the short run, shiftwork increases with output as long as o < 1, but decreases for o > 1. A similar
result was found in Chapter 3 in relation to overtime hours.74 Chapter 4
• An increase in the hourly wage ff operates in the opposite direction, reducing the number of
shifts. At least if the share of operating costs in capital costs is low enough.
A reduction of working time //combines the effects of an outward shift of the isoquant in Figure 4.2
and a reduction in the wage rate." For a given output level, output per efficiency hour increases
towards £y*CA). leading to £' with more employment and more shifts. The lower remuneration,
due to the given hourly wages, tilt the isocost line towards the dotted C',, shifting the new equilibrium
towards A',. Both effects lead to more shiftwork, but work in opposite directions for employment. In
Table 4.4 employment increases, and shiftwork increases less than proportionally. As a
consequence, the operating time f/decreases slightly.
Calmfors and Hocl (1989) have provided a rather similar analysis, but with a different set of
parameters (sec footnote 10). The major difference is their higher elasticity of efficiency hours, as
they do not consider the difference between efficiency hours and working time. This leads to a
stronger shift of the isoquant, and hence leads to a stronger impact of reduced hours on both
employment and shiftwork, table 4.6 in Section 4.5 below, illustrating the sensitivity of my results,
illustrates that our short-run working time elasticities would be E««~ ~ 1.09 and EJJ^ = - 1.19 in
that case. Reduced hours would now tend to increase the operating time £/.
4.3.2 Corner solutions
Table 4.1 illustrated that the majority of firms face a corner solution without shiftwork. In that case
allocation £o in Figure 4.2 would imply a non-feasible solution 5< 1, and the solution would be on
the isoquant at 5 = 1. The corresponding isocost curve is steeper than the isoquant at this corner
solution, see equation (4.8) with A.^ > 0. Such a corner solution might, for example, be due to a
relatively high shiftwork premium 0, large adverse productivity effects of shiftwork [i or important
hourly operating costs <p,.
A small working time reduction again shifts the isoquant outwards. Given the absence of
shiftwork higher employment is needed to accommodate the reduction in efficiency hours.
Compared to the interior solution, the short-run employment elasticity with respect to working time
increases in absolute value from E^^ = -0.75 to - 1.00, see Table 4.5. For a sufficiently large
reduction in hours worked, the new equilibrium might be an interior solution involving some
shiftwork, however. Hence the incidence of shiftwork is likely to increase with shorter working times.
12 Formally the relation between the various elasticities is the E^, = - tyc^^ + t-.nw ft"" A" = Af,
where e^ is the elasticity of the endogenous variable -V with respect to the exogenous variable








































On the other end of the spectrum, Table 4.1 illustrated that continuous operation prevails for
some 5% of employment. This can be the case for a sufficiently low shiftwork premium 6, or for
strongly positive productivity effects of shiftwork (^l < 0), etc. In this situation, a reduction of
working time leads - by definition - to a fully proportional increase in the number of shifts. As this is
stronger than the impact in the interior solution, see Table 4.5, employment rises slightly less.
4.4 LONG-RUN COST MINIMISATION
In the short-run model firms can vary the amount of shiftwork without adj usting the capital stock.
However, I would argue that decisions to implement shiftwork are closely related to investment
decisions; implementing shiftwork is typically a long-run decision, with a need to adapt the
organization and the capital stock. Hence a natural extension of the previous analysis, and of
Calmfors and Hoel (1989), is to allow the capital stock to adjust simultaneously. Indeed most
papers on shiftwork include the determination of investment or the capital stock. But these papers
do not tend to emphasize the impact of hours worked on shiftwork. This section thus adds another
variable to the standard determinants of shiftwork.
The long-run cost minimisation problem faced by the firm becomes
mn C = (F
subject to (4.4) and (4.6).76 Chapter 4
The first-order conditions reduce to the production function (4.4), the choice between shifts and
employment in (4.8), the complementary slackness conditions (4.9) and
This equation describes the traditional choice between capital and labour, where the marginal rate of
substitution equals the price ratio. This introduces a second margin of substitution into the model.
The second-order condition for an interior solution again sets an upperbound Oytothe elasticity
of substitution of the instantaneous production function, see Appendix H for details. As O5> 1, this
condition is assumed to hold. The parameter values of Table 4.3 imply o? - 1.08 < O^.
4.4.1 Interior solution
The first-order conditions (4.10) and (4.11 ^jointly determine the capital-intensity * and shiftwork &
This is due to the assumption that the instantaneous production function F() is homothetic. Figure
4.3 provides an illustration of the first-order conditions. Reinterpreting equation (4.11), the capital-
per shirt. With more shifts, the capital costs per shift decline, hence there is a substitution effect
towards a higher capital-intensity. This is the curve labelled /t in the figure; its slope is steeper the
larger the elasticity of substitution a. Indeed, with fixed factor proportions, O = 0, the capital-
intensity would be fixed by technological requirements, leading to a horizontal line.
The choice between employment and shiftwork in (4.10) also implies a relation between the
capital-intensity and the amount of shiftwork. A higher capital-intensity essentially leads to a flatter
isoquant in Figure 4.2, at least for O < 1. Moreover, it increases the importance of hourly operating
costs, making the isocost line steeper. Both factors tend to reduce shiftwork. In Figure 4.3 this is
represented by the downward sloping curve labelled &"
The equilibrium £,, is given by the intersection of both curves. When the equilibrium £Q would
violate one of the time restrictions on shi ft work in (4.6), a corner solution would prevail; the solution
is then given by the intersection of the A-curve and the vertical line S = 1 (no shiftwork) or 5 = 77//
(continuous operation).
13 This curve is downward sloping for O < (1 - |l)/( I - |i - <p^), the right-hand side being larger than one
when hourly operating costs arc included in the model. In the absence of hourly operating costs, a
Cobb-lXiuglas production function would imply a vertical S-curve. The curve will be upward
sloping for values of O exceeding the above critical level. In that case, the second-order condition




Figure 4.3 Capital-intensity and
shiftwork
Comparative static results for the interior solution are derived in Appendix H. Here I focus on the
numerical elasticities, again based on the parameter values of Table 4.3. The resulting long-run
elasticities for the interior solution were already included in Table 4.4. The table also presents the
impact on unit costs c = C/£. Before discussing working time reduction, consider briefly the other
determinants.
• As the production function is linear homogeneous in the capital stock and employment, an
increase in output leads to a full proportional increase of both stocks, leaving the capital-intensity,
shiftwork and unit costs unaffected.
• An increase in the user cost of capital /? leads towards a substitution effect away from the capital
stock, see equation (4.11). In Figure 4.3 the Ä:-curve would shift downward, increasing shiftwork
and reducing the capital-intensity. In terms of capital services the increase in shiftwork (intensive
margin) offsets the reduction in the capital stock (extensive margin). Employment is only
marginally increased. Obviously, unit costs increase, the elasticity being equal to the shaie of
capital corrected for the share of hourly operating costs.
• An increase in the operating costs Z also induces substitution away from capital services. In
Figure 4.3 the £-curve would shift downward, and the S-curve would shift to the left. The latter
negative effect dominates for shiftwork.
• For a large part, labour augmenting technical progress /i has a simi lar impact as an increase in the
user cost of capital. Equation (4.11) illustrates that it is more or less comparable to an increase in
the capital costs, leading to a reduction in capital (services). However, employment is reduced
almost proportionally due to its augmented productivity in thejjroduction function (4.4). As a
result unit costs decrease.71 Chapter 4
• An increase in quasi-fixed labour costs K, leads to a small additional substitution effect towards
capital, beside the short-run substitution away from labour.
• As wage costs form the major part of labour costs, an increase in the hourly wage leads to larger
elasticities. The rising costs of shifts due to higher wages reduces shiftwork both in (4.10) and
(4.11). In Figure 4.3 both curves would shift to the left.'* For the capital-intensity both effects
operate in the opposite direction, but the negative effect via the S-curve can be shown to
dominate. The impact on employment is mildly negative and the capital stock increases more to
offset part of the reduction in capital services due to reduced shiftwork.
Working time reduction again combines the effects of reduced wage costs and an increase of output
per efficiency hour." For shiftwork and the capital-intensity, only the former effect matters, as is
illustrated in Figure 4.3. With constant hourly wages, reduced working time leads to lower
remuneration rates, hence both the .V- and ^-curves shift to the right, the new equilibrium being £,.
Asa result shiftwork increases unambiguously and the capital-intensity can also be shown to rise.
With Ev,, 0.81 the operating time is reduced slightly. As a consequence of the lower
remuneration at constant hourly wages, employment expands and the capital stock is reduced,
compare the column Win Table 4.4. Moreover, additional capital and employment are needed to
increase output per efficiency hour. Both effects work in the same direction for employment, but in
opposite directions for the capital stock. Given our parameter values, the scale effect weakly
dominates for capital. As the impact on the capital stock is rather small, the long-run effect on
employment is of the same magnitude as the short-run impact.
Table 4.4 finally illustrates that unit costs increase as a consequence of reduced hours. This is due
to the choice of the elasticity of efficiency hours T)', which implicitly defines the initial working time.
As in Chapter 2 scale invariant long-run hours demand can be determined minimising long-run unit
costs with respect to hours. The resulting first-order condition is
or, in short-hand. T|' - (1 - <p, X1 ~ t/) + <P/ lY. using equation (4.11). Given the parameter values
of Table 4.3. the right-hand side of this short-hand expression is equal to 0.59, which is lower than
the 0.7 for T|'. This means that hours initially worked fall short of hours demanded by firms. As
reduced hours increase the gap between the two, unit costs will increase.
14 The shift from £,, to £, in the figure corresponds to a wage reduction.
15 The relation between the various elasticities is e^ = -Tl%y + £jr»v for A"= £ Af. 5, andShiftwork. Operating Time and Working Time 79
Figure 4.4 Capital-labour substitution
4.4.2 Corner solutions
The results of Table 4.4 only hold for the interior solution with positive shiftwork. Table 4.5 provides
the same results with respect to reduced hours for the two possible corner solutions. In the absence
of shiftwork, substitution will only occur between the capital stock and labour, see equation (4.11).
As Figure 4.4 - a copy of panel (a) of Figure 2.2 - illustrates, the increased output per efficiency
hour (the shift from equilibrium £<, to £") and the lower remuneration rate (the shift from £* to £,)
lead to increased employment. For the capital stock both effects operate in opposite directions, but
the shift in the isoquant dominates in Table 4.5. Obviously the capital-intensity falls from &„ to £,,
due to the lower labour costs. In the interior solution of Table 4.4, this was more than offset by the
increase in shiftwork. This also reduces the employment effects in the interior solution, relative to the
corner solution without shiftwork.
For firms using continuous operation, shiftwork increases proportionally with the reduction in
hours worked. As the interior solution leads to a smaller increase in the number of shifts, the
employment effects are slightly lower. The difference is small, however.
4.5 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
The results presented in the last two sections depend fora large part on the parameter values chosen
in Table 4.3. This section briefly considers how sensitive the resulting elasticities of working time
reduction are with respect to changes in these parameter values. Table 4.6 summarises the results;
the table contains the benchmark case in the first column.
* The first variant to consider is a higher elasticity of efficiency hours T)'. This case corresponds
more closely to the parameter choice of Calmfors and Hoel (1989). As there are no longer any80 Chapter 4




































































When changing piirnniclcr value*. I he elasticity of shiftwork in labour costs 6 is adjusted
•imuluncously. in order to fulfil the first-order condition (4.10).
hourly productivity gains, the isoquant shifts further outward in Figures 4.2 and 4.4. Accordingly
the impact is stronger: in the short run for employment and shiftwork; in the long run only for the
two stock variables, as shiftwork, capital-intensity and unit costs are independent of scale.
Further variations of the elasticity of efficiency hours - and thus in initial working hours, as the
two are inversely related allow to identify a number of critical values within this cost minimising
framework:
- for worker-hours £ AT/to,be constant, the hours elasticity iy should be 0.92 in the short
run and 0.95 in the long run;
- in the short run operating time {/will be constant for T|* = 0.83; in the long run the decline in
operating time is independent of T]';
- in the long run the capital stock would be constant for T|* = 0.66;
- finally, long-run unit costs remain unaffected for T)' = 0.59.
Thus for relatively long initial hours, i.e. T)' < 0.59, working time reduction leads to a fell in unit
costs, a decrease in the capital stock, a fall in operating time and a decrease in worker-hours.
But for initial short hours, i.e. T|' > 0.95, the opposite effects occur. Figure 4.5 illustrates that the
effects of reduced hours vary with the initial length of the workweek.
A higher elasticity of substitution a of the instantaneous production function, reduces the
curvature of the isoquants in Figures 4.2 and 4.4. A reduction in working time then leads to
stronger substitution effects towards shiftwork, reducing the impact on employment. In the long
run the operating time decreases, unless O > 0.80. The impact on employment becomes zero for
O > 1.044 in the short run and O > 1.045 in the long run. For a Cobb-Douglas productionShiftwork, Operating Time and Working Time 81
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Jf increase <- | -> decrease
£/ increase <- | -> decrease
£ increase <- | -> decrease
Figure 4.5 Initial working time and working time reduction
function, the long-run elasticities are Ej^ = -0.43 and E.^ = - 1.89 (the latter being
independent of scale).
• The sensitivity with respect to the other parameters appears to be rather minor.
All in all, the sensitivity analysis suggests that the results are fairly robust, but that the initial length of
working time is an important determinant of the size of the effects.
4.6 COMPETITIVENESS
The above results refer to a cost minimisation framework, thus at given output. The results indicate
that unit costs may increase as a result of a reduction in the working time. As a consequence, profit
maximisation can lead to adverse scale effects. This is analysed by Calmfors and Hoel (1989) for
their short-run model in the context of perfect competition in the goods market. Their results indicate
that the negative scale effect of the supply decision is likely to dominate the picture for the demand
for labour.
This approach can not be followed in the long-run model of this chapter, however, as with
constant returns, the scale of operations of individual firms is indeterminate under perfect
competition. This can be remedied by the introduction of a downward sloping demand curve for
goods. Therefore, briefly consider a goods market characterised by monopolistic competition.
Suppose the demand for firm /' is given by the downward sloping demand curve
ß,=^,/^)ö(n </'(•) <0,Z>'(0 *0 (4.13)
where /*, is the price of firm /, /* is the average price on the market and Z) is a shift parameter of the
demand curve, for example related to aggregate demand, but which might well decline with the
market price /*. Let X and T) denote the absolute value of the elasticities of the functions d() and
ö(), respectively, then it is sensible to assume that T > T| £ 0.82 Chapter 4
It is now straightforward to extend the long-run analysis of Section 4.4. Long-run profit
maximisation with constant returns to scale leads to the well known condition for the Lemer index:
-L_ = 1. (4.14)
The Lerncr- index should be equal to the inverse of the absolute elasticity of firm demand. As a
consequence, the price is a mark-up on unit costs and an increase in unit costs c leads to a
proportional increase in the price, at least if the elasticity of demand is constant."
Suppose that the working time is reduced. Table 4.4 provided the numerical cost minimising
elasticities E^,^, for A" = AT. iV and e^« for A' = S. * and c." In the profit maximising framework, the
impact on unit costs E, „ triggers an additional scale effect of size !£,.„ for capital and employment.
The total effect for these stock variables thus becomes"
/:,yV (4.15)
As the demand elasticity T is probably relatively large, the scale effect might well dominate for these
stock variables. Given the numerical elasticities of Table 4.4, reduced hours increase employment as
long as T < 7.0, whereas for larger values the negative scale effect dominates. Considering the
parameter values underlying the sensitivity analysis of Table 4.6, the critical value varies between 2.6
(for IT = 1) and 11.1 (if = 0.25)." So whether employment will fall in the case of profit
maximisation, as suggested by Calmfors and Hoel (1989), depends most importantly on the firm
specific demand elasticity.
The average observed profit share (in value added) from the Dutch National Accounts was
0.062 over the period 1960-1997. Using this value for the Lemer index in (4.14), a very rough
indicator of the firm specific demand elasticity would be around 16. In Chapter 21 used the lower
value X = 5. Comparing these values with the above critical level, it should be no surprise if the scale
effect would indeed dominate.
16 In the symmetric market equilibrium /* = /*„ see below, so T is the elasticity of d() evaluated at the
relative price of I, which is independent of c.
17 In the long run shiftwork S, the capital-intensity A or unit costs c, are independent of scale.
Therefore, these elasticities need not to be taken conditional on £.
18 Nothing changes for shiftwork S and the capital-intensity A, as they are independent of scale.
Calmfors and Hoel (1989) conclude that shiftwork might even fall in the case of profit
maximisation. However, this is an artifact of their assumption of a given capital stock.
19 Using the parameter values of Calmfors and Hoel (1989). the critical value for T is 4.2.Shiftwork, Operating Time and Working Time 83
However, this is only a partial result ignoring the repercussion of reduced hours on the
competitors. In a partial market equilibrium framework, competitors face the same increase in unit
costs. Hence their prices will increase in line, as /> = /*,. The scale effect then only operates through
the aggregate demand D^), which is less elastic. As a consequence, the total effect in a symmetric
equilibrium of the goods market reduces to
Tiec«, * = £# (4.16)
instead of (4.15). Estimates of market demand elasticities are typically much lower than firm specific
elasticities. Therefore, the scale effect is less likely to dominate in a market equilibrium context.
4.7 CONCLUSION
This chapter considered in more detail the employment effects of reduced working time on
employment and shiftwork. The additional intensive margin of adjusting shiftwork reduces the impact
on employment, but in acost minimising framework employment is still likely to increase, although
the size of the effect depends on the initial length of the workweek. Moreover, it is shown that there
are incentives to increase shiftwork, although probably somewhat less than proportional. As a
consequence, the capital operating time will probably fall only slightly. This conclusion appears to be
roughly in line with the observed near stationarity of operating times despite the reduction in working
times. This chapter also identified other determinants of shiftwork and operating time, including
factor costs and labour augmenting technical progress.
The analysis also illustrated that unit costs tend to increase as a consequence of working time
reductions. In a profit maximising framework this loss in competitiveness will lead to adverse
employment effects, although without altering the results with respect to shiftwork and operating
time. In a closed economy all competitors will face the same increase in unit costs, hence the scale
effect may be modest. In the exposed sectors of an open economy more important scale effects wi 11
arise. However, the claim by Calmfors and Hoel (1989) that there is a general presumption that
employment will fall, can not be substantiated once the capital stock is allowed to be determined
endogenously.5 Wage Bargaining, Working Time and
Unemployment
5.1 INTRODUCTION
Work-sharing is a recurring theme in the European unemployment debate. Every now and then at
times of high unemployment, the suggestion is made to reduce working times as to redistribute the
available work. A recent example is France, where in 1997 the then newly elected socialist Jospin
government suggested to reduce weekly hours to 35 at the beginning of the new millennium. Around
the same time a similar discussion occurred in Italy. In France a law has been enacted to implement
this reduction in 2000. Early adopting firms got deductions on their social premiums to provide
incentives. In the early eighties a similar attempt by Mitterand was considered a failure, see Hunt
(1998).
In Germany and the Netherlands, similar discussions were observed in the eighties. In these
countries, however, the work-sharing debate must be considered in the context of labour relations.
Unions, instead of governments, pressed for reduced hours. After the first two oil shocks in the
seventies, the Dutch economy was in disarray.' Unemployment increased rapidly, reaching its highest
level of about 10% in 1983. The government and the social partners felt the urge for changes. This
lead to consultations and in October 1982 the famous Wassenaar Agreement was struck. One of
the main recommendations for unions was to moderate wage claims in exchange for increases in
employment and reductions in working time. Except as employer in the public sector, the
government was not directly involved in the agreement, but would facilitate the wage moderation by
general tax reductions. Since then annual full-time working time has fallen by roughly 100 hours,
partly as a reduction in weekly hours from 40 to 38 hours (36 in the public sector) and partly by an
increase in holidays. Moreover wages have been moderated and the wedge has been reduced. In
the second half of the nineties, this sustained policy was considered a success and was referred to as
the Dutch miracle.
The economic literature has been rather sceptical towards the merits of work-sharing policies.
The major argument is the so-called lump-of-labour fallacy, see Layard, Nickeil et al. (1991, Ch.
1 The German case is discussed in Hunt (1998).86 Chapters
10). This critique refutes the idea that there is a fixed amount of work that can be redistributed at
will. On the contrary, employment is determined by demand and supply factors. The impact of
work ing time may occur through various channels, see Freeman (1998) and Hunt (1998) for recent
discussions.' The main ones are:
• I >abour productivity per hour may change, although the direction is ambiguous. First, the share of
non-producti vc hours increases, reducing hourly productivity, but second, reduced fatigue works
in the opposite direction. Booth and Ravallion (1993).
• Wage costs per hour increase through the existence of fixed costs per employee. Beside the
direct negative effect on the demand for labour (worker-hours), this provides an incentive to use
more overtime and to substitute away from workers. Hart (1984b) and Hunt (1999).
• Capital utilisation will decrease, at least to the degree that the operating time of the capital stock
is linked to the working time of workers, see Calmfors and Hoel (1989). This leads to an
increase in production costs and a reduction of labour demand.
• I lourly wage rates may increase in an attempt to protect real incomes. This may occur due to
union wage setting, as in Calmfors (1985), or to efficiency wage considerations, as in Hoel and
Vale (1986).
• Labour supply, i.e. participation in the labour market, may change, although the direction is
ambiguous and depends on desired hours. Hunt (1998).
Taking these factors together, the general equilibrium effects of work-sharing on unemployment
are puzzling. L-ayard, Nickeil et al. (1991, Ch. 10) claim that equilibrium unemployment is unaffected
by work-sharing. However, as their model does not incorporate working time and leisure as
separate elements, this conclusion seems doubtful. In the efficiency wage model of Hoel and Vale
(1986) the unemployment rate will increase if working time is reduced, but they also ignore the utility
of leisure. Cahuc and Granier (1997) do take this into account, and conclude that equilibrium
unemployment is unaffected by work-sharing policies. The current chapter elaborates on these
issues. The conclusion is that there is a U-shaped relation between equilibrium unemployment and
working time. Recently, Fit/Roy. Funke et ai. (2002), Marimon and Zilibotti (2000), Moselle
(1996) and Rocheteau (2002) obtained similar results, but in different settings. FitzRoy, Funke et al.
(2002) use a monopoly union model with simple Cobb-Douglas utility and production functions.
Moselle (1996) considers a moral hazard efficiency wage model. Marimon and Zilibotti (2000) use
an equilibrium matching model and Rocheteau (2002)combines the equilibrium matching approach
with moral hazard issues. This chapter uses the union bargaining framework, considering three
different settings: monopoly union, right-to-manage and efficient bargaining. Moreover, the chapter
generalises the specification of utility and production functions, as contrary to most other papers, the
2 Further references can be found in the surveys by Comeo (1994) and Houpis (1993).Wage Bargaining. Working Time and Unemployment 87
utility function is left unspecified and the production function incorporates the impact of working time
on capital services.
The chapter can be considered as an elaboration of the seminal paper by Calmfors (1985). That
paper considers a partial equilibrium monopoly union model. I extend the model in a number of
directions to incorporate most of the above issues and to derive general equilibrium results. As in
Calmfors (1985) 1 do not include overtime into the analysis, but assume that cuts in standard hours
translate almost one for one into reductions of actual hours. Hunt (1999) confirms this for Germany
and I found a similar result for the Netherlands in Chapter 3. see also Hunt (1998). In the labour
demand model I do incorporate a dependence of capital services on the working time of workers,
reducing the scope of work-sharing policies. This is reinforced by a focus on long-run adjustment,
where the capital stock is allowed to adjust.
With respect to the wage bargaining. I extend the monopoly union results of Calmfors (1985)
towards right-to-manage and efficient bargaining models. As working time is assumed to be given
exogenously, wage bargaining can be described in terms of hourly wages or in terms of total
remuneration. It turns out that the latter is easier, but 1 also describe the impact on hourly wages to
compare with Calmfors'results. For hourly wages, the results of my partial equilibrium analysisare
fairly in line with his results, but I hope to suggest a more intuitive interpretation. Even though hourly
wages may increase as a consequence of working time reduction, the results indicate that annual
incomes are likely to fall. The partial equilibrium employment effects are ambiguous and depend on
the initial working time: for long hours employment increases, but for short hours employment falls. In
the general equilibrium, I find similar results, leading to the U-shaped relation between unemployment
and working time.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 introduces the partial equilibrium monopoly
union model and describes the impact of reduced working time within this model. Section 5.3
discusses the impact of working time reductions on wage setting in the right-to-manage union model
and section 5.4 considers the efficient bargaining framework. Section 5.5 then considers the labour
market equilibrium of the right-to-manage model. Section 5.6 concludes.
5.2 THE MONOPOLY UNION MODEL
5.2.1 Firms
The model of the firm has been extensively discussed in Chapter 2, so I can be rather brief here.
Firms are operating in a monopolistically competitive output market. A typical firm in the industry
faces a downward sloping iso-elastic demand curve of the type 0 = /* *D, where £ is the output of
the firm, /> is its price, D is a demand shift variable and T > 1 is the elasticity of demand. The
demand shifter D may well depend on the aggregate price level, but for the present analysis it can,8S Chapter 5
without loss of generality, be set equal to unity. So the revenue of the firm is given by £>\ where v s
1 - l/T C (0, I) measures the competitiveness of the output market.
Firms produce their output with capital and labour as their only two production factors. Beside
the stocks of these inputs, capital A' and employment /V, the duration of operation matters. Ignoring
shiftwork, the operating time of the capital stock is equal to the working time //of labour. To
incorporate warming-up times and fatigue effects, working time in labour services is replaced by
efficiency hours e(//). For the sake of analytical convenience, I also replace working time in capital
services by efficiency hours.^ In line with the discussion in Section 2.2.1, efficiency hours are
increasing in working time, though probably at a decreasing rate, so e"(//) < 0 < e'(//), at least in
the relevant range of work ing hours. More specifically, the elasticity of efficiency hours with respect
to working time T|' is non-increasing in working time.
Combining these assumptions with a linear homogeneous production function F() in capital and
labour services, see also equation (2.5), output is given by
ß = /W//), MK//)) = <*//) A7W, (5.1)
where it = K//V is the capital-labour ratio, measured in bodies, and/*) = F(^, 1) is the per capita
instantuneous production function, satisfying/'(A) < 0 </(*) </*)/*. So the elasticity T/ =
*/*(*)//(*) of the per capita instantaneous production function satisfies T/e (0,1). The substitution
elasticity between capital and labour (bodies) is O, and in line with most evidence, see Hamermesh
(1993, Ch. 3), I assume O * 1.
In this chapter working time is still considered fixed exogenously for the firms. It is best
interpreted as standard hours either set by the government or, more realistically, determined in the
bargaining between firms and unions. As elaborated in Chapter 6, there are many different solutions
to this hours bargaining problem. The maintained hypothesis here is that hours are determined before
the wage bargaining. In this way I'm able to describe the response to changes in hours for any
outcome of the hours bargaining process. Moreover. I assume that firms do not use overtime.
Although the impact of reductions in working time on employment may depend on the use of
overtime, see e.g.. Freeman (1998) and Hart (1984b), the evidence seems to suggest that actual
hours vary proportionally with standard hours, see Hunt (1998) and Chapter 3.
With this set-up, labour costs consist of two parts: first, the hourly wage costs Wand second,
quasi-fixed labour costs K The latter are independent of the number of hours and may consist of
3 This amounts to the case K = 1 in Chapter 2. As argued in Chapter 2. the crucial assumption is that
working time affects capital services. Allowing for different efficiency hours in capital and labour
services, sec de Regt (1988), complicates the algebra but docs not yield qualitatively different
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discounted hiring costs, holiday and sick payments, etc. In the search models of Marimon and
Zilibotti (2000) and Rocheteau (2002) these hiring costs depend on labour market tightness. This is
ignored here. Given the absence of overtime hours, total remuneration per worker corresponds to K
= ffW. As the firm also incurs fixed costs, labour costs per worker are K + >'. The share of fixed
costs in labour costs is denoted <p, = F/(P+ K)- Finally, the user costs of capital are exogenously
given by Ä. It is thus assumed that operating time of capital does not influence these costs, see
Chapter 4 for a discussion. Given the above assumptions, the profit of an individual firm can be
written as II = 0" - (K+ 07/yv - ÄA\
In Chapter 21 have shown that it is important to include the optimal determination of the capital
stock when considering the impact of reduced hours on the demand for labour. The reason is that
working time affects capital services in my specification of the production function. 1 lence working
time reductions make capital less productive and may reduce capital formation. Taking the capital
stock fixed, as in Calmfors (1985), may thus overstate the potential for work-sharing policies.
Therefore, I concentrate on the opposite extreme where the capital stock may be adjusted freely.
The qualitative outcomes for the short-run model with fixed capital stock are rather similar, however,
and the short-run impact will be included in the numerical illustration.
Maximising the profit with respect to the capital stock /C and number of workers Af gives the first-
order conditions, compare equations (2.15) and (2.16),
(5.2)
(5.3)
The marginal revenue of the input variables should correspond to their marginal costs. The second-
order conditions for profit maximisation, V < 1 and a > 0, are satisfied. Log-differentiating both
equations, one can easily show that the elasticity of labour demand with respect to remuneration is
e,v, = - (l - (p^)[T( 1 - if) + ary] < 0.




which is a special case of equation (2.7). The optimal capital-labour ratio only depends on working
time through its impact on total remuneration K90 Chapter5
The impact of a working time reduction on labour demand was extensively discussed in Chapter 2,
recall Figure 2.5 for a graphical illustration. It is useful to distinguish between the case where
remuneration K is fixed or where the hourly wage ff is fixed. In the first case we have the conditional
elasticity e^r (X I )1* -* 0, whereas in the second case the conditional elasticity becomes E^*.
• EvMr + e^, which can be either positive or negative/
• A reduction in hours at given remuneration K is tantamount to neutral technological regress, and
consequently reduces employment. Although more workers are needed to produce the same
amount of output, the higher unit costs at fixed remuneration K imply that output is reduced in a
monopolistic competit ivc environment. The second-order condition (X > 1) guarantees that this ;
output effect dominates. i
• At given hourly wages >f, however, a simultaneous decrease in remuneration occurs, which i
leads to a positive impact on employment through the labour demand elasticity £*>-• 7
• Whether employment increases or falls depends on the length of working time, see Chapter 2.
The productivity effect Ev/fr dominates for short hours, whereas the cost effect E,„ dominates
for long hours.
More formally, let //„ be implicitly defined by E^». = 0, as in Chapter 2. In Appendix I it is shown
that the critical level //„ is a decreasing function of the wage. Moreover, E^w ^ 0 for // £ //„. In
other words, at given hourly wage W, the number of workers is maximised at //„ and employment is
positively (negatively) related to hours worked for shorter (longer) working times.
The same two effects can also be identified for profits II; again the productivity effect dominates
for relative short hours, whereas the cost effect dominates for relatively long hours. A work-sharing
policy will thus reduce profits for relatively short hours, but will increase profits for long hours. Using
the envelope theorem, the corresponding elasticities can be shown to be £n^> = (X - 1 )T|' > 0 for
the productivity effect and £n.y= - (X - 1X1 ~ <p^X • ~ *V) < 0 forthe cost effect. The critical level for
which both effects cancel is given by hours demand //* > //^ see Appendix I.
Finally, these two opposing effects can also be used to define the warranted change in
remuneration as to keep employment, or profits, constant in case of a working time reduction. This
will provide useful reference points for the discussion. The corresponding iso-employment working
time elasticity of remuneration (iso-employment elasticity for short) is given by A.* = - E^y/E^
0, whereas the iso-profit working time elasticity of remuneration (iso-profit elasticity for short) is
defined as An = - £n.Hir/£nr > A*. The properties of these elasticities are derived in Appendix I.
Figure 5.1 illustrates that the iso-employment and iso-profit elasticities are declining in hours.
Moreover, the iso-profit elasticity An exceeds the iso-employment elasticity Ay. although in more
4 Remember that e^ denotes the elasticity of the endogenous variable Z with respect to the
exogenous variable .V. whereas e^., denotes the same elasticity, but conditional on variable F.Wage Bargaining, Working Time and Unemployment
Figure 5.1 Iso-employment and iso-profit
elasticities
competitive markets the iso-employment elasticity is closer to the iso-profit elasticity. The declining
nature of both curves illustrates that at shorter initial hours work-sharing policies should be
accompanied by stronger decreases in remuneration to keep employment, or profits, constant.
When the iso-employment (iso-profit) elasticity exceeds one, hourly wages should even fall to keep
employment (profits) constant. The corresponding level of hours is //„, and Z/' for profits. Thus, in
the range (//„, //*) a working time reduction at unchanged hourly wages, leading to a proportional
fall in remuneration, leads to more employment but lower profits. This will be important in the general
equilibrium analysis of Section 5.5.
5.2.2 Worker utility
All agents in the economy have an identical utility function in terms of consumption and leisure. In our
static set-up, there is no saving, and consumption is equal to income. Hence K stands both for total
remuneration and for consumption. Agents can be in three different states: they can be employed,
unemployed or not participating. This section only considers workers employed in a specific firm. If
not employed in this firm, their outside option is given as C/" in utility terms. This outside option will
be specified in the labour market equilibrium analysis of section 5.5, but is exogenous in the partial
equilibrium framework.
Workers can only be employed full-time at a fixed working time //, earning X. Their utility is then
given by t/(F, //), with partial derivatives (/,/< 0 < LV, as agents enjoy consumption and leisure. It
will be useful to parameterise the utility function and to put in some more structure than in Calmfors
(1985). The rate of relative risk aversion for consumption is OCy = - 1TV/LV £ 0. The 'parameter"
5 - - JT/,T/£/„ plays an important role in the sequel.' The sign of £ determines whether
5 Notice that ^ is not a constant parameter, but typically depends on income and hours worked,
except for Cobb-Douglas preferences.92 Chapter 5
consumption and leisure are Rdgeworth substitutes (£ > 0) or complements (£ < 0). Marimon and
Zilibotti (2000) use two different specifications for the utility function: a CES-specification and so-
called Gl II l-prefercnces. The latter is a generalised version of the quasi-linear utility introduced in
the real business cycle literature by Greenwood, Hercowitz et al. (1988).* Consumption and leisure
can be shown to be substitutes (£ -> 0) for the GHH-preferences, but complements (£ < 0) for the
CES-preferences. As I argue in Chapter 6,1 have no strong feelings about the sign of £. Finally, as
usual, leisure is assumed to be a normal good, implying I; < a,-.
To derive more specific results later on, I need to assume that consumption and leisure are not
too strong Edgeworth complements. A sufficient but not necessary - condition will be that
or $ 2r Kty £/. It is easily checked that this condition holds for a Cobb-Douglas utility function.
For a CES-utility function, however, the sufficient condition (5.5) is violated if the elasticity of
substitution between consumption and leisure, say C. is below one. Marimon and Zilibotti (2000)
consider values of C ranging between 0.2 and 2. Based on micro-econometric evidence on Dutch
labour supply, Bovenberg, Graafland et al. (2000) set £ = 4.0 in their applied general equilibrium
model for the Netherlands.
If workers would be free to choose hours worked, their hours supply W would be determined by
the usual equality between the wage and the marginal rate of substitution. This can be written as to s
(//(/„)/( )7/,) = 1, where 0) represents the marginal rate of log-substitution. Notice that to£ 1 for
// $ /f. indicating that to increases with working time.' The impact of income (or the hourly wage
rate) on the marginal rate of log-substitution to is ambiguous, however. Let to, denote the relative
change in to due to changes in income, so to, = ^^- = <Xy - I - £. The sign of the hours supply
is given by the sign of toy. In view of the secular trend towards shorter working times, it seems
reasonable to focus on cases where toy £ 0.
Straightforward calculations show that for CES-preferences toy = l/(- l.soto, ^ OimpliesC*
1, with the equality for Cobb-Douglas preferences. GHH-preferences lead to to, = -I.
Accordingly. CES-prcferenees with £ > 1 and GHH-preferences appear to have some
counterfactual feature, as they cannot explain the secular downward trend in hours worked. As
noted by Marinion and Zilibotti (2000), this unattractive property can be remedied if the disutility of
working increases with labour productivity, e.g., through technical progress in home production or
6 The GHH-preferences are specified as C = Y (^" *#*/x)"*. with y > 1. X > • »™1 *> <>•
7 AS is guaranteed - at least locajly around supply W - by the second-order condition of utility
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consumption externalities as "keeping up with the Joneses'. A shortcut could be to make the disutility
of hours proportional to income or income of a reference group but that basically brings us
back to multiplicative separable preferences, such as the Cobb-Douglas.*
The two left panels of Figure 5.2 below illustrate the properties of the utility function of an
employed worker. The figure uses natural logarithms, so slopes correspond to elasticities. The
upper-left panel uses total remuneration (or income) >'as the relevant variable. To be willing to work
in the firm under consideration, the utility level has at least to be equal to the outside option f/\ as is
for example the case for the indifference curve IT. Along an indifference curve, there is a positive
relation between income Kand working time //.' The slope corresponds to the marginal rate of log-
substitution CO. Starting from the outside option (/" with marginal rate of log-substitution CO", an
increase of income from K" to P" raises utility and increases the slope to CO" > CO", at least as long as
(Or>0.
The lower-left panel of Figure 5.2 illustrates the same properties, but with the hourly wage ff as
the dependent variable. The main difference is that the indifference curves are U-shaped and have a
minimum at hours supply //. Assuming that C0y> 0, hours supply is backward bending. The figure
considers the case of underemployed workers, so // < /f or CO < 1.
5.2.3 Monopoly union wage setting
Employment at each firm in the economy is unionised. Firms retain their right-to-manage power and
determine employment (and capital) after the wage has been set unilaterally by the union. This
corresponds to Calmfors (1985). The assumption that capital is determined after the wage setting,
implies that firms cannot pre-commit on the capital stock. Manning (1994) has shown that the timing
of the capital stock decisions might change the comparative statics of the model. To simplify the
model, I abstract from strategic behaviour in the determination of capital, however. As labour
demand is more elastic in this case, this will reduce wage claims.
The specification of the union utility function is an awkward business, see Pencavel (1991, Ch. 3)
for a discussion. Obviously, union utility incorporates, among others, employment possibilities,
income and leisure. For the present purpose, I assume that the utility Fof a typical union is given by
the Stone-Geary function
r = ^•[i/(y,Ä)-t/i. 0>o (5.6)
8 Such a procedure may reconcile the cross-sectional evidence of weekly increasing labour supply
with the time-series evidence of a secular decline in hours worked.
9 As G),, = 1^51 > 0, the indifference curve can be shown to be convex.54 • Chapter 5
The union wants to increase the utility of its employed members above the given outside option {/",
but also cares about employment W. The parameter 6 is an indicator of the weight put on
employment. For0 = 1,this specification generates the same outcomes as the expected or utilitarian
utility function used by Booth and Ravallion (1993), Calmfors (1985), FitzRoy, Funke et al. (2002)
and Houpis( 1993).
At given working time, maximising union utility with respect to the hourly wage Wis equivalent to
maximising it with respect to total remuneration K. Maximising the (logofthe) union utility function
(5.6), subject to the labour demand in (5.3) and (5.4), with respect to remuneration K gives
.
The left-hand side is the slope of the logarithmic labour demand curve, which corresponds to the
inverse of the labour demand elasticity. The right-hand side is the sJqpe of the union indifference
curve in the log-income and log-employment space. It corresponds to minus the ratio of the utility
'ent per unit income (t/-[/")/y of additional workers, weighted by the value 0 unions attach to
employment relative to the marginal utility f/^ of income of employed workers.
The monopoly solution is illustrated in Figure 5.2. The upper-right panel illustrates that union
indifference curves are downward sloping in terms of income and hours worked. It has an asymptote
for}™, implicitly defined by {/" = (/(h", //), as the utility for employed workers should not fall below
the outside option. The logarithmic labour demand function is depicted as In TV* in the right-hand
panels of the figure. Given the use of logarithms, the slope of the labour demand curve is the
reciprocal of the elasticity e,vy. Moreover, as argued in Chapter 2, the logarithmic labour demand is
concave.'" At the equilibrium A/, as identified by equation (5.7), the union indifference curve P" is
tangent to the labour demand curve. The second-order condition for monopoly union wage setting
ensures that the union indifference curve is less concave than the labour demand curve. From the left
panels, observe that employed workers have utility £/" > £/\ In a competitive labour market with
fixed working time the resulting allocation would be^, because workers would be forced to accept
their outside option.
10 Basically, the absolute value of the labour demand elasticity £yr increases with the level L*"
remuneration y: first, with higher remuneration the share of quasi-fixed costs in labour costs <p>-
falls; second, higher remuneration may change the optimal share of capital costs t/ in total costs.
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The same partial equilibrium is again illustrated in the lower panels, but with the hourly
wage on the vertical axis. The asymptote is given by **" = y///, but the remaining part of the
figure is similar.
5.2.4 Working time reduction
First, consider the impact of reduced working time on individual and union preferences at
given monopoly union remuneration K". This is illustrated in Figure 5.3, which corresponds
to the upper panel of Figure 5:2, where hours are reduced from //„ to //,. From the left-hand
panel it is obvious that employed workers increase their utility from LT to £/,. The increased
individual utility implies that the union can obtain its old utility level P" with lower
employment A',. Hence the union indifference curve in the right-hand panel shifts left towards
the dotted curve r,(//„). With the old working time, this combination of P and JV, would
yield union utility r,(//„) < P".
More important, the union indifference curve rotates, compare the curves r,(//„) and
P"(//|)." Differentiating the left-hand side of the first-order condition (5.7) with respect to
hours, it can be shown that the union indifference curves become steeper if (and only if)
{/„, - —^-2- > 0. (5.8)
The left-hand side cannot be signed unambiguously: it is positive if consumption and leisure
are Edgeworth substitutes (£ > 0), but could be negative if consumption and leisure are
Edgeworth complements (^ < 0). Condition (5.5), however, is a sufficient condition for the
expression to be positive. For this type of preferences the union indifference curves in Figure
5.3 become steeper, as !",(//„) and P"(//,).'-
Combining the effects of the changes in labour demand and union utility in Figures 2.5 and
5.3, we can derive the impact on remuneration. Merging the two figures gives a rather blurred
picture, however, yielding no further insight. But as the monopoly remuneration is
determined by tangency between labour demand and union utility, recall equation (5.7), it is
only the change in the slopes of labour demand and union utility that matter, and not the
change in their positions. At given remuneration the labour demand elasticity is unaffected by
a work-sharing policy, but the indifference curve becomes steeper, at least if (5.8) is fulfilled.
Hence there is an incentive to reduce
11 Moreover, their limit remuneration y falls to >'," due to the increased leisure. Due to the fall in
limit remuneration the union indifference curve also shifts downward, see P"(//,).
12 The sufficient condition (5.5) does not hold for CES-preferences with an elasticity of substitution (
< 1. However, I conjecture that the necessary condition (5.8) holds as long as the elasticity of
substitution is not too small. Indeed, for CES-preferences this condition can be written as C >
1 - l/W and wage setting guarantees that the utility £/ exceeds the outside option £/".Wage Bargaining, Working Time and Unemployment 97
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The monopoly union model is a special case of the right-to-manage bargaining framework and it is
easy to extend the analysis in this direction. The wage bargaining game is not modelled explicitly. As
usual in the literature on wage formation, see e.g., Layard, Nickeil et al. (1991), I assume that the
outcome of the bargaining process can be found by maximising an asymmetric Nash function.
Muthoo (1999) provides a critique on this approach. The Nash-maximand is given by
Q = (r-E)(n-ny\ (5.9)
where ß measures the bargaining power of firms, insofar not reflected in their fallback options F and
H. For ß = 0 the model reduces to the above monopoly union model, whereas for ß - °° firms
have all the bargaining power and will set the wage equal to the outside option. In the long-run
model, both threat-points are set equal to zero, hence the Nash-maximand reduces to Q = F IP.9t . . • Chapter 5
For the union this implies that workers are able to obtain the outside utility (/" during a strike, for the
firm this is consistent with the (admittedly unrealistic) hypothesis that the capital stock can be
adjusted freely after completion of the wage bargain."
The outcome of the wage bargain is most easily obtained differentiating the log of the Nash-
maximand with respect to remuneration. After rearranging, this yields the first-order condition
(5.10)
This is a straight forward generalisation of equation (5.7) for the monopoly union. The left-hand side
is the increase in utility rent for employed workers. The first term on the right-hand side isdue to the
right-to-manage assumption and measures the employment costs of increasing remuneration. The
second term is due to the bargaining power of firms and captures employer resistance due to lower
profits. Taken together, m thus captures wage resistance.
As usual in right-to-manage models, the outcome will be on the labour demand curve somewhere
between A/ and /I in terms of the right panels of Figure 5.2. As ß increases, wage resistance
increases and we move downwards along the labour demand curve. The competitive outcome/I,
where t/ = £/\ results in the limiting case where the firm has all bargaining power (ß - °°).
Wage resistance |i, plays an important role in the model. So consider its determinants. Using the
model of the firm, wage resistance can be written as
r Ky-V) + oV]>O, (5.11)
where Xp s T+ ß(T- iy6 £ T > 1. One easily checks that wage resistance satisfies
•*>
where the signs below the variables denote the sign of the corresponding partial derivative. The signs
of the partial derivatives are as expected. Wage resistance is high in more competitive markets (T
high); when labour is easily substituted by capital (o high); when the labour share is high (T/low);
when employment is highly valued (0 high); or when firm bargaining power ß is high. Higher quasi-
fixed costs J reduce employer resistance, as it makes remuneration }'a smaller part of labour costs.
For the capital-intensity /t, which operates through the capital share iy, the sign depends on the
13 In the short-run model the fallback option of the firm should be specified as II = -Wage Bargaining. Working Time and Unemployment 99
elasticity of substitution, being positive for O < 1 and equal to zero for the Cobb-Douglas case (O =
1). For the total impact of )on wage resistance, notice that
(1 -<p^ 5 > 0.
So wage resistance increases with remuneration K. although less than proportionally as Yr £
[<PK, I).'* Finally, notice that wage resistance does not depend on working time, except for its
impact on total remuneration. This is the main reason why it is easier to work in terms of
remuneration instead of hourly wages.
The second-order condition of the wage bargain corresponds to
which is assumed to hold. Sufficient, but not necessary, conditions are toy £ 0 and assumption (5.8),
as (5.8) and (5.10) jointly imply £ + Hy > 0.
53.2 Working time reduction
The partial equilibrium bargaining model can be used to derive the impact of an exogenous reduction
in working time on remuneration, hourly wages, employment and welfare. It turns out that it is most
convenient to start with the impact on remuneration, instead of the hourly wages used by Calmfors
(1985). Hourly wages can then be derived recursively. This provides more intuition in the underlying
mechanisms.
5J.2.7 /?emwnera//o« ara/ Aowr/y wages
To derive the impact of a reduction in working time on income, totally differentiate the first-order
condition (5.10) to obtain the partial equilibrium remuneration elasticity
= a) —— >0. (5.13)
14 Comparing wage resistance H^ with the labour demand elasticity E^, the only differences are the
use of Tp instead of T and the multiplicative constant - 0. Hence we can use the properties of e^,
see Chapter 2 and Appendix I.100 Chapters
The second-order condition guarantees that the denominator is positive. Hence the sign is
determined by the expression in (5.8). Thus, given the outside option Lf, the right-to-manage union
model indicates that working time reduction leads to wage moderation, in the sense that
remuneration per worker will fall. Through the value of leisure, no full wage compensation is needed.
This is true as long as consumption and leisure are not too strong Edgeworth complements (£ + n,.
> 0). An obvious counterexample is a Leontief utility function, where consumption (or income) and
leisure are to be used in fixed proportions. A reduction in working time increases leisure and hence
income should be increased too. Remembering that the sufficient condition (5.5) holds for the Cobb-
Douglas case, but not for CES-preferences with elasticity of substitution £ < 1, this example
illustrates that the necessary condition (5.8) holds up to some critical level of the substitution
elasticity £. Below that level, working time reductions do not lead to wage moderation. On the
contrary, total remuneration might even increase. I further restrict myself to the case where (5.8) is
satisfied, so i; t ^ > 0.
An increase in (^reduces the remuneration elasticity in (5.13). Recall that the slope of the hours
supply curve //" is given by minus the sign of 00^. If it is upward sloping, a decrease in working time
can be accommodated by a decrease in the hourly wage, to stay in line with hours supply. The
opposite holds for a backward sloping curve. Hence higher values of 0)^ - making hours supply
more backward sloping - make unions bargain more aggressively in case of a reduction in working
time. An increase in y r has a similar impact. The higher Yr< the more concave the labour demand
curve is. A working time reduction at given hourly wages makes labour demand more inelastic,
increasing wage claims."
As long as G)y+Yy > 0, an increase in £ increases the remuneration elasticity. This illustrates that
bargaining is less aggressive - a larger reduction in income being accepted - when consumption and
leisure are Edgeworth substitutes, as argued by Marimon and Zilibotti (2000) when comparing their
GHH- and CES-preferences. Finally, an increase in wage resistance ^^ also leads to more wage
moderation. Hence right-to-manage bargaining models lead to more wage moderation than the
monopoly union model. In the limiting case of ß - °°, wage determination will follow the outside
option (/', and the remuneration elasticity is equal to the marginal rate of log-substitution CO. As w
increases with working time this suggests that the amount of wage moderation is reduced as working
time falls. This is also illustrated in Figure 5.4, which compares Wand e,™,., see equation (5.13).
Both are increasing in working time.'* In general the marginal rate of log-substitution exceeds the
remuneration elasticity, but to a lesser extend when wage resistance }ij is high.
15 These two effects are absent in FitzRoy, Funke et al. (2002), as they consider Cobb-Douglas
preferences and production functions and they do not consider quasi-fixed labour costs. Hence CO,
= Yr = O.
16 For CES-preferences, for example, O) tends to infinite as hours approach the available time per
period. Therefore curves are drawn convex.100 Chapter 5
The second-order condition guarantees that the denominator is positive. Hence the sign is
determined by the expression in (5.8). Thus, given the outside option (/", the right-to-manage union
model indicates that working time reduction leads to wage moderation, in the sense that
remuneration per worker will fall. Through the value of leisure, no full wage compensation is needed
This is true as long as consumption and leisure are not too strong Edgeworth complements (i; + p^
> 0). An obvious counterexample is a l^ontief utility function, where consumption (or income) and
leisure are to be used in fixed proportions. A reduction in working time increases leisure and hence
income should be increased too. Remembering that the sufficient condition (5.5) holds for the Cobb-
Douglas case, but not for CES-preferences with elasticity of substitution £ < 1, this example
illustrates that the necessary condition (5.8) holds up to some critical level of the substitution
elasticity £. Below that level, working time reductions do not lead to wage moderation. On the
contrary, total remuneration might even increase. I further restrict myself to the case where (5.8) is
satisfied, so £ t p,• » 0.
An increase in G),. reduces the remuneration elasticity in (5.13). Recall that the slope of the hours
supply curve //" is given by minus the sign of 00^. If it is upward sloping, a decrease in working time
can be accommodated by a decrease in the hourly wage, to stay in line with hours supply. The
opposite holds for a backward sloping curve. Hence higher values of (Oy - making hours supply
more backward sloping - make unions bargain more aggressively in case of a reduction in working
time. An increase in Yr has a similar impact. The higher y>s the more concave the labour demand
curve is. A working time reduction at given hourly wages makes labour demand more inelastic,
increasing wage claims."
As long as (*)>• + Yr > 0, an increase in £ increases the remuneration elasticity. This illustrates that
bargaining is less aggressive - a larger reduction in income being accepted - when consumption and
leisure are Edgeworth substitutes, as argued by Marimon and Zilibotti (2000) when comparing their
GHH- and CES-preferences. Finally, an increase in wage resistance p.^ also leads to more wage
moderation. Hence right-to-manage bargaining models lead to more wage moderation than the
monopoly union model. In the limiting case of ß - °°, wage determination will follow the outside
option (A and the remuneration elasticity is equal to the marginal rate of log-substitution CO. As O
increases with working time this suggests that the amount of wage moderation is reduced as working
time falls. This is also illustrated in Figure 5.4, which compares GO and e,™., see equation (5.13).
Both are increasing in working time.'* In general the marginal rate of log-substitution exceeds the
remuneration elasticity, but to a lesser extend when wage resistance |ij is high.
15 These two effects are absent in FitzRoy, Funke et al. (2002), as they consider Cobb-Douglas
preferences and production functions and they do not consider quasi-fixed labour costs. Hence G)?
= Yr = 0.
16 For CES-prcfcrences, for example, U) tends to infinite as hours approach the available time per
period. Therefore curves are drawn convex.102 Chapter 5
Figure 5.5 Hourly wages and working time
although that figure used a lo^arilhmJcscale.
wage, this yields the curve labelled ff*. It gives all bargained hourly wages as a function of working
time, but given the outside option. When hours worked correspond to //(,, worker utility increases to
(A The curve ff* is U-shaped as long as the final term in the numerator of (5.14) dominates." The
second term y >• tilts the whole curve clock-wise, the minimum //„ being to the right of hours supply.
The first term in (5.14) would tilt the W*- curve in the opposite direction of the slope of the labour
supply curve. Thus a backward sloping supply curve shifts the minimum further to the right, and
reduces the likelihood of a positive elasticity c^y«.
The U-shape of the W* curve underscores the conclusion of the previous paragraph that wage
moderation - in terms of remuneration will fall as working time is reduced. Wage moderation of
hourly wages is much less likely to occur, however, and depends on the initial length of the working
week. For initial hours below //„. hourly wages will increase.
J.3.2.2
Having determined the partial equilibrium impact of working time reduction on wages, consider the
effects on employment and welfare. For employment two effects work in opposite directions: the
productivity effect reduces employment; but wage moderation leads to an increase in employment.
The total impact is given by ^^ = Ew (e ,™,. - Ay). Therefore, employment increases as long as
din//
the remuneration elasticity exceeds the iso-employment elasticity A.*.. As the former elasticity is
19 Calmfors (1985, Fig. 2) also draws a U-shaped pattern for hourly wages.Wage Bargaining. Working Time and Unemployment 103
increasing in hours and the latter decreasing, recall Figures 5.2 and 5.4. there is a critical value //„
above which a reduction in working time increases employment. For shorter working times
employment will decrease."* So, at the firm level, there is an inverted U-shape between working time
and employment.
For output £> there is an additional negative direct impact on productivity. So output is more
likely to decrease. It can be shown to have exactly the same sign distribution as profits II. For
profits the total effect of working time is given by ^— = £nr(Grai{/« ^n)- So reduced working
time increases profits only if the remuneration elasticity exceeds the iso-profit elasticity A.n. Again
this gives an inverted U-shape between profits (or output) and working time. The critical value for
profits is //,.>//„. Figure 5.6 which combines Figures 5.2 and 5.4 illustrates the determination
of these critical levels. There is an interval of working hours (//^ //„) where a reduction in working
time leads to increased employment, but to reduced output and profits. Given that employers
typically resist work-sharing policies, it seems that currently working time is at least lower than //„.
A reduction in working time has two opposite effects on the utility (/of employed workers. First.
leisure is increased, but second, as a result of wage moderation, remuneration falls. Totally
differentiating the utility rent of employed workers gives, using (5.13),
As long as <o> + YK > 0, as was assumed to hold, employed workers always gain. In other words,
the wage moderation will not fully offset the gain in leisure. This could also be seen in Figure 5.5, as
at initial hours //<,, the #*-curve is steeper then the indifference curve (A A movement to the left
along the bargained H*-curve then leads to an increase in utility.
Finally, consider union utility F. Combining the effects on employment and individual utility, the
impact on union utility can be written as
The first part on the right-hand side measures the impact on employment and is negative for //> //„.
The second part measures the impact on the utility rent and is negative. For //<//„ both effects
20 In a short-run labour services model Booth and Ravallion (1993) conclude that a sufficient, but not
necessary, condition for a cut in hours to increase employment is that absolute wage elasticity is
less than the share of variable labour costs in the wage bill. This can also be interpreted as a
lowerbound on working time.104 Chapter 5
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Figure 5.6 Critical working times and work-
sharing
work in opposite directions. For the monopoly union the above expression simplifies to
- 6 e^j,(A.^- (i>). Hence the union gains as long as the marginal rate of log-substitution CO exceeds
the iso-employment elasticity A.,y In Figure 5.6 this corresponds to // > //"*. It can be shown, see
Chapter 6, that //" corresponds to the optimal hours as set by a monopoly union. As in general
^l£ -5 -6e™(A. -to) *"T' tj,g critical level of hours is even lower in a bargaining
framework. So there is a rather large interval where unions gain from a work-sharing policy. This
might explain why unions favour work-sharing policies, even when there may be adverse
employment effects. Employed workers always gain.
The discussion illustrates that the consequences of reduced working time depend on the initial
length of the working week. Adverse effects are likely to occur at relatively short hours, whereas
gains can be obtained for longer hours. This brings the issue of the determination of working time to
the fore. This is elaborated in more detail in Chapter 6. Here 1 only look briefly at three benchmark
cases used in the literature.
• Calmfors (1985), considers the case where the union sets the working time, so // = //". As
illustrated in Figure 5.6, work-sharing policies then lead to negative employment and profitability
effects.
• Contensou and Vranceanu (1998) and Moselle (1996) consider the opposite case where hours
are set unilaterally by the firm, given the utility constraint of the workers. This gives the
constrained Pareto-efficient solution that the slope of the indifference curve is equal to the slope
of the iso-profit line, see FitzRoy, Funke et al. (2002). In my notation this implies CO = A.n. or//
= //" in Figure 5.6. Work-sharing policies then lead to reduced profitability (as /f < //„), but
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more aggressive bargaining(lower£or[l,)shifts the remuneration elasticity Emu/« downward,
increasing the likelihood of adverse employment effects (when //* *- //„)."'
• Finally, Marimon and Zilibotti (2000) and Rocheteau (2002) consider the case where hours are
set by simultaneous bargaining about wages and hours. In our set-up this means that hours are
determined along the co-curve between A.* and An., the exact position depending on the
bargaining power ß." The corresponding bargained hours, say //*, will thus be somewhere
between //" and /f. Again work-sharing will reduce profitability, but the impact on employment
is ambiguous. More bargaining power for firms increases bargained hours /V* and reduces the
critical value //„ (as the remuneration elasticity shifts upward toward CO). This increases the
likelihood of positive employment effects.
5-3.3 A numerical example
To illustrate the working of the model, this subsection provides a numerical illustration of the main
effects of a work-sharing policy in the model. The intention is not to provide very realistic outcomes,
but to illustrate the main channels operating within the model. Therefore, I use a rather crude
calibration of the parameters of the model.
First, consider the model of the firm. Here I use the same parameters as in Chapter 2: so the
share of capital costs T/ is set at 0.3; quasi-fixed labour costs account for 20% of labour costs; and
I adopted o = 0.5 for the elasticity of substitution. Estimates of the elasticity of output with respect
to hours are rather imprecise, see Freeman (1998) and Hamermesh (1993). Contrary to Chapter 2,
1 used T)" = 0.6 as the benchmark, indicating that work-sharing leads to some hourly productivity
gains. As If = 0.6 > 0.56 = (l-(p^)(l-T|0, firms would like to have longer hours. For the firm
specific elasticity of goods demand T, I used 5.0 as the benchmark.
These five parameters determine the labour demand elasticities E^y and e^^ of the partial
equilibrium in Table 5.1, see also Chapter 2. As e^y+£yy< 0, the calibration implies that work-
sharing increases employment at unchanged hourly wages.
Second, consider the labour supply parameters. For the rate of relative risk-aversion with respect
to income CXy, Pissarides (1998) uses 0.8 whereas Teulings and Hartog (1998) suggest a value of
roughly 1.25. I took the intermediate value of a,- = 1. With respect to £ I am not aware of any
sensible estimates. As a benchmark I just assumed that consumption and leisure are neither
Edgeworth complements nor substitutes, leading to ^ = 0. These joint assumptions on the utility
function imply that to,. = 0, so hours supply //* is inelastic. Evidence on workers being over- or
21 This mechanism also explains the different employment effects for the CES- and GHH-
preferences in Marimon and Zilibotti (2000). CES-preferences entail more aggressive wage
bargaining through a lower £ and hence are less likely to have positive employment effects.
22 See Chapter 6 for details.106 Chapter 5













































The parameter values for the partial equilibrium are <p, 0.2, rf - 0.6, n/ - 0.3,0 - 0.5,1 - 5, 0 - 1,
ß La,- l,5'0«nd(i)-0.9.
underemployed is mixed, see for example OECD (1998). I assumed that workers work less than
their desired hours, so the marginal rate of log-substitution to is below one. I adopted to = 0.9.
Third, consider the bargaining parameters. The results in Pencavel (1991) indicate that unions
care about employment, but estimates vary considerably. I mimicked the results of an utilitarian union
utility function, as 1 set the employment elasticity in union utility 6 equal to one. Finally, evidence of
bargaining power of firms ß is scarce. As in Marimon and Zilibotti (2000) I assumed that both
parties have the same power, accordingly I took ß = 1, but I also considered the case of a
monopoly union (ß = 0).
The partial equilibrium results in Table 5.1 indicate that work-sharing will lead to wage
moderation, as the elasticity of remuneration with respect to working time £,„ is positive. However,
hourly wages increase as e,-,, is smaller than one. Wage moderation is stronger in the right-to-
manage bargaining model than in the monopoly union. Wage moderation is also stronger in the long-
run labour demand models, compared to the short-run labour demand model. In both cases this is
due to the difference in wage resistance fi, (not included in the table): bargaining power increases
wage resistance, as does the absolute value of the labour demand elasticity E^.
The column labelled to" indicates what the marginal rate of log-substitution should be for full
wage moderation. This corresponds to minimum //, of the U-shape bargained wage curve in Figure
5.5. The results indicate that workers should be overemployed (to > 1) for this to occur.Wage Bargaining. Working Time and Unemployment 107
The impact of the work-sharing on employment A/ differs between the monopoly union model
and the right-to-managc model. In the former employment is reduced, whereas in the latter
employment is increased. The monopoly union model is less favourable, because of its weaker wage
moderation. In both cases the resulting elasticities are rather small, however.
The final column considers the critical value of r)' CO where employment does not change as •
result of work-sharing. This corresponds to //„ in Figure 5.6. Notice that the ratio iy/w is
decreasing in working time, so relative low figures in this column correspond to relative long initial
hours. In the benchmark T|7fa) = 2/3. In the right-to-manage models the critical values are higher
than the benchmark, hence employment increases. With a lower initial working time, however,
employment could fall, as in the monopoly union model. This illustrates the inverted U-shape for
employment.
Experimenting with different parameter values gives different numbers, but the broad picture
remains: there is some wage moderation; long-run labour demand models and right-to-managc
bargaining lead to stronger wage moderation; and employment effects tend to bcTather limited, the
sign depending on the initial level of working time.
5.4 EFFICIENT BARGAINING
The next question is whether the qualitative results change if we allow for bargaining over
employment. So 1 turn to the class of efficient union bargaining models. Booth and Schiantarelli
(1987) also analyse a cut in working time within such a set-up. They conclude that the employment
outcome is ambiguous, but likely to be negative, and they do not discuss the impact on remuneration.
Moreover, their model ignores capital as a separate production. Johnson (1990) does include
capital, but then ignores the impact of working time on capital services.
The solution of the efficient bargaining model can be derived by maximising the (logarithm of the)
Nash-maximand (5.9) with respect to capital, employment and remuneration. The first-order
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Rearranging equations (5.15) and (5.16) the optimal capital labour ratio is now determined as
= TAV (5.18)
Comparing this expression with equation (5.4) for the right-to-manage model, one can show that the
optimal capital-labour ratio/f" in theefflcient bargaining model is lower than in the right-to-manage
model. As in Johnson (1990), efficient bargaining leads to overmanning of the capital stock. As
before, the capital-labour ration is scale independent and does not depend directly on the working
time. Given )k**, equation (5.15) can be used to derive the employment level A^*. So the model can
be interpreted as follows: unions and firms bargain over the manning ratios, but given this choice of
technology the firm chooses its scale in an optimal way, see Johnson (1990).
Differentiating (5.15) and (5.18) the wage elasticity of labour demand for the efficient bargaining
model is given by
It is tempting to write c^ = ÖE^y, where
ft = __£: Li—!_ * i for o £ 1,
Tp(l-rtVoT/
but this ignores the fact that, due to the lower capital-labour ratio in the efficient bargaining model,
the elasticity T/may be higher in the efficient bargaining model." For a Cobb-Douglas production
function, however, the wage elasticity of labour demand is always the same in both models.
On the other hand, the working time elasticity of labour demand at given remuneration is the same
in both models, as e^^ = (X- 1)T)' = E^y. The reason is that a working time reduction can be
compared to neutral technical regress and the firm is free to choose its optimal scale - and thus
employment - in both models.
Using equations (5.15) and (5.18), the first-order condition (5.17) for the wage can be rewritten
as
23 Moreover, T^ is no longer equal to the capital share in total costs, see Johnson (1990). Due to the
inefficient high manning ratio, the capital share falls to —i—^5^ T/ < lV.
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.(l-nVir']- (519)
This expression has the same structure as the wage setting equation (5.10) for the right-to-manage
model. The only difference is that wage resistance Jl*'* is defined in a slightly different way for the
efficient bargaining model, compare with equation (5.11). Due to the possible difference in the
elasticity T/between both models, it is hard tocompare the levels of n*" and ^l,. although they are
the same for a Cobb-Douglas production function. As in the right-to-manage model, wage
resistance is increasing in 0, ß. v and O, non-decreasing in the capital-labour ratio (at least for O £
I) and decreasing in the share of quasi-fixed labour costs.
To derive the comparative statics of the efficient bargaining model with respect to working time
reduction, differentiate (5.19) to obtain"
The second-order condition for maximisation of the Nash-maximand guarantees that the
denominator is positive.
Comparing (5.20) with (5.13) shows that the partial equilibrium elasticity of remuneration with
respect to working time has the same structure in the efficient bargaining model and the right-to-
manage model. Both elasticities are positive, at least given condition (5.8). Hence the conclusion that
a working time reduction will be followed by wage moderation is independent of the bargaining
framework.
The numerical example in Table 5.1 indeed illustrates that the results for the efficient bargaining
model are rather similar to the right-to-manage model. The impact on remuneration is almost
unchanged, but due to the slightly higher labour demand elasticity, the impact on employment is
somewhat more favourable.
5.5 LABOUR MARKET EQUILIBRIUM
The wage bargaining process presented above takes the outside option as given. In the labour
market equilibrium, wages in all sectors or firms are set in a similar vein. As a result the outside
option (/" becomes endogenous. Layard and Nickell (1990) have shown that the labour market
24 The expression derived for Ye in the right-to-manage model remains valid in the efficient bargaining
model, although one should use the appropriate value for the elasticity T/.1
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equilibrium results might differ substantially from the partial equilibrium analysis. This is the issue of
this section, where I use the right-to-manage model of section 5.3. Similar results hold for the
efficient bargaining model of the previous section.
Layard, Nickel! et al. (1991, Ch. 10)claim that equilibrium unemployment is unaffected by work-
sharing. However, their model does not incorporate working time and leisure as separate elements.
Cahuc and Granier (1997) do take this into account, and conclude that equilibrium unemployment is
unaffected by work-sharing policies, at least in the absence of unemployment benefits. Including
these benefits, unemployment may be affected, although the sign depends on the determination of
benefits. Work-sharing leads to higher unemployment if the benefit level is given, but lowers
unemployment at a given replacement rate. Their model, however, does not incorporate the impact
of working time on capital services.
5.5.1 Wage determination
When participating in the labour market, agents are either employed or unemployed. Considering a
symmetric equilibrium, all firms provide the same utility level (/(X,//) for their workers. When being
unemployed, workers get an unemployment benefit Ä, but have more leisure time." The
corresponding utility is given by {/ = (7(5,0) < t/(K, //). The outside option corresponds to the
expected util ity when participating in the labour market and is thus given by a weighted average of
the utility when working and the utility when unemployed
L/° = (1 - w)£/(r, #) + «f/(5,0), (5.21)
where « is the unemployment rate.*'
In the partial equilibrium, wage setting depends on the outside option £/". In a symmetric
equilibrium, the latter depends on unemployment as in equation (5.21). Substituting this in the partial
equilibrium condition (5.10) gives the equilibrium wage setting curve
(5.22)
It has the same structure as (5.10), but with outside option £/" replaced by the utility C* of the
unemployed and with wage resistance (^multiplied by the unemployment rate u. As a consequence
25 1 don't discuss the issue of financing the benefits. This is incorporated in FitzRoy. Funke et al.
(2002).
26 In the intertemporal search models of Marimon and Zilibotti (2000) and Rocheteau (2002) the
weight on the instantaneous utility L'(ß, 0) of the unemployed is higher, as employed workers also
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of this analogy in structure, the comparative statics are roughly similar. For example, higher benefits
5 increase remuneration, whereas wages decline with higher unemployment or higher wage
resistance. These are standard predictions of aggregate wage setting behaviour, see Layard, Nickell
et al. (1991).
With respect to the impact of working time on remuneration, the equilibrium elasticity can be
written as
(5.23)
Compared to the partial equilibrium elasticity e^y. in (5.13), the numerator and the denominator
have both decreased. The second-order condition (5.12) no longer guarantees that the denominator
is positive, although it is along the aggregate wage setting curve.*' The numerator of (5.23) is once
again ambiguous, and may be negative if consumption and leisure are strong lidgeworth
complements (5 < - H^u). A sufficient, but not necessary, condition to exclude this possibility was
given by the class of utility functions in (5.5). So, for this class of utility functions the analysis predicts
that, in terms of annual remuneration, working time reduction will lead to wage moderation in the
symmetric equilibrium.
Comparing wage moderation at the partial and the labour market equilibrium, notice that Cy^iy«
> Em if and only if 0)^+ YK> 0. This corresponds to the condition for employed workers to gain
from a cut in working time. The reason is the following: if workers gain due to a cut in working time,
the outside option will increase in the labour market equilibrium; this in turn increases wage claims
and thus reduces wage moderation in the labour market equilibrium. In terms of Figure 5.6, this
means that the remuneration elasticity shifts downward in the labour market equilibrium, see Figure
5.7. As a consequence the interval with adverse effects of work-sharing on employment and profits
becomes larger.
5.5.2 Unemployment
To determine the effect of working time on unemployment, wage setting behaviour should be
combined with the market demand for labour. Two complications arise compared to the labour
27 The semi-elasticity of remuneration with respect to unemployment is e^ = ^£ =
— ! < 0, with the same expression in the denominator. The denominator is positive for w
= I, as guaranteed by the second-order condition of the wage bargain. Decreasing unemployment
increases wages more at lower unemployment rates. For « = w^, = max[0,-((Oy + Yy*5)^jr]
the increase is infinite. Hence aggregate wage setting implies a lowerbound on the feasible
unemployment rate given by !/„,„. This in turn guarantees that the denominator in (5.23) is positive.
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demand of individual firms. First, we should take into account that the aggregate price level may
change, second, entry may blur the picture. In this subsection I deal with the first problem, entry is
covered in the next section.
Consider aggregate prices. Given the assumption of constant returns to scale, each firm sets its
price P as a mark-up on unit costs c, as long-run profit maximisation implies P = c/v. As a
consequence, the elasticity of price with respect to remuneration is equal to the share of variable
labour costs in total costs, so £,>,. = (I - <p, X1 - if), and the elasticity of price with respect to
working time is E^y = - T|*. The total impact of a change in hours on the market price is thus given
by-^^ = £/>,- Ey// + E^y = £/.y (Ey„ - An). Accordingly, reduced hours will increase the market
price as long as £y„ < An, or //<//„ in Figure 5.7.
In a symmetric equilibrium, all firms set the same price, reducing the sensitivity of the individual
firm demand with respect to price.** Let the elasticity of the demand shifter D with respect to the
market price level be X^, then it can be shown that the elasticities of aggregate labour demand are
given by similar expressions as E^T and E^y, but with "C replaced by T.,. As the aggregate demand
is most likely less elastic than firm demand, this makes aggregate labour demand less elastic and less
responsive to changes in working time. In terms of the iso-employment elasticity A*, the aggregate
version shifts X^ towards the origin in Figure 5.7, reducing the interval of adverse employment
effects. The intuition is simply that all firms face the same change in unit costs, so in equilibrium there
is a smaller loss in competitiveness. Compared to the partial equilibrium version, the remuneration
elasticity Ey« and the iso-employment elasticity A. ^ both shift down, making the shift of//,
ambiguous.
The aggregate model consists of the wage setting equation (5.22) and the aggregate labour
demand curve. Given a fixed labour supply Sand together with the definition of unemployment, v =*
28 The elasticity t is best interpreted as the elasticity of firm demand with respect to their relative
price. In a symmetric equilibrium the relative price is unity.Wage Bargaining. Working Time and Unemployment 113
Figure 5.8 Unemployment and work-sharing
lnS - lnTV, the model determines (real) remuneration K, employment JVand the unemployment rate «.
The model is illustrated in Figure 5.8. Wage setting is illustrated by the upward sloping y*, whereas
market demand for labour is given by the downward sloping curve N. The intersection of both
curves gives the equilibrium remuneration K, and the corresponding employment level JV, < S. Union
wage setting leads to equilibrium unemployment.
The vertical axis gives (real) annual remuneration and not hourly wages. As working time
reduction leads to wage moderation, the wage setting curve y* shifts downward. Moreover, labour
demand also declines. Both effects reduce the equilibrium remuneration, but the impact on
(unemployment is ambiguous. As a benchmark, the figure considers the case where employment is
unaffected. This corresponds to initial hours //„ in Figure 5.7.
Indeed, solving for the comparative statics, the equilibrium effects on remuneration and
unemployment are
where Cy„ < 0 is the semi-elasticity of remuneration with respect to unemployment and Ay„ =
1 + E^y Ey„ > 1. The unemployment rate will fall - or employment will increase - when wage1
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moderation dominates, that is for £„, > A,^, or // > //.. In any case there exists a U-pattern
between the equilibrium unemployment rate and working time, and //„ is the working time that
minimises the unemployment rate.
5.5.3 Extensions
In the next subsections I introduce three simple extensions of the model. First I consider the impact
of a fixed replacement rate, instead of fixed benefits. This institutional change affects the slope of the
wage setting curve in Figure 5.8. Second, I allow for endogenous participation decisions, leading to
an upward sloping labour supply curve. Finally, I introduce free entry into the model, leading to a
horizontal price setting curve, instead of the downward sloping labour demand. These variations do
not affect the general conclusion that there is a U-pattern between the equil ibrium unemployment rate
and working time, but they do affect the value of hours //„ that minimise the unemployment rate.
5.5.5. /
The above labour market equilibrium results take the benefit level Ö of the unemployed as given. In
the longer run however it mqv he more realistic to consider j« fix«* «r,nlar.ßn\ßn'.Gitp,f> =JW<\1.
As working time reduction leads to wage moderation, this suggests that benefits will be reduced. In
practice, this may seem an unrealistic assumption. But in an environment with productivity growth, as
in Chapter 6, the only implication is that benefits and remuneration grow at different rates in the face
of working time reduction.
Taking the fixed replacement rate into account, remuneration is given by
In standard wage bargaining models, a constant replacement rate typically implies a vertical wage
setting curve, see e.g., Layard, Nickeil et al. (1991). This is not the case here. The first reason is that
the wage elasticity of employment or more general wage resistance |i, - changes with the level of
remuneration. The only exception is a Cobb-Douglas production function without quasi-fixed labour
costs. The second reason is that the left-hand side may also depend on remuneration, the exception
being a Cobb-Douglas utility function. So only with the often used Cobb-Douglas specifications and
without quasi-fixed costs as in Cahuc and Granier (1997) and FitzRoy, Funke et al. (2002),
equation (5.24) defines a unique equilibrium unemployment rate. For such a specification, it can be
shown that, due to the disutility of working time, equilibrium unemployment will be reduced as a
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In general, however, equation (5.24) defines a wage setting curve where remuneration falls if
unemployment increases. The slope is steeper than with fixed benefits. This curve may shift due to a
change in the replacement rate and due to changes in working times. In terms of elasticities, the
impact of the latter can be written as
I/Up f 0)
where p, = p—£—— > 0 is related to the replacement rate p. Compared to (5.23). only the
denominator becomes smaller, increasing the impact of reduced working time. This reflects the fact
that, at given replacement ratio, benefits will fall as a consequence of the wage moderation. The sign
remains unaffected, however, and the previous analysis applies only with a rcinterprctation of the
elasticities of the wage setting curve. As wage moderation is increased, the critical value //. is
reduced, see Figure 5.7, and a working time reduction is more likely to increase employment, than
with fixed unemployment benefits.
5.5.5.2
When deciding to participate in the labour market, agents compare the expected utility of
participation £/" with their endowment in utility (A I follow the specification in Cahuc and Granier
(1997), assuming that these utility endowments may differ between agents. This may, for example,
result from differences in wealth or in family composition. Let s(£/), with s'0) > 0, denote the
cumulative density of utility endowments in the economy. Individuals will only participate when {/" >
tf. Normalising without loss of generality the number of agents to one, labour supply 5 - i.e. the
number of participants and not their desired hours /^ - is given by 5 = $(£/*)• This is a non-
decreasing function of the expected utility level (/".
For the properties of the labour supply equation, (log-)differentiate labour supply, using (5.21).
Rearranging, using (5.22) and the definition of 00, this yields
</u + p,,u</1nJ3], (5.25)
where 85 s ty rty [7° > 0 and ry >0 is the elasticity of the density function $(•). So labour supply is
an increasing function of remuneration and benefits. The negative impact of unemployment illustrates
the discouraged worker effect in the model.116 Chapters
At given remuneration, a reduction in working time increases labour supply, as leisure is
valuable.^ Another mechanism working in the same direction, but not present in this chapter, is the
effect on the non-wage incomes of partners. If working time reduction leads to wage moderation,
family incomes are reduced. Such a negative income effect may trigger additional participation of
partners, increasing labour supply.
This shift of the labour supply curve induces another shift of the wage setting curve, which is
defined relatively to the labour supply curve. So remuneration will fall even more. This in turn
increases employment. The effect on the unemployment rate remains ambiguous, however, as both
labour supply and labour demand increase. The critical value of initial hours //„ where work-sharing
starts to have adverse unemployment effects is most likely to increase. Indeed, including endogenous
labour supply, the impact of work-sharing on unemployment is given by
The denominator is positive and the second term in the numerator is negative as long as toy + y r>
0. If this is the case, as assumed throughout, the labour supply effect dominates and //„ increases
compared to the case of inelastic participation.
5.5. i.i Genmj/ t'gu/7il>rium
As can be seen from Figure 5.7, work-sharing policies lead to reduced profitability as long as //<
//„, because wage moderation E^, falls below the rate An needed to keep profits constant. This will
have adverse effects in the long run, for example, through exit of firms. However, entry and exit is
difficult to model with constant returns to scale. A shortcut, leading to similar results, is to replace
market labour demand in the general equilibrium by price setting behaviour, see e.g., Blanchard
(2000). W ith constant returns to scale this gives a fully elastic price setting curve, shifting downwards
as a consequence of working time reductions.'"
To keep profitability constant, the long-run impact of reduced working time on remuneration is
given by the iso-profit elasticity, or -^Z = An > 0. Combining this with the wage equation (5.22),
tfln//
the general equilibrium impact on unemployment is given by"
29 At given hourly wages, however, a cut in hours has an ambiguous effect on labour supply,
depending on whether workers arc over- or underemployed. For overemployed workers (0) > 1)
the cost of participation declines, leading to an increase in labour supply. The opposite holds when
workers would be underemployed.
30 The impact of working time on price setting is larger than on (market) labour demand, as A.^ > A.y.
31 Keeping the replacement rate constant, instead of the benefits, as in (5.24), the effect on the
unemployment rate becomes-^- = -—38—L. This yields similar conclusions.Wage Bargaining. Working Time and UnemploNment 117
The sign of this expression is determined by the relative sizes of the iso-cmployment elasticity A-u
and the remuneration elasticity E^ Using Figure 5.7. it is clear that work-sharing policies only lead
to reduced unemployment if//> //„ > //.. So. the general equilibrium results, thus including entry
and exit, are more likely to give adverse effects compared to the labour market equilibrium.
Moreover, if. as argued before, bargained hours are determined in the interval |/f, /f| any
work-sharing policy starting from bargained hours will in the long run lead to higher unemployment
(and lower remuneration).
5.5.4 A numerical illustration
Table 5.2 concludes the section with a numerical illustration of the equilibrium effects. As a
reference, the first row repeats the values found in Table 5.1 for the partial equilibrium right-to-
manege model. Moreover, one additional column is added. -^^. to illustrate the interaction effects
on remuneration. Contrary to the right-to-manege model, the final impact of reduced hours on
remuneration will differ from the remuneration elasticity E^.
To find the equilibrium results, I need to calibrate four more parameters. The price elasticity of
aggregate demand T< is set at 1.5 as in Chapter 2. Participation in the labour market is considered
to be fully inelastic, so £5 = 0. The parameter p^ is related to the replacement rate Z?/K, but may be
higher due to risk aversion. Ignoring the latter aspect, I used p^ = 0.6 as in Pissarides (1998), but
lower than in Bovenberg, Graafland et al. (2000). Although unemployment is determined within the
model, 1 also needed an initial value as I only consider relative changes. This benchmark value for
unemployment w was set at 0.075, as work-sharing is typically suggested at times of high
unemployment.
For given benefits, wage moderation is lower in the general equilibrium than in the partial
equilibrium. The reason is that in the partial equilibrium employed workers gain from work-sharing,
hence the outside option increases in equilibrium. This reduces wage moderation. Due to the lower
price elasticity of goods demand in the aggregate, aggregate labour demand reacts less. Combining
the shifts in labour demand and wage setting, see Figure 5.8, remuneration falls and employment is
slightly increased in the labour demand model. The co-column illustrates that full wage moderation
only occurs at rather long working times. The last column demonstrates that employment is more
likely to increase, compared to the partial equilibrium.
The opposite holds forthe general equilibrium model, where remuneration is adjusted as to keep
profitability constant. Here price setting is independent of the scale of production (or employment).
As initial working time //is lower than the demand //'of firms, remuneration declines more than
proportionally in the equilibrium. Nevertheless, employment falls. The last column illustrates thatus Chapters












































u. Dcsides Ihc parameters from Table 5.1, the additional parameters lor the market equilibrium are T,, ~ 1.5, £, - 0, p,,.
-0.6wdu-U.U73.
initial working time should be rather long to get positive employment effects of work-sharing.
If the replacement rate is given, the employment effects become somewhat more favourable. Due
to wage moderation, benefits also decline reinforcing the positive impact on employment. Notice,
however, that the utility of the unemployed falls. Employment still declines in the price setting model,
although the critical value for initial hours is reduced considerably.
5.6 CONCLUSION
Working time reduction is a recurrent theme in the European discussion on unemployment.
Proponents typically stress the work-sharing aspects, whereas opponents stress the impact on costs
and competitiveness. This raises the issue of wage determination in the wake of working time
reduction. In this chapter I have incorporated these issues in an equilibrium labour market
framework. The main conclusions of the analysis are:
• working time reduction is likely to lead to wage moderation in terms of annual remuneration;
• wage moderation holds for any type of union bargaining framework;
• wage moderation is stronger if consumption and leisure are Edgeworth substitutes in utility,
• wage moderation is stronger in right-to-manage models compared to monopoly unions;Wage Bargaining. Working Time and Unemployment 110
• wage moderation is stronger at longer working times;
• there is a U-shaped relation between working times and hourly wages; and. as a consequence,
• there is a U-shaped relation between working times and the equilibrium unemployment rate.
So working time reduction can indeed reduce unemployment, but only for sufficiently long working
times. Moreover, a numerical example suggests that the (unemployment effects are rather limited.
The key then is to determine at what level of working time the impact changes sign. This is on the
agenda for future research. From an empirical point of view, the question is whether one can
estimate wage setting curves and labour demand or price setting curves with the predicted impact of
working times. From a theoretical point of view, the main question is how, and at what level,
working times are determined. This is the topic of the next chapter.6 Bargaining over Hours or Effort
6.1 INTRODUCTION
During the 20* century the industrialised world has witnessed a strong decrease in annual hours
worked per person in employment. In the beginning ofthat century the annual working time was
around 2700 hours, see Maddison( 1982), whereas in 1995 full-time annual hours of industrialised
countries varied somewhere between 1700 and 1900 hours, see Hunt (1998). Around 1700 hours
is typical for northern continental European countries like Germany and the Netherlands, whereas
American workers tend to work around 1900 hours a year. A similar difference is observed for
normal weekly hours: the 40-hours week is the norm in the USA, but in continental Europe 36 or 38
hours seem to be the rule. The remaining difference is explained by longer vacations in Europe
compared to the USA.
The standard explanation for these reductions in annual or weekly hours is based on productivity
gains: productivity gains lead to higher hourly wages in the labour market and with a backward
bending labour supply curve this in turn leads to reductions in hours worked. The 1000 hours
reduction in a century corresponds roughly to a 0.5% decrease per annum. With a not unrealistic
increase in productivity and hourly real wages of 2% per year, this would imply a labour supply
elasticity of - 0.25. Although perhaps a bit high in absolute value, this seems within the bounds of
empirical estimates of male labour supply elasticities.
The decline of 800 to 1000 hours during the century, did not occur at the same time on both
sides of the Atlantic, however. The 40-hour week was introduced in the 1940s in the USA. Since
then annual full-time hours have remained rather constant. In continental Europe, on the other hand,
the 40-hours week was only introduced in the 1960s or 1970s, but annual and weekly hours further
decreased during the 1980s and 1990s. This difference in development is sometimes attributed to
the role of labour unions in Europe. In the high unemployment era after the oil-shocks of the
seventies, European unions have been pushing towards reductions in working time to redistribute
work amongst people. This is the so-called work-sharing strategy, see Hunt (1998). The merits of
such a strategy have been questioned in the literature, see e.g., Freeman (1998) or Hunt (1998).
In the previous chapter I have shown that the impact of working time redistribution depends on
the length of the original working week. A natural extension is to consider the determinants of
working time in a union bargaining framework. This seems to be a rather underresearched area, but122 Chapter 6
notable exceptions are Calmfors (1985) and, more recently, Marimon and Zilibotti (2000). This
chapter tries to fill the gap and provides an overview of various hours bargaining models. To explain
the impressive reduction in working hours of the last century, the final question will be how
productivity growth affects bargained hours. It will be shown that declining hours can be consistent
with inelastic, or even upward sloping, labour supply.
The plan of the chapter is as follows. Section 6.2 sets the scene by considering a taxonomy of
hours determination models. This leads to a natural distinction between hours models and effort
models. In Section 6.31 introduce the partial equilibrium model, which closely follows the model of
Chapter 5, and I compare the traditional labour supply model of hours determination with three
alternatives: labour demand, union hours and bargained hours. Section 6.4 then considers effort
bargaining and Section 6.5 briefly summarises the wage bargaining model of Chapter 5. Section 6.6
considers the simultaneous hours and wage bargain. In Section 6.7 I briefly consider a sequential
bargain, where hours are determined before the wage bargain. In Section 6.81 turn to the impact of
productivity growth on bargained hours. For this we need a general equilibrium framework. Section
6.9 concludes the chapter.
6.2 A TAXONOMY OK HOURS AND EFFORT BARGAINING
Let me first provide a framework for hours or effort determination within a union bargaining
framework. The industrial relations literature ascribes an important role to trade unions in the setting
of hours worked or effort. This is, for example, confirmed by the observation that a large majority of
British unions negotiate about hours of work, see Clark and Oswald (1993). Andrews and Simmons
(1995) and Oswald (1993) also stress that working conditions, including working time issues, are on
the bargaining agenda. The call for work-sharing by continental European unions in the 1980s and
1990s is another piece of corroborating evidence.
The term 'effort' has become widespread in recent years, yet its meaning varies considerably.
Andrews and Simmons (1995) clarify the definition and meaning and give examples, see also Oi
(2001). It is best perceived as being multi-dimensional - think of working conditions - but for
modelling purposes it is mostly treated as being one-dimensional. Two key characteristics are that
effort increases labour productivity, but is disliked by individuals. This suggests an analogy with
hours of work, which has the same two characteristics. There is one crucial difference, however, as
"/u/wMr cv«/.v ur«? cÄ/^ren/, /veaust? /?rms pay d!r>wf/y./br /jours />«/ nor/or e/forf" (Andrews
and Simmons (1995. p. 314)). In other words, whereas an additional hour increases the wage bill
with the hourly wage costs If. effort can in principle be increased without a corresponding rise in
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This property of effort has an important impact on the functioning of labour markets. If effort is
unobservable. this has led to various efficiency wage theories, mostly of the shirking type introduced
by Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984). In this chapter, however, the focus is on observable effort which is
bargained over with unions.' In doing so. 1 will concentrate on working time //. Nevertheless, the
distinction between hours and effort models is still relevant: in the former, working time is determined
at given hourly wage W. whereas in the latter, working time is determined at given annual or weekly
remuneration >'. In a sense it is the timing of decisions which matter for the distinction between hours
models and effort models: in effort models annual remuneration is fixed before annual working time,
whereas in hours models the choice of hours will affect annual remuneration, as only the hourly wage
is fixed in advance. When hours, or effort, is determined before the wage bargain, the distinction is
meaningless.
Table 6.1 illustrates the difference between the two types of models within a wage bargaining
framework. In all cases, the maintained hypothesis of the table is that wages H'(or remuneration 0
are bargained between unions and firms. Moreover, as the number of workers JV is typically not
directly bargained about, see Clark and Oswald (1993). l^ayard. Nickelletal. (1991) and Oswald
(1993), I also assume throughout that wage bargaining is of the right-to-manage type, as introduced
by Nickell and Andrews (1983), where the firm determines the number of workers.
First, consider the various hours models. The best known is the labour supply model, where
working time W is determined by workers given the prevailing hourly wage. Alternatively, we can
define hours demand /f'as the working time firms would like to implement at given hourly wage, see
Dobbs (1992). Contensou and Vranceanu (1998) use a model where firms set hours, but at given
reservation utility of its employees, instead of a given wage. Alternatively we could let agents
determine hours, given the profit level of firms. Combining all points where the iso-profit curves and
indifference curves are tangent, we get a contract curve in terms of hourly wages and hours. This is
labelled efficient hours /f in the table. It is included as a benchmark case.
As unions also care about employment, their desired hours //" do not necessari ly correspond to
labour supply. But if unions do not have all the bargaining power, bargained hours W will be
different and also incorporate the preferences of firms.
Although union bargaining models were high on the research agenda, see e.g., Layard, Nickell et
al. (1991), only little effort has been devoted to the determinants of normal hours of work within
1 Bulkley and Myles (1996) consider unobservable effort in a bargaining framework, see the
comment by Goerke (1998), however.124 Chapter 6



























such a framework.- Notable exceptions are Calmfors (1985), Earle and Pencavel (1990) and
Pencavel (1991). Calmfors (1985) considers the optimal working time //" for the trade union and
Earle and Pencavel (1990) provide a taxonomy of the bargaining structure, of which Pencavel
(1991) considers two special cases. More recently, Marimon and Zilibotti (2000) and Rocheteau
(2000) consider bargained hours //* as their benchmark.
In effort models, annual (or weekly) remuneration K, instead of hourly wages ff, is determined in
the wage bargain. At given remuneration firms have an incentive to maximise working time //,
whereas employed individuals would tend to minimise it. These conflicting interest can be solved in a
union bargaining framework, leading to W in a monopoly union setting and to W if the bargaining
power of the union is limited.
A number of papers has been devoted to the determination of effort within union bargaining
models. A major conclusion of the literature is that union power tends to reduce effort, suggesting W
> W. see e.g.. Bulkley (1992), Bulkley and Myles (1997), Johnson (1990), Rosen (1989) and
Sampson (1993).
2 Booth and Schiantarelli (1987) and Houpis (1993) do consider the determination of actual (or
overtime) hours within a wage bargaining context. Overtime is typically determined by firms in the
last stage of the model, after the wage bargain. Cahuc and Granier (1997) show that firms would
like to prccommit on actual hours in such models. These models take normal hours, which is the
focus of tliis chapter, as parametric, however.Bargaining over Hours or Effort 125













































The bargaining outcomes also critically depend on the timing and structure of the bargaining process,
see Manning (1987). Whereas the papers above consider simultaneous bargaining over
remuneration and effort, Andrews and Simmons (1995), Nickell, Wadhwani et al. (1992) and
Rosen (1989) compare this with recursive bargaining, where effort is determined before
remuneration. On the other hand, Table 6.1 assumes that hours are (or effort is) determined after the
wage bargain. This may lead to strategic behaviour in the wage bargaining phase, where the
bargaining parties take the subsequent impact on working time into account.
Moreover, when including more than one issue on the bargaining agenda, the bargai ning power of
the union and the firm might differ between the issues. Let the parameter ß, ^ 0 denote the
bargaining power of the firm with respect to issue X: ß, = 0 corresponds to the monopoly union
model and ß, - °° to the firm having all bargaining power on this issue. In the symmetric case the
bargaining power is the same, say ß, on all issues.
Table 6.2 lists the possible alternatives, at least restricting our attention to right-to-manage models
with respect to employment JV in the last stage.' This yields 9 different models. By and large three
groups with respect to the timing can be distinguished:
• With simultaneous bargaining, hours and wages are determined jointly in the first stage. With
equal bargaining power on both issues, but not with different bargaining power, this is
observationally equivalent to a simultaneous effort and remuneration bargain.
3 Earle and Pencavel (1990) and Pencavel (1991) also include efficient bargaining with respect to
employment as an alternative.126 Chapter 6
• Casual observation of industrial relations suggests that normal working times are only adjusted
once in a whi le, whereas wages are bargained in each round/ Similarly, Andrews and Simmons
(1995) argue that work practices seem to be less sensitive to economic changes than wages and
employment. This suggests that we should consider hours or effort to be set prior to wages. This
leads to the sequential hours, or effort, first bargains, but these two are observationally equivalent
In the first stage normal hours are (or effort is) determined and in the second stage wages (and
hence remuneration).
• 1 lours-first bargains suggest that hours or effort are not adjusted that often, but it could be argued
that hours or effort may be changed rather quickly at the discretion of firms or individuals. This
would suggest the opposite sequence, where hours are determined after wages or remuneration.
This leads to the wage- and remuneration-first models of Table 6.2. The bargained hours model
of Table 6.1 corresponds to a wage-first bargain, whereas the bargained effort model
corresponds to remuneration-first bargain.' This sequence of events, where working time is
adjusted after the wage bargain, should not be confused with overtime models, however. The
reason is that in wage-first (remuneration-first) models employment is determined after the hours
(effort) detenuination, whereas the overtime decision is typically taken at given employment
levels. Thus, incorporating overtime would lead to a fourth stage, after employment
determination, where actual hours are determined, see Pencavel (1991). Overtime is ignored in
this chapter.
Summarising, Tables 6.1 and 6.2 illustrate that there is a wealth of economic models to analyse
hours worked, and most of them have indeed been used in the literature. The relevance of each
seems to depend on the institutional detail. In this chapter I take it for granted that unions are
involved in the determination of hours. This still leaves the nine models of Table 6.2. The
simultaneous bargaining model with equal bargaining power will be used as a benchmark, but I will
briefly discuss the impact of differences in bargaining power and consider the hours-first sequential
model as an alternative. The sequential wage- or remuneration-first models seem less relevant to me,
as they imply that hours will be adjusted after each wage bargain, and that does not seem to be the
normal practice.'
4 There may be many reasons for this, including coordination problems, externalities and
heterogeneity of preferences. This is all ignored here.
5 Manipulating the firm's second stage bargaining power ß*. all outcomes of Table 6.1 can be
obtained, except for the labour supply model W and efficient hours W. Consider the wage-first
model, for example, then ß» = 0 gives /f, whereas ß» - °° gives /f.
6 Unless bargained hours would be inelastic.Bargaining over Hours or Effort 127
6J HOI RS DETERMINATION
To introduce the partial equilibrium model and the corresponding notation, the hours models of
Table 6.1 are introduced first. As a by-product, the analysis provides a comparison of the various
hours models in the literature. The model is essentially the same as in the previous chapter, the only
difTerence is that I explicitly include productivity parameters, to analyse the impact ot productivity
growth on hours (and wages) later on.
6 J.I Individuals
Individuals derive utility from consumption land leisure I. Given a fixed time constraint, leisure is
the complement of hours worked //. So the utility function can be written as (/(}'. //). with partial
derivatives satisfying i7„ < 0 < (V There is no non-wage income and the price of consumption
goods is normalised to one, so consumption is equal to income, which is given by the budget
constraint K = Jf//, where (f is the real hourly wage.
Hours supply //* is obtained by maximising utility at a given hourly wage. Hence the marginal rate
of substitution is equated to the wage. It seems reasonable to assume that consumption and leisure
are both normal goods, but the sign of the derivative <3//7(3ff of the hours supply curve is
ambiguous. The bulk of the evidence indicates that labour supply elasticities (if positive) are rather
small. To explain the decrease in working time during the last century with an hours supply model it
should be negative.
For future reference I use the same notation as in Chapter 5: first, the marginal rate of substitution
between log-leisure and log-consumption is denoted as CO = - (//£/,/)/( KtVy) > 0; second, the rate of
relative risk aversion with respect to consumption is CCy = -JT^y/LV ^ 0; third, the rate of relative
risk aversion with respect to hours worked is 0C„ = //£/„„/£/„ £ 0; and finally, £ = - XLV„/t/„
reveals the substitutability between consumption and leisure. Using this notation, hours supply //" is
implicitly given by CO = 1.' The signs of the (X's indicate that individuals are risk averse - or at least
not risk seeking - with respect to consumption and leisure.* Finally, the usual assumption that
consumption and leisure are both normal goods implies that i; < min (OCy, OC„/co). As in Manning
(2001), I need to assume in the sequel that this condition holds everywhere, i.e. for al 1 hours and not
only for hours supply /f.
The cross-partial £/>-„, and hence £, cannot be signed opr/ori. In the often used Cobb-Douglas
type multiplicative separable utility function, e.g., Johnson (1990) and Nickell, Wadhwani et al.
(1992),
The second-order condition, a,- -2£ + a„ > 0, is assumed to hold. This is clearly the case if
consumption and leisure are normal goods.
The coefficient of relative risk-aversion with respect to leisure is given by - ££/„/£/, = a„ L/// 2 0.128 Chapter 6
(6.1)
with a' > 0 £ a" and </ < 0, £ is negative, implying that consumption and leisure are Edgeworth
complements. Machin and Manning (1992, p. 293) find this a plausible assumption, as it implies that
Wr/terv W/JO worA /wrJ ore /oo f/ra/ fo e/t/oy /Ae/r //icome'. Andrews and Simmons (1995), on
the other hand, argue that this sign is counterintuitive, as it implies that the marginal utility of income
declines as hours (or effort in their model) increase. Non-negative cross-partials are obtained, for
example, in utility functions of the type
t/(r,//) = *<a(n «(")), (6.2)
wilha'>0* a",v'>0i v",g'>0,g" 2 0 and g" > a". This class of utility functions is often
used in papers on effort, see e.g., Andrews and Simmons (1995), Bulkley (1992), Rosen (1989)
and Sampson (1993), although in most papers at least one of these three functions is an identity.'
The so-called (il II l-prefcrences of Marimon and Zilibotti (2000) also belong to this class, as they
use iso-elastic specifications for v(-) and #(•). and set a(K) = K
I have no strong feelings about the sign of the cross-partial. Maybe it also depends on the length
of the workweek: for long hours tiredness may dominate (£ being negative), but that is less likely for
shorter workweeks (£ positive). I am not aware of a simple utility function satisfying this property.
However, to derive more specific results. 1 need to assume that consumption and leisure are not too
strong Kdgeworth complements. As in Chapter 5, a sufficient, but not necessary, condition will be
that
t/„ *-*-£. (6.3)
This gives a negative lowerbound for the parameter I;. It is easily checked that (6.3) is satisfied for
both of the above utility functions.
Finally, two important expressions are the elasticities of the marginal rate of log-substitution to
with respect to consumption and hours. They are given by toy = —— = (ty - 1 -£ and O)« =
,, d In r
--^L = 1+ a„ ~to£, respectively. When consumption is a normal good, as is assumed, to„> 1,
and (0 is changing more than proportionally in hours at given income levels.'" On the other hand, tor
can not be signed a priori. Leisure being a normal good implies toy > - 1. For a Cobb-Douglas
9 The only exception 1 am aware of is Andrews and Simmons (1995), who use three iso-elastic
functions.
10 As a corollary, to is positively correlated to // at given hourly wage. Indeed in that case ^^| =
to„ + toy > 0. The second-order condition for utility maximisation implies that the last expression is
positive.Bargaining over Hours or Effort 129
utility we have 0>r=0. and the marginal rate of log-substitution o) is independent of consumption.
For the class of utility functions (6.2), we have to, = a. I. where tt_ is the rate of relative risk
aversion of a( K). So in general. (0 can either be increasing or decreasing in consumption. Notice,
however, that the sign of the derivative d///dff of the hours supply cur. • ,s given by minus the sign
of 0>r (evaluated at U) = I)." So to explain the decrease in working time during the last century by
hours supply we would need G>r > 0.
Firms
Conventional analysis of a firm's choice between workers and hours focusses on the determination
of overtime at given standard hours, see e.g.. Rosen (1968), Khrcnbcrg (1971).! lamennesh (1993)
or Hart (1987). This short-run decision is not what this chapter is about, but see Chapter 3. Here
the focus is on the long-run demand for hours. So I assume that there is no overtime and focus on
the desired (standard) hours from the viewpoint of the firm, as in Dobbs( 1992). Given the long-run
perspective it is important to incorporate the impact of hours on capital services, sec Chapter 2.
The model of the firm is the same as in Chapters 5. except that exogenous technical progress is
introduced in this version. The instantaneous production function /•!(/(*A.', /<yV) relates output ut uny
moment of time tc the stock of capital /T and labour JV, i.e. the number of machines and workers.
The variables^ and/^. capture capital or labour augmenting technological progress, respectively.
The production function is assumed to have constant returns to scale, so it can be written in intensive
form as F(^/C, -<4JVW) = ^^./W» where the capital-intensity A = ^^//l^V is now the capital-
labour ratio expressed in efficiency units. To capture positive but decreasing marginal productivity,
the function/*) satisfies/'(*) < 0 </(£) </*)/*. As before, the elasticity of/*) will be denoted
as r^and a > 0 is the elasticity of substitution between the stocks of capital and labour. In view of
the available evidence, I concentrate on the case where Oil.
Beside the scale of operations - as determined by the stocks of capital and labour - output can
be increased lengthening the duration of operations. Including efficiency hours a( f/) to capture things
like warming-up times and fatigue effects, output is 0=e(//WV/W- Let T|' denote the elasticity of
efficiency hours and define //^ and //^, implicitly by T|' = 1 and iy = 0, respectively. In line with
Chapman (1909) and Walker (2000), hourly producti vity reaches a maximum at //^, whereas output
per worker, and hence efficiency hours, is maximised at //„^ > //p. The relevant range of hours for
firms is then [//^, //„„]. Within this range, efficiency hours are increasing in hours worked, so e' > 0,
whereas the elasticity T|' is declining. To capture the last property, let y« = ~ ^^- ^ 0.
11 More specifically, the elasticity of hours supply is given bye^i^ = - —^—.130 Chapter6
On the cost side, wage costs per worker correspond to K + ff//, where fixed costs per worker
Kare independent of hours worked and hourly wage costs are W. Each worker's remuneration
corresponds to ffT/, which is equal to his of her income K With respect to capital costs, the
exogenous user cost of capital, Ä, is independent of the duration of operations.
In the output market, firms are operating in a market of monopolistic competition. A typical firm
faces a downward sloping iso-elastic demand curve of the type £> = ZV \ where /* is its price, Z) is
an exogenous demand shifter and T > 1 is the elasticity of demand. Substituting out the price, the
revenue of the firm is thus D' "£', where 0 < V = 1 - 1/T. < 1 measures the competitiveness of the
output market, with V close to I the market being very competitive. Combining all this, the profit of
a firm is given by
Maximising the profit with respect to the capital stock /L and number of workers W, the first-
order conditions can be rewritten as"
(6.4)
and
Equation (6.4) equates the marginal rate of technical substitution between the stocks of capital and
labour to their ratio of marginal costs. It determines the optimal capital-intensity *, which is inversely
related to relative costs, corrected for non-neutral productivity changes, but independent of the scale
Z). Equation (6.5), equating the marginal revenue product to unit labour costs, determines the
demand for workers. As in Chapter 5. the elasticity of labour demand with respect to remuneration
ise.v)- (1 <p,)[T(l T|V orfi ^ 0, where qv = K/(K+K)e (0, 1) is the share of fixed costs F
in labour costs.
For the impact of hours worked on labour demand N, it is important to distinguish between the
case where remuneration K is fixed (effort) or where the wage Wis fixed (hours). In the first case we
have the conditional elasticity e^r = (T- 1)T)* > 0, whereas in the second case E^,r = e^r +
£w An increase in effort is tantamount to neutral technological progress (c/ln^v = rfln.^ > 0), and
12 The second-order conditions for profit maximisation arc the same as in Chapter 5. and are satisfied
for v < I and O > 0.Bargaining over Hours or Effort 131
ir
increases employment. Although less workers are needed to produce the same amount of output,
the lower costs imply that output is expanded in a monopolistic competitive environment. The
second-order condition (T "> 1) guarantees that the output effect dominates. At given hourly wages,
however, a simultaneous increase in remuneration occurs, which reduces the positive impact on
employment. Whether employment increases or falls depends on the length of working time, see
Chapter 5. Let //„ be implicitly defined by e^wr = 0. then the number of workers is maximised at //„
and employment is positively (negatively) related to hours worked for shorter (longer) initial working
times. In Appendix 1 it was shown that the critical level //. is a decreasing function of the wage.
Next consider the impact of hours worked on profits II. Using the envelope theorem, it is easily
shown that En^r = (X- 1)T|* = e^, > 0 and Cn«* €„«, + Cnr. where e^ < Cnr -
~ (I" <peXT " IX1 ~ T*) < 0, as in Chapter 5. Obviously, profits and effort are positively related, but
for hours, thus at given wage, the negative impact of increased remuneration has to be added. l"he
sign then once again depends on the length of working time.
If the firm can unilaterally set hours, it will determine optimal hours //as to maximise profits. This
gives the first-order condition
Dividing equation (6.6) by (6.5), the marginal rate of substitution between hours and workers should
be equal to the ratio of marginal costs. This implies
(67)
or ri' = (] - <p^)( 1 - ryO < 1 in short-hand." In the optimum the elasticity of efficiency hours (or
output) with respect to hours should be equal to the elasticity of output with respect to employment
1 - r/, corrected for the share of remuneration in labour costs 1 - <p^. As a consequence, r)' < 1 and
Jointly, the equations (6.4) and (6.7) define the capital-intensity and hours that minimise unit
costs. The comparative statics of hours demand //* can easily be derived. This was discussed at
length in Chapter 2. For simplicity the signs are summarised in Table 6.3 below. Hours demand is
declining in the hourly wage ffand increasing in the fixed costs F. Moreover, as long as O < 1, it is
13 As a consequence, we have En«i»' ~ ^nwrv * ^nr ~ 0 in the optimum, as was to be expected from
the first-order condition.132 Chapter 6
increasing in the user cost of capital /?. Long-run hours demand is independent of scale £). For the
same reason it is independent of competitiveness V. Neither will neutral technical progress affect
hours demand. Biased technological progress, however, changes the marginal rate of technical
substitution between capital and labour, see equation (6.4). Therefore, it has the same effect as a
change in the user cost of capital.
Table 6.3 also incorporates the comparative statics of the critical hours //„, see again Chapter 2
for a more extensive discussion. It has the same properties as hours demand //*, except for the
impact of competitiveness V: in more competitive markets (v closer to one) the critical level of hours
is higher, and both coincide under perfect competition.'*
6.3.3 Efficient hours
Combining the ingredients of the above two models, consider the determination of hours in
competitive markets. Many economists commonly assume that hours are determined by the labour
supply curve. As illustrated in the previous section, however, firms typically have their own
preferences for hours worked. So in general, hours supply and hours demand need not to
correspond and the question is how to equate demand and supply. At first sight, the hourly wage
rate seems to be a relevant price variable. However, the wage rate can not equate the labour market
at the extensive (workers) and at the intensive margin (hours). The only exception is the unlikely case
when the production functions can be expressed in terms over employee-hours, £ = AW, and when
there are no fixed labour costs, K= 0. Only then the firm is willing to leave the choice of working
time to the workers, as it can get the optimal employee-hours adjusting the number of workers, see
Lewis (1969) and Manning (2001). To equate the extensive and intensive margins of the labour
market in more general models, one typically needs a non-linear pricing schedule where average
hourly wages depend on hours worked. The simplest example is the two-tier price mechanism with a
constant hourly wage and a fixed fee or benefits.'' The hourly wage rate equates demand and supply
at the intensive margin and the fee or benefit equates demand and supply at the extensive margin.
1 will not elaborate on this, but just consider the properties of the corresponding contract curve
for hours and hourly wages. This corresponds to the case analysed by Contensou and Vranceanu
(1998). who consider the competitive solution under utility competition. That is, the firm maximises
its profits under a participation constraint for its workers, as they should obtain at least their
14 In general we have W, < /f, see also Cahuc and Granier (1997), and in^, //. = W, see
Appendix I.
15 This could be one possible interpretation of the labour cost structure introduced in the previous
subsection, where W is the hourly wage and I' the fixed fee. However, this is not the interpretation
used in this chapter. Moreover, notice that the two-tier schedule only works with homogeneous
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reservation utility (/". Maximising profits II, subject to the constraint (/(K, //) ^ £/\ with respect to
capital £, employment N, working time //and remuneration K, the first-order conditions can be




This equation replaces hours demand (6.7) and determines the contract curve between hours and
wages.'* In short-hand this equation can be rewritten as T|' = (1 - (p^X 1 ~ i"|0ü) or Xn = (0, where
A-n s D js the iso-profit elasticity of remuneration with respect to hours. The latter
condition just states the tangency between the iso-profit curve and the indifference curve and hence
defines the contract curve. The solution is illustrated in Figure 6.1. In the graph hours supply /f is
assumed to be fully inelastic. The minimum of the U-shaped indifference curves t/, is at hours supply.
Hours demand //* is downward sloping and corresponds to the maximum of the iso-profit lines II,.
Hours demand exceeds productive hours //^, but is lower than maximum hours //^,. Efficient hours
W correspond to the tangency between the indifference curves and the iso-profit lines. The exact
16 Notice that when the marginal rate of substitution is equal to the wage rate, that is at hours supply,
both equations are the same.134 Chapter 6
position on the contract curve depends on the reservation utility, or more general, on the bargaining
power of firms and workers.
Figure 6.1 also illustrates that efficient hours can be seen as a kind of weighted average of the
hours demand and hours supply. Indeed, its properties combine the properties of hours supply and
hours demand in Table 6.3. The comparative static properties are easily derived differentiating
equations (6.4) and (6.8). The corresponding wage elasticity of efficient hours is a weighted average
of the hours demand elasticity and the hours supply elasticity. As hours demand is decreasing,
efficient hours are more likely to decrease with wages than hours supply."
6.3.4 Union hours
Another possibility of hours determination is that hours are set by unions, instead of firms or
individuals. The main difference with individual hours supply, is that unions take into account the
impact on employment. To illustrate this, let the utility Fof a typical union be given by the Stone-
Geary function
r = AT" [I/(C,//)-(/"]• 9>0 (6.9)
The union wants to increase the utility of its employed members above the given outside option £/\
but also cares about employment W. The parameter 0 is an indicator of the weight put on
employment. Johnson (1990) uses a similar specification. For 6^1, this specification generates the
same outcomes as the expected or utilitarian utility function used by e.g., Andrews and Simmons
(1995). Bulkley (1992), Calmfors (1985), Rosen (1989) or Sampson (1993) in their analysis of
hours or effort bargains.
I consider a right-to-manage framework, where the firms unilaterally determine capital and
labour, after hours have been set. The same model was used in Chapter 5 to analyse wage
determination. For the moment, however, hourly wages are exogenously given and the union sets
hours of work. Maximising union utility F with respect to hours, given the long-run labour demand
curve, gives the first-order condition
The utility gain of an additional hour for employed workers at the left-hand side, should be balanced
against the loss of employment at the right-hand side. From section 6.3.2 we know that e,v„ * £ 0
17 Yu € [9,, I) is the relative change of the profit elasticity e^ see Chapter 5 and Appendix 1.Bargaining over Hours or Effort I3S
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for // ^ //„, whereas the left-hand side is positive for //<//* (and negative for //> //"). So union
hours //" fall short of hours supply //", as long as they exceed the critical level //„.
This is illustrated in Figure 6.2, where union hours //" are a weighted average of//„ and W. For
simplicity, the latter is assumed to be inelastic in the figure. The difference between both panels is the
level of the outside option £/*. The only relevant part is when union hours are above this outside
option. The figure illustrates that for wages high enough, unions prefer shorter working times than the
individual employed workers. The reason is that when acting collectively through a trade union,
workers take into account that reduced working time decreases the risk of unemployment, see
Calmfors (1985). Empirical evidence on this issue is scarce, see Pencavel (1991, Ch. 2), but Perloff
and Sickles (1987), for example, provide evidence for a negative union hours mark-up in the US
construction industry.
Table 6.3 contains the properties of union hours //". As can be expected from the above figure, it
combines the properties of hours supply /f and the critical level //„, although the weight of each may
also change due to exogenous shocks. The impact of hourly wages W is ambiguous, it can be shown
to consist of three similar effects as bargained hours below, but as long as /y™ < //" union hours are
more likely to be downward sloping than labour supply. An increase in other factor costs, like For
Ä, increases //„ and hence increases union hours. An increase in the outside option £/" makes
unemployment less costly and shifts the weight towards /f. Accordingly union hours increase i f they136 Chapter 6
Figure 6.2 Union hours
fall short of hours supply. Increasing the weight 6 of employment in union utility shifts the weight
more to //^ and union hours decrease if they exceed this critical level. Finally, an increase in
competitiveness V increases //„ but also shifts the weight towards this critical level. The two effects
operate in opposite directions, but the increase in //„ dominates as long as A/" < //*.
These results may provide a rationale for the work-sharing strategy followed by European unions
in the 1980s. The increase in unemployment reduced the outside option for its members. This led to
a higher weight on the employment effects in hours determination. As long as employment is
negatively correlated with hours, thus for // > //„, unions had an incentive to reduce hours.
Furthermore, notice that //„ is higher in more competitive output markets. So the incentive for work-
sharing strategies was smaller in countries with more competitive markets. Beside the weaker
position of unions, this may explain why work-sharing is less an issue in the USA than in Europe.
6.3.5 Bargaining over hours
Instead of assuming that unions determine hours worked, it may be more realistic to consider the
case where unions and firms bargain over working time. 1 assume that the outcome of the bargaining
process can be found by maximising an asymmetric Nash function Q* ~ FII *, where ß* measures
the bargaining power of firms with respect to hours worked. As 1 focus on longer run issues, it
seems reasonable to set the threat-points equal to zero: for the union this implies that workers are
able to obtain the outside utility (f during a strike; for the firm this is consistent with the hypothesis
that the capital stock can be adjusted freely after completion of the bargain.
Maximising the Nash-maximand with respect to hours, given the long-run labour demand curve,
gives the condition (see Appendix J for the second-order condition)Bargaining over Hours or Effort 137
Figure 6.3 Bargained hours
£/-{/"
(6.11)
This is a straightforward generalisation of the monopoly union condition (6.10). The right-hand side
now also takes into account the impact of an additional hour on profits. As profits increase
(decrease) with hours as long as hours worked are less than (exceed) hours demand Z/', bargained
hours //* will be longer than union hours //" if the latter fall short of hours demand /^.
In Figure 6.3 this implies that bargained hours can be viewed as a weighted average of union
hours //" and hours demand //*. The weight on the latter increases with bargaining power ß,,. Hence
an increase in bargaining power will increase bargained hours as long as //" < Z/', see Table 6.3.
For the other variables the comparative static results are the same as for union hours. The impact of
wages on bargained hours will be discussed in some detail in section 6.6.2. Finally, the figure
illustrates that, depending on the going wage rate, workers can be over- or underemployed in the
bargaining set-up. Underemployment will most likely occur at relatively high wages. Therefore, it is
important to consider the determination of wages, but before doing so in Section 6.5, there is a brief
digression on effort bargains.1
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6.4 BARGAINING OVER EFFORT
The crucial difference between effort and hours, at least for the present analysis, is that for the
former remuneration is given, whereas for the latter hourly wages are fixed. If firms could unilaterally
determ ine effort, they would like to increase it as much as possible, that is, they would choose //^,.
However, as effort decreases the utility of its workers, effort can only be increased until the outside
option becomes binding. The corresponding iso-utility curve implicitly defines effort as an increasing
function of remuneration, with elasticity I/CO.
On the other hand, if employed individuals could determine effort, they would like to reduce their
effort to zero. However, this would reduce the revenues of the firm to zero and profits would
become negative. As this is not sustainable, effort can only be reduced until profits are zero. The
corresponding iso-profit line would implicitly define an upward sloping effort curve, with elasticity
Unions would also take into account the employment effects of effort, and therefore set effort W*
higher than individuals, as higher effort increases employment. In a bargaining framework, effort will
increase even further to accommodate the firm's pressure, so /A > /f. To illustrate this, maximise the
Nash-maximand Q* with respect to W at given remuneration }' and given the long-run labour
demand curve. The first-order condition implies
*^" . _.. . _«. _r
The disutility of effort to employed workers should be offset by the gains to the union and the firm in
terms of employment and profits, respectively. Let me call H« > 0 effort inclination, as it measures
the joint inclination of unions and firms to increase effort. Effort inclination declines with effort as
returns to effort decline with effort levels (^^ ^^ = - V« < 0).
The second-order condition corresponds to A,, " a,, + p« + Yw + 1 > 0. see Appendix J. This
is satisfied in the present set-up. As consumption is a normal good, one can even show that A« >
ü)Ao. where A« ~ 5 + ^» and ^> - —— > 0- Assumption (6.3) guarantees that A<, > 0.
Table 6.3 also includes the comparative statics of the resulting bargained effort //>. Effort is an
increasing function of remuneration ). 1 ligher remuneration increases the utility of employed workers
and. at given effort inclination ji^ workers are willing to supply more effort. The corresponding
elasticity is e^ = Ao/A« > 0. The elasticity is smaller than one as long as u >(O* =
1 - (O)// + YMVAQ . with (0* < 1." An increase in the outside option L" is followed by a reduction
18 Using this expression the effort elasticity can be written as e„^ = 1/(1 -Q* + w).Bargaining over Hours or Effort 139
in effort to increase the utility of workers. Soeffort bargaining is not consistent with a work-sharing
strategy, as higher unemployment now leads to more effort. Finally, effort is increasing in effort
inclination. This can be due to a higher employment weight 6, more bargaining power ß*. see also
Bulkley (1992) and Bulkley and Myles (1997), or increased competitiveness v. Factor casts do not
influence effort inclination, and therefore have no impact on bargained effort.
These comparative static results seem consistent with the observed stylised facts as summarised
by Andrews and Simmons (1995): a removal of restrictive practices, interpreted as an increase in
bargaining power for firms, leads to more effort and there is a positive relation between effort and
remuneration."
&5 WAGE BARGAINING
To compare effort and hours bargains, we need to determine the relevant wage. As a benchmark,
consider the case of bargaining over remuneration at given hours or effort. Moreover, the bargaining
power with respect to wages ß» is not necessarily equal to the bargaining power with respect to
hours ß,,. This wage bargain is exactly the same as in Chapter 5, where the focus was on the effect
of working time on wages and remuneration. This sections summarises the most relevant results.
The model is most easily presented in terms of remuneration. Maximising the Nash-maximand Q*
= FII • with respect to the remuneration, taking account of the right-to-manage assumption, gives
the first-order condition
[/-£/'
The left-hand side is the elasticity of the utility rent of workers with respect to remuneration, A.y. It
corresponds to the ratio of marginal utility of consumption and the average utility rent of employed
workers. The right-hand side |iy is what was called wage resistance in Chapter 5. It measures the
resistance of unions and firms to raise wages, due to its costs in terms of employment and profits,
respectively.
The second-order condition for the wage bargain is given by Ay = OCy+ p.^+ Yr ~ 1 > 0, where
0<7r= < 1, see Chapter 5 or Appendix J. So the sum of the coefficient of relative risk
aversion a> and wage resistance ^ should be sufficiently large, as is assumed to hold.
19 Andrews and Simmons (1995) interpret the latter observation in terms of the contract curve
between effort and remuneration, whereas the last row of Table 6.3 refers to bargained hours at
given remuneration.140 Chapter 6
Table 6.4 Comparative statics remuneration
e p. v [/• K
+/0
a. FofO £ I.
The properties of the bargained remuneration are summarised in Table 6.4. Most of them are as
usual. An increase in the outside option {/* increases remuneration, whereas an increase in wage
resistance reduces wages. This may be due to a higher weight of employment for unions (6), more
bargaining power of firms (ßj or a more competitive goods market (v). An increase in quasi fixed
labour costs K reduces wage resistance, see Chapter 5, and therefore increases the bargained
remuneration. The same applies for the user costs of capital Ä, at least if the elasticity of substitution
O is smaller than one. Hiascd technical progress (/fy'/<^) has the same effect. Finally, an increase in
hours is matched by an increase in remuneration, to compensate for the disutility of longer hours. The
corresponding elasticity is e^ - G)A</A^ > 0.
In Chapter 5 I argued that the impact of hours on hourly wages is U-shaped. Hourly wages and
hours are negatively correlated if (and only if) Ay> toA<). This can be rewritten in terms of the
marginal rate of log-substitution as to < to" = 1 + (toy + YJO/AO, see Appendix J.*° Given the
positive correlation between hours and to, this gave the U-shape. The minimum is obtained for to =
to" and this exceeds hours supply (to = I < to") as long as toy + Yi> 0. The latter expression
plays an important role in the sequel. The model of the firm guarantees that y> > <P» £ 0, so that
wage resistance increases with remuneration, see Chapters 2 and 5. As stated earlier, the sign of (0y
determines whether labour supply is backward bending (toy > 0) or not. Given the small estimates of
labour supply elasticities, we might conclude that to, is unlikely to be very negative. Taking together,
these observations suggest that it may be reasonable to focus attention on the case where to, + Yr^
0. or in a different notation to" > 1. The implication is that, unless workers are sufficiently
overemployed (to > to" > 1), hourly wages will increase with working time reduction, although less
than proportional.
20 Using this expression the remuneration elasticity can be written asBargaining over Hours or Effort 141
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6.6 SIMULTANEOUS WAGE AND HOURS BARGAINING
The most straightforward way to combine wage and hours determination, is the case of simultaneous
bargaining over wages and hours with equal firm bargaining power ß on both issues, recall Table
6.2. This is equivalent to a simultaneous bargain over remuneration and effort, which is more easily
analysed.
6.6.1 Remuneration and effort
The first-order conditions for the latter model are given by the equations (6.12) and (6.13), with ß*
= ß„ = ß. The joint determination of effort and remuneration is illustrated in Figure 6.4. For
simplicity, consider first the monopoly union model. The curve labelled J"corresponds to monopoly
union wage determination, as given by equation (6.13), but with ß„ = 0. The curve labelled //"
determines effort for the monopoly union and is given by equation (6.12), but with ß^ = 0. Both
equations are upward sloping, see the Tables 6.3 and 6.4, and the second-order condition
guarantees that the effort-curve is steeper.^' Union utility is maximised at the intersection of both
21 The corresponding second-order conditions are A,. > 0 and A = A,, A,, - d)A^ > 0. The first
guarantees that &)" > 0 and the second is always satisfied for co" ^ 1. For 0)* < 1, the second142
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curves, yielding the monopoly union allocation (//„, KJ. The figure also gives two union indifference
curves F. As in Rosen (1989) they arc ellipsoids. At the intersection with the W (I*) curve the
indi (Terence curves are horizontal (vertical, respectively). The larger the ellipsoid, the lower the union
utility.
Allowing for bargaining power of the firm, both curves shift to the right, see again Tables 6.3 and
6.4: more bargaining power for the firm in the effort bargain would increase effort and remuneration
along the monopoly wage schedule P; whereas more bargaining power for the firm in the wage
bargain would reduce effort and remuneration along the monopoly effort curve //*. With equal
bargaining power ß, wage determination (6.13) yields the curve labelled P and effort bargaining
(6.12) the curve /A. The bargaining equilibrium is (//^ K»), with corresponding union utility F».
Bargaining with equal bargaining power on both issues reduces remuneration (J^ < K„), but the
impact on effort is ambiguous. The figure assumes that effort is increased (//^ > //„). A sufficient
condition for this to occur is to" > I.
Ilie comparative statics of the equilibrium of the simultaneous bargaining solution are summarised
in Table 6.5. see Appendix J for the underlying calculations. An increase in quasi-fixed labour costs
I•', or an increase in capital costs Ä, reduces wage resistance and hence shifts the wage setting curve
)* (and P) upward. As a consequence, both hours and remuneration increase. The impact on hourly
wages is ambiguous, however. Wages increase if (and only if) to > to*. So unless hours are relatively
short, hourly wages increase as well.
The other variables shift both curves in Figure 6.4 in the same direction, recall Tables 6.3 and
6.4. leading to possibly ambiguous results. For the outside option {/*, the curves shift upward. For
remuneration, the shift of the wage setting curve dominates, but for hours the impact is ambiguous.
I lours decrease as long as to" > I. In any case, hourly wages will increase.
condition sets an uppcrbound to the marginal rate of log-substitution O). see Appendix J.Bargaining over Hours or Effort 143
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For the remaining parameters both curves shift downward, as has been illustrated for bargaining
power ß in Figure 6.4. Hourly wages tend to move in the same direction as remuneration. An
increase in competitiveness v (or in bargaining power ß) has ambiguous effects for remuneration
and effort, although we can exclude the possibility that remuneration increases while effort declines.
The most likely outcome is that remuneration falls and effort increases. Hourly wages tend to
decrease with competitiveness. Finally, an increase in the union employment weight 6 reduces
remuneration and hourly wages. The impact on hours depends on the size of CO", however.
6.6.2 Hours and effort bargains compared
Figure 6.5 compares hours bargaining with effort bargaining. As in the previous figure effort
determination /f and wage bargaining y* correspond to the equations (6.12) and (6.13),
respectively. The figure adds hours determination //* as given by equation (6.11). Obviously, the
three curves cross in the equilibrium, as condition (6.11) is implied by (6.12) and (6.13). The left-
hand panel expresses all curves in terms of remuneration, the right-hand panel uses the hourly wage
rate on the vertical axis. First, consider the left-hand panel. Compared to Figure 6.4, only bargained
hours //*' are added, but expressed as a function of remuneration y and not of hourly wages ff.
Contrary to the other two cur.es, ihe slope of the bargained hours curve is undetermined. It is144 Chapter 6
downward sloping if (and only if) CO* < CO < CO", as is assumed in the graph.^ The figure illustrates
that for remuneration rates above (below) the equilibrium level X» effort bargains lead in general to
longer (shorter) hours than hours bargains.
Second, consider the right-hand panel of Figure 6.5, which makes the same comparison, but now
in terms of hourly wage rates ff instead of remuneration K. As argued before, wage bargaining
(6.13) leads to a U-shaped wage setting curve J*, the minimum corresponding to CO = CO". Effort
bargaining (6.12) also leads to a U-shaped effort curve /A in terms of hourly wages. The minimum of
this curve corresponds to CO CO* < CO". Next consider the impact of hourly wages on bargained
hours //". It can be shown, using the expressions in Appendix J, that the sign of the elasticity is given
by the sign of the following expression
The first term CO^ is the ambiguous slope of hours supply W, the second part (1 -co) is the
disequilibrium of bargained hours //* compared to supply /f, and the third term with y>reflects the
change in wage resistance p. ,•. This final term captures the negative slope of both hours demand /r*
and the critical level //„. This decomposition indicates that bargaining hours are likely to be
downward sloping, unless bargaining hours exceed hours supply and hours supply is rather elastic.
In Chapter 5 it has been shown that a similar decomposition holds for bargained wages at given
hours. The only difference is that wage bargaining ensures A., = [iy. So in the equilibrium, the sign of
the slopes of bargained hours and bargained wages are the same. As long as CO < CO" in the
equilibrium, both will be downward sloping as suggested in Calmfors (1985) and as illustrated in the
right-hand panel of Figure 6.5.
Finally, the figure illustrates that for wage rates above (below) the equilibrium level H^ effort
bargains tend to lead to longer (shorter) hours than hours bargains.
6.6.3 A labour contract
Although simultaneous bargaining gives a unique equilibrium pair of hours and wages - or
equivalently effort and remuneration the results can also be used to define a trade-offbetween
hours and wages (or effort and remuneration). Dividing equations (6.12) and (6.13) yields the
following expression for the marginal rate of log-substitution CO
(6.14)
22 In the equilibrium the hours elasticity is given by e„^. = -((0"-<o)/[td(to-<o*)]. For to < to* t!«
curve will be upward sloping and steeper than the bargained effort /A. and for to > to* it wil' be
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I will call this the labour contract, as it gives all combinations of hours and wages, or effort and
remuneration, consistent with the bargaining framework, but independent of the outside option (/*.
The latter only affects the remuneration determined in e» mat ion (6.13).
This trade-off between hours and wages is somewhat a A:«J to the efficient hours /f discussed
in section 6.3.3. Efficient contracts between workers and firms imply that the marginal rate of log-
substitution between hours and remuneration to equals the iso-profit function elasticity An. see
equation (6.8). This would also be the outcome of (6.14) if the union does not care about
employment (6 0) and the bargaining power on both issues is the same (ß. ßj or if the firm
would have all the bargaining power on both issues (ß. ß* ß • <*>). In general, however,
simultaneous union-firm bargaining about wages and hours implies to H,/Ht *- A.n.'' ^' '^
denote the solution of (6.14). then this condition illustrates that //•//'. Due to the righl-to-manage
assumption, the labour contract implied by union bargaining reduces hours or effort below the
efficient level.
Table 6.3 included the properties of the labour contract /f. The impact of higher wages of hours
(or remuneration of effort) is ambiguous. Hours decline as long as O)^ * y> ^ 0, or W > I. So,
compared to hours supply, the labour contract is more likely to be downward sloping, as wage
resistance p^ is increasing in remuneration (y> > 0). On the other hand, the labour contract is
somewhat less likely to be downward sloping than efficient hours W.-^lncreas' ... factors costs K
and /? increase hours through their negative impact on wage resistance HJ.. Tl.o same applies for
labour saving technical progress. An increase in competitiveness v, an increase in bargaining power
ß» and a decrease in the value of employment 8 all increase p.^n^.-' Hence in the labour contract
hours would increase after such shocks.
6.6.4 Work-sharing
Figure 6.6 illustrates the relations between the key parameters of the simultaneous bargaining model
as a function of effort or hours. It is an extension of Figure 5.6 in Chapter 5. Due to concavity of
efficiency hours, the iso-profit elasticity A.n is decreasing in hours. The demand for hours /^ is given
by A.n. = 1, see equation (6.7). Let A.^, = -E^/Ey,. denote the iso-employment elasticity of labour
demand. As was shown in Chapter 5, this parameter is also decreasing in hours, with A.^ < A.n. The
critical employment level //„ is given by A.^ = 1, so //„ < Z/'. The right-hand side of the labour
23 Notice that (6.14) does not correspond to the contract curve between unions and firms, except for
6 = 0. The union-firm contract curve depends on the outside option, as the right-to-manage
assumption with respect to employment implies that for the union the marginal rate of substitution
between effort and remuneration depends on the outside option.
24 As Yn > Y>-
25 Although not included in the table, an increase in bargaining power ß„ works in the opposite
direction of a change in ß,,. With equal bargaining power on both issues, the impact of ß*
dominates.146 Chapter 6
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contract (6.14) Jl,/^ is a weighted harmonic mean of A* and An- It is equal to Ay for a monopoly
union and equal to An when firms have all the bargaining power on both issues. Moreover, the more
unions value employment the closer H/^H> is to Ay.
The marginal rate of log-substitution O) is increasing in hours. Hours supply //* is determined by
(0=1. The labour contract (6.14) is given by the intersection of to and fVm yielding hours /A. As
efllcient hours /f are given by the intersection of o> and A.n. see equation (6.8), efficient hours
exceed the hours from the labour contract. As //<//" in the figure, workers are underemployed,
although this is not necessarily the case.*'
The hours elasticity of remuneration e^»^ = to/to" is increasing in effort. This reflects the U-
shape of bargained wages with respect to hours. Hourly wages are independent of hours for to =
to", which corresponds to e,,»^ = I. Figure 6.6 considers the most likely case where to" > 1, or
equivalcntly to, » Yi > 0. Accordingly, e,,»^ is lower than to. The second-order conditions
guarantee that the inverse of the remuneration elasticity of effort e„,,, exceeds max(to, e,. »„). The
critical value to* corresponds to the value of to where e„,_ = I.
In Chapter 5 it was argued that a work-sharing policy can increase employment as long as initial
hours are not too long, the critical level being given by the intersection of Ay and e,.»„. A
simultaneous bargain would lead to /f as initial hours. Accordingly, with the parameter constellation
underlying the figure, a work-sharing policy would lead to negative employment effects. However,
changing the union employment weight 6. or bargaining power ß* or ß. the relative positions could
change, leading to positive employment effects of work-sharing. Similarly, the choice of the utility
26 The figure also assumes that //" < W. This needs not to be the case as can be seen by shifting the
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function may affect the relative position. For example. Marimon and Zilibotti (2000) using essentially
a simultaneous bargaining model, find different results fortheirCHS- andGHH-utility functions. In
terms of Figure 6.6. the choice of the utility function influences the position and slope of the u>-curve,
and thus of the corresponding elasticities e^»„ and e^,^. As a consequence, different utility
functions may well lead to disparate conclusions with respect to the effectiveness of work-sharing
policies.
6.7 SEQUENTIAL BARGAINING: Horns FIRST
Although it seems reasonable to assume that hours or effort are on the bargaining agenda of unions
and firms, it is not necessarily the case that unions have the same bargaining power for working
conditions as for wages. Moreover, the bargaining sequence may be important, recall Table 6.2. To
me. the most relevant model seems the sequence where hours are determined prior to the wages, the
so-called hours-first bargains.
Compared to the sequential wage and employment bargaining model of Manning (1987). the
main difference is that sequential bargaining is now about hours and wages or effort and
remuneration and that the firm retains the right-to-manage with respect the employment, i.e. the
number of workers, in the final stage. Working backwards, the second-stage remuneration is found
maximising the corresponding Nash-maximand Q" = m^", subject to the factor demand
equations (6.4) and (6.5). This just gives the wage bargain (6.13), with the corresponding
remuneration elasticity e j,»^. Then in the first-stage, hours are (or effort is) found by maximising the
Nash-maximand Q* = TII^*, subject to factor demand and the wage bargain (6.13). The first-
order condition for hours can be written as
//(/„
(/-£/'
The last term on the right-hand side is the strategic effect of the sequential bargain: during the first
stage, the bargaining parties take into account the subsequent positive effect of hours on
remuneration. As long as the bargaining power on both issues is equal, that is for ß* = ß„ = ß, the
last term vanishes and there is no difference between the sequential bargain (6.15) and the
simultaneous bargain (6.12).
Figure 6.7 illustrates the outcome of the sequential hours-first bargain with different bargaining
power. It considers two extreme cases: the first case assumes that the union has all the bargaining
power (ß* = 0 < ß J during the hours bargain; the second case gives all the first stage bargaining
power to the firm (ß* - °°). The wage curves J~ and y* and the effort curves //* and //* are the
same as used in Figure 6.4. A simultaneous bargain with equal bargaining power ß on both issuesChapter 6 1
Figure 6.7 Sequential bargaining
would yield the bargained outcome (//», K»), at the intersection of the F* and /^ curves. In this
simultaneous bargaining equilibrium, the slope of the union indifference curve F,, is equal to the slope
of the firm's iso-profit line (in log's the latter is equal to the iso-profit elasticity An). The reason is
that the outcome of the simultaneous bargain lies on the union-firm contract curve in terms of hours
and remuneration. The slope (in log's)of the second-stage bargained wage J* is the elasticity e j.»„.
This is typically smaller than An. as is clear for //" from Figure 6.6. The union thus has an incentive to
reduce hours towards //„. where union's utility F. is tangent to wage setting J*. As a consequence
remuneration is also lowered in the second stage.Bargaining over Hours or Effort 149
So, according to equation (6.15). unions have an incentive to reduce effort in a sequential
bargain, as long as e ^.»^ < A.n."' This is consistent with the results in Andrews and Simmons (1995)
for their specific utility function.
Nickeil, Wadhwani et al. (1992) and Rosen (1989) compare the simultaneous bargain with the
situation where the firm has all the power to determine effort in the first stage. This corresponds to
ihe limiting case of ß» - ». This is illustrated in Figure 6.7. The firm having all bargaining power
during the first stage, the iso-profit curve should now be tangent to wage detenuination )*. As the
iso-profit line is steeper in (//», )*) than the wage curve, this implies that firms would like to set
higher effort. The highest profit II, is reached at //,, where the slopes are equal, implying e^ •
An- Compared to the simultaneous bargain, workers will be partly compensated by an increase in
their remuneration.
A important result of the simultaneous bargain was that it implied a trade-off between
remuneration and hours independent of the outside option, the so-called labour contract of equation
(6.14). A similar result holds for the sequential bargaining model of this section: dividing the first
stage condition (6.15) by the second stage condition (6.13), the resulting labour contract becomes
This equation has a rather similar structure as (6.14), only the right-hand side is adjusted to
incorporate the strategic effects of sequential bargaining. The occurrence of the remuneration
elasticity e j,»^ in the strategic effect complicates the comparative statics of the labour contract, so
when studying the impact of productivity growth we return to the simultaneous bargain.
27 At first sight, equation (6.15) might suggest a different outcome as the last term is negative for ß,, =
0. However, hours bargaining power ß^ also affects effort inclination Ji„. So using (6.15), one
compares the sequential model with a simultaneous bargaining model with unequal bargaining
power, as given by the intersection of the //"-curve with the ]"*-curve. Compared to that situation,
the sequential bargaining model leads to an increase in effort. However, rewriting (6.15) as
" 0 ß (ß*ß„>WW-*n> C6-15-)
/-1/
the last term is positive for ß,, = 0, showing that hours indeed decrease relative to the simultaneous
bargain with equal bargaining power ß„ on both issues.150 Chapter 6
6.8 PRODUCTIVITY AND HOURS IN GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM
Finally, let us investigate the impact of technical progress on hours (and remuneration) in the
simultaneous bargaining model. The partial equilibrium effects can be read from Table 6.5. Neutral
technical progress leaves /V/f* unchanged and has no direct impact on the bargaining outcome."
Labour saving technical progress, on the other hand, reduces wage resistance, and therefore shifts
the bargained wage K* in Figure 6.5 upward, see Table 6.4. The bargained effort curve //* is not
affected by biased technical progress, see Table 6.3, but bargained hours //* would increase. As a
result, see Table 6.5, remuneration and hours increase in the partial equilibrium. This increase in
hours is rather incompatible with the observed secular decline in working times. A simple explanation
can be found in the general equilibrium, where the outside option 6" is no longer exogenous.
As in Chapter 5, consider a symmetric equilibrium where all firms have the same working time//
and remuneration K. Let u denote the unemployment rate of the economy and let S be the
exogenous unemployment benefit for the unemployed. For simplicity 1 ignore taxation issues to .
finance these benefits. The unemployed thus have a utility level £/ = {/(Z?,0) and the outside option
for each union is given by the expected utility
fr = (i-«)f/(r,//) + uf/(Ä,o). (6.17)
Substituting this in the partial equilibrium effort bargaining equation (6.12) and wage bargaining
equation (6.13), respectively, gives their general equilibrium counterparts as
(6.18)
and
— = JI.M. (6.19)
£/-£/*
These equations have a similar structure as their partial equilibrium counterparts; only the outside
option (/* is replaced by the utility of the unemployed £/ and wage resistance Hy and effort
inclination }!„ are multiplied with the unemployment rate.
These two equations can be used to derive the effect of an increase in unemployment u on wages
and hours. This leads to the same type of effects as a fall in the outside option in the partial
28 This could change if unions would claim their fair share of profits.Bargaining over Hours or Effort 151
equilibrium model of Table 6.5. So. remuneration falls and the impact on hours is ambiguous, but
they increase as long as (*),• + y^ > 0. However, unemployment is endogenous in the general
equilibrium and is determined by the interaction of wage setting and labour demand or price setting,
as in Layard, Nickell et al. (1991). With the focus on the long-run development of hours, the
equilibrium is best characterised by the price setting behaviour, see Hlanchard (2(XX)).
Gi ven the assumption of constant returns to scale, each firm sets its price /* as a mark-up on unit
costs .V, as long-run profit maximisation implies /> - A7V. Let K, land Ä now reflect real prices,
then this price setting behaviour implies
v = £-£-. (6.20)
where the right-hand side corresponds to real unit costs A7/\ Implicitly this equation determines real
remuneration y as a function of working time, technology parameters and other (real) factor prices.
Equations (6.4). (6.18). (6.19) and (6.20)jointly determine the general equilibrium, with),//.*
and M as the endogenous variables. The model can be solved recursively, however. Dividing
equation (6.18) by (6.19), shows that the labour contract (6.14) also holds in the aggregate. As it is
independent of the unemployment rate w, equations (6.4), (6.14) and (6.20) can be used to
determine general equilibrium remuneration y, hours //and capital-intensity /t. The unemployment
rate then follows recursively from (6.19). As equations (6.4), (6.14) and (6.20) do not include the
unemployment benefit 5, remuneration and hours will in the long run be independent of these
benefits. On the other hand, the unemployment rate is positively correlated to unemployment benefits
according to (6.19).
Figure 6.8 illustrates the long-run general equilibrium for remuneration and hours. The upward
sloping line corresponds to price setting (6.20), including cost minimisation (6.4). The downward
sloping line is the labour contract (6.14). The price setting curve is upward sloping because an
increase in hours is tantamount to neutral technical progress, at least as long as hours do not exceed
the level //„^. This allows the firm to set lower prices and hence real wage costs K increase. In more
competitive goods markets the price setting line is higher. The slope of the bargained labour contract
(6.14) is ambiguous, but it was shown to be downward sloping as long as CO" > l,oro)y+ Yr-*0,
recall Table 6.3.
Neutral technical progress does not infl uence the labour contract, but shifts the price setting curve
(6.20) upward. As a result, remuneration increases unambiguously and the impact on hours depends
on the slope of the labour contract. With the downward sloping curve in Figure 6.8 hours will be
reduced. Labour saving technical progress has a similar impact on price setting, shifting it upward,152 Chapter 6
price setting
Figure 6.8 General equilibrium hours and technical progress
although to a lesser extend. In this case, however, the labour contract may also shift. If the elasticity
of substitution 0 between capital and labour is smaller than one, labour saving technical progress
reduces wage resistance |i,. As a consequence, the labour contract (6.14) shifts to the right. This
reinforces the increase in remuneration, but has an offsetting effect on hours.'' In Appendix K it is
shown that the shift in price setting dominates, as in Figure 6.8, if (and only if) toy + (p, > 0.
In the standard hours supply model, productivity growth translates into wage growth, which in
turn affects labour supply. To explain the observed secular decline of hours during the last century,
labour supply should be backward bending (to, > 0). Within an hours bargaining framework, the
slope ofthe hours supply curve is no longer the sole determinant, and factor demand elements play a
role. Due to quasi-fixed labour costs, we are more likely to observe a decline in working time as a
consequence of productivity growth. Thus, even if the hours supply curve would be moderately
upward sloping, labour saving productivity growth will reduce hours in a bargaining framework.
29 With an upward sloping labour contract, hours unambiguously increase, as both effects work in the
same direction.Bargaining over Hours or Effort 153
6.9 Si MM ARY AND CONTUSION
This chapter provides a unifying framework for working time determination within union bargaining
models. Many models can be found in the literature, and their relevance depend on the institutional
context. The taxonomy of models yields a natural division between hours and effort models, although
the two are observationally equivalent for some and perhaps the most relevant bargaining set-
ups. So the results of the more abundant effort bargaining models may be used for the inference on
working time determination in a union bargaining framework.
Combining wage bargaining and hours or effort bargaining, the labour supply curve of standard
models is basically replaced by a labour contract, identifying the bargaining trade-off between wages
and hours (or remuneration and effort). This curve is more likely to be backward bending than the
ordinary labour supply curve, for example due to the existence of quasi-fixed labour costs.
Moreover, the labour contract summarises in a neat way the institutional context of hours
determination. For example, increased union bargaining power and a less competitive goods market
shift the labour contract towards lower hours. These kind of factors may explain part of the hours
differential between Europe and the USA. It would be interesting tötest these predictions in across-
country analysis.
The bargaining framework has finally been used to investigate the impact of technical progress on
hours and remuneration. The results indicate that it is important to consider general equilibrium
effects: whereas in the partial equilibrium hours tend to increase, the opposite may be true in the
general equilibrium, even when hours supply is inelastic.7 Hourly Wages and Working Time in the
Dutch Market Sector 1962-1995
7.1 INTRODUCTION
During the 20* century there was an impressive decline in annual working hours in capitalist
countries. Nowadays full-time workers tend to work about 800 to 1000 hours less per year than
their grandparents a few generations earlier. In some countries the bulk of the decline occurred
during the first halfofthe century, in other countries the decline started later. In 1936, under Blum's
Front Populaire, France was the first country to introduce the 40-hour week, for example. The New
Deal policy of the 1930s in the United States also involved a reduction of working hours. These are
two early examples of a so-called worAr-s/jar/ttg strategy, i.e. 'ra//s//77>M/i/ig HW£ am»/i#sf
/?eop/e so as to ra/wce /«vo/MMtary wHe/np/qyme«/', Dreze (1986, p. 562).
After the Second World War during the period of reconstruction, working hours remained rather
high in many European countries, whereas the 40-hour week was introduced in the USA. During the
high growth period of the 1960s and early 1970s, however, working times were substantially
reduced in (continental) European countries. So before the oil shocks of the 1970s, standard
working times were fairly harmonized in Western industrialized countries, j ust as in the beginning of
the century. The large reductions of working time during this post-war period, are probably
examples of the process of allocating the gains of productivity growth between wage increases and
increases in leisure time. I will call this phenomenon/voc/Mcf/v/Vy-.s/janrtg, as opposed to the work-
sharing argument presented above.
Since the oil shocks of the 1970s, full-time hours remained rather stable in the USA and the UK,
but they dropped further in continental Europe. In this chapter I confine myself to the decline in full-
time hours in the Netherlands. An important question is whether this decline was due to work-
sharing or to productivity-sharing. In other words, was it a defensive strategy intended to reduce
unemployment or was it j ust the consumption of a part of the productivity gains in increased leisure?
Consider the French case, for illustration. In 1981 thejust elected socialist Mitterand government
called for a substantial but gradual reduction of weekly hours from 40 hours to 35 hours in 1985. In
















Figure 7.1 Full-time working hours
was a clear example of a work-sharing strategy. After disappointing results in terms of
unemployment, sec I lunt (1998), the remaining reduction to 36 hours was not implemented. In 1997
the newly elected socialist Jospin government announced a similar policy of mandated (gradual)
reduction of weekly hours to 35 hours a week in 2000, in exchange for some labour flexibility and
reduced social security contributions. The law ('La Loi Aubry') was enacted in January 2000.
In the Netherlands, a similar debate was initiated in the early 1980s, although here trade unions,
instead of the government, asked for reduced working time. After the famous 1982 Wassenaar
Agreement, social partners agreed to moderate wage increases and to reduce working time in due
course. In the late 1990s this strategy of wage moderation is commonly believed to have been
successful in terms of employment performance. It is not clear, however, whether the observed
decline in full-time hours is due to work-sharing or to productivity-sharing: indeed the 1990s is also
the period of larger productivity increases, probably due to IT. This chapter tries to identify whether
work-sharing or producti vity-sharing was the main force behind the observed reduction in working
time.
To this end, the chapter presents a small empirical model of the joint behaviour of Dutch hourly
wages and standard full-time working hours. I use cointegration techniques to deal with the non-
stationarity of the data. For the work-sharing hypothesis, unemployment should have a negative
impact on hours worked, whereas for the productivity-sharing hypothesis productivity increases
would lead to reduced working times. The chapter does not answer the question whether work-
sharing has been effective in terms of unemployment reduction. Thus, the focus is on the
determinants of full-time normal annual working hours.
The chapter is set out as follows. Section 7.2 provides some background for the Dutch market
sector since 1960. Section 7.3 introduces some of the theoretical aspects of the work-sharing versusHourly Wages and Working Time in the Dutch Market Sector 1962-1995 157





































productivity-sharing debate. It provides a simple model for the behaviour of wages and working
hours. Section 7.4 presents some properties of the data, showing that cointcgrating relations exist.
Section 7.5 then presents the estimation results. The implications for the work-sharing or
productivity-sharing debate arc given in Section 7.6. Conclusions are drawn in the final Section 7.7.
7.2 THE DUTCH MARKET SECTOR '
Figure 7.1 shows the development of normal full-time working hours in the Dutch market sector.
The solid line corresponds to annual hours, whereas the dotted line represents weekly hours. The
data do not incorporate overtime hours, neither do they correct for absenteeism. During the fifties,
annual working time (//) decreased rather slowly from about 2350 hours to roughly 2300 hours. At
that time a normal job was characterized by a workweek of 48 hours and employees had two to
three weeks off per year, including public holidays. During the sixties and early seventies, weekly
hours decreased gradually to reach the 40-hour week in 1975. At the same time some additional
holidays were introduced, so that in the beginning of the seventies four weeks off became the norm.
As a consequence of both developments, annual working time fell below 1900 hours in 1975. The
average decrease in normal hours during this period until the oil shocks amounted to 1.2% per
annum, see Table 7.1, which presents some key indicators by sub-period.
The whole period of the sixties and the first half of the seventies was characterized by low
unemployment rates, see Figure 7.2, and strong productivity growth, see Figure 7.3. Before the first
For more extensive descriptions of the recent history of the Dutch labour market, see e.g.
Broersma, Koeman et al. (2000), Hartog (1999) or van Veen (1997). An account of the
development of Dutch working time is given in de Neubourg (1991) and van Doorne-Huiskes and
de Lange (1994).1SS Chapter 7
Unempbymcnt Labour share
Figure 7.2 Unemployment and labour share
oil crisis, the unemployment rate («) was on average only 1.1% over the period 1960-1973, and
hourly productivity (/I*) increased by 6.2% per year. The net hourly real consumer wage (W„)
tagged .d/gMj' betond HM? a grm»f/r rate ofi.0?o, wnweas gross rrourfy reai' producer wages (W^j
increased by 7.5%. The difference was mainly caused by the increasing tax wedge to finance the
welfare state arrangements introduced during the sixties. As a consequence, the labour share in value
added ((p* = W.7/1,,) increased substantially from 62% in 1960 to 82% in 1975. see Figure 7.2.
After the first oil shock in 1974, the Dutch economy was in disarray. Unemployment increased
rapidly, reaching its highest level of about 10% in 1983. Simultaneously, the growth rate of hourly
productivity dropped to only 3.2% in the period 1974-1982. Wage increases where roughly in line
with productivity, but the labour share remained at a high level. The decrease in working time slowed
down: 40-hours a week remained the norm, although the number of holidays increased slightly,
reducing the number of weeks worked. In 1982 the labour market situation was considered to be
dramatic, this lead to consultations between the government and the social partners. In October
1982 the famous Wassenaar Agreement was struck. One of the main recommendations was to
moderate wage claims in exchange for increases in employment and reductions in working time.
With respect to wages, the impact of the Wassenaar Agreement can be seen in Figure 7.2. Real
hourly wages increased less than hourly productivity: whereas hourly productivity increased with
2.2% per year in the period 1983-1995. real hourly wage costs increased only by 1.3%. As a
consequence, the labour share fell with 10 percentage points. In terms of unemployment the results
were less impressive, as unemployment remained rather high, see Figure 7.2. However, the small
decrease in 1995. has been followed by larger decreases during the second half of the 1990s.Hourly Wages and Working Time in the Dutch Market Sector 1962-1995 159
I S S S
Figure 7.J Hourly wages and productivity
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After the Wasscnaar Agreement, annual normal full-time working time fell from 1840 hours in
1982 to 1740 hours in 1992, see Figure 7.1. This decrease is partly due to a reduction of the normal
workweek to 38.5 hours in the eighties. The second element is a further increase in the number of
days off, amounting to almost seven weeks in 1995.
Summarising the development of working time, annual full-time working hours show a steady
decline of 0.8% per year in the period 1960-1995. Part of this decline occurred during the golden
sixties, but another part during the high unemployment era of the eighties. This suggests that both the
productivity-sharing - i.e. consuming productivity gains in leisure - and the work-sharing arguments
- reducing hours in an attempt to redistribute unemployment - could be relevant.
As a first crude test, Table 7.2 presents Granger causality tests between working time //, hourly
productivity /!,, and unemployment M.~ The results indicate that working time is Granger caused by
productivity, but not by unemployment. Moreover, productivity and unemployment do not seem to
be Granger caused by full-time working hours.' These result suggest that the decline in full-time
working hours is most likely due to the productivity-sharing hypothesis. To analyse the underlying
mechanisms in some more detail, however, I develop and estimate a simple model in the next
sections.
2 Except for the unemployment rate, small letters denote natural logarithms of the variables.
3 Similar results were obtained from a reduced form specification, omitting the contemporaneous
exogenous variables as explanatory variables under the general specification.160 Chapter 7

























p-values Granger causality test in tri-variate model, trend included; p-values bivariate
Granger causality tests (trend included) between brackets. Significance levels: * at
5% and*» at 1%.
7.3 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
From a theoretical point of view, the work-sharing strategy has been severely criticised. The major
argument is the so-called Iump-of-labour fallacy, see Layard, Nickell et al. (1991, Ch. 10).
Krugman (1997) called this the global-glut doctrine. This critique refutes the idea that there is a fixed
amount of work that can be redistributed at will. On the contrary, employment - and thus
unemployment is determined by demand and supply factors, or in a more modem context by price
and wage setting behaviour. Reductions in working time, may affect both price setting and wage
setting, and the final impact on unemployment is uncertain, see Chapter 5 for a theoretical analysis.
The main topic of this chapter is to have a closer look at the origin of the observed reduced
hours. The impact on unemployment is not investigated/ As stated in the previous sections, two
alternative hypotheses are typically suggested: the work-sharing hypothesis and what I labelled as
the productivity-sharing hypothesis. According to the work-sharing hypothesis reductions in hours
may be due to high unemployment; whereas the productivity-sharing hypothesis indicates that
productivity growth is the driving force. In the latter case, there may be a trade-off in wage
determination between increased hourly remuneration and reductions in hours worked. Toanalyse
these types of questions 1 develop a simple joint model of wage and hours determination capturing
both elements.
4 To do so, the model should be augmented with a labour demand or price setting equation, see
Chapters 5 and 6. This falls outside the scope of this chapter.HourK Wages and Working Time in the Dutch Market Sector 1962-1995 161
7J.1 Wage determination
In modern wage theories, wages are set. in one way or another, as a mark-up on the outside option,
see Layard. Nickeil et al. (1991) or Chapter 5 for an illustration. In the general equilibrium this leads
toa wage curve, w here wages depend negatively on the unemployment rate u. This curve may shirt
upward if aspiration levels, such as benefits or productivity, increase. Considering a simple log-linear
specification, where except for the unemployment rate u lowercase letters denote log's, this may be
summarized for our purposes as
f, = Yo-Y»* + Y.a^Y»*Y.«^,^Y.^ (7.1)
where u; is the real hourly wage cost. A is annual full-time hours worked, u* is hourly pnxluctivity, A
is net real level of unemployment benefits, u is the unemployment rate,.«is the wedge between real
producer wage costs w, and real net hourly consumer wages H„ and finally v» summarizes other
wage push variables. In general the Y-parameters arc expected to be positive.
As it stands, equation (7.1) includes the main determinants of Dutch wage equations, see for
example Graafland and 1 Iuizinga (1999) and Muysken, van Veen ct al. (1999). first, capturing the
aspiration level of workers, wages increase with productivity and with benefit levels. Typically, it is
found that the effect is proportionally, implying y„ = 1 ~ Ya- Second, as predicted in theory, higher
unemployment reduces wages. Third, tax shifting is an important phenomenon in the Netherlands.'
In Chapter 5 I discussed the impact of working hours in a union bargaining framework, see also
Calmfors (1985). The conclusion is that the impact of hours worked on hourly wages is
indeterminate, various factors operating in different directions. Chapter 5 suggests that the impact is
likely to be U-shaped: for short working times reduced working times are likeh to increase hourly
wages; whereas for longer hours the opposite may be true. The sign conjectured in equation (7.1)
illustrates the belief that the first case is nowadays most likely to occur. Moreover, as total
remuneration is likely to fall, 1 expect to have Y* < 1 •
Unfortunately, most empirical aggregate wage studies formulate their models in terms of annual
wages (w^ + A) and annual productivity (o = a,, + A). This is a special case of equation (7.1), with
Y* = 1 ~ Ya- The only exception for the Netherlands I am aware of is Dur (2001). He finds an
estimate of 0.77 for Y*, indicating that a reduction in hours worked leads to an increase in hourly
wages, although significantly less than proportional. However, as his wage equation contains the
capital stock instead of labour productivity as an explanatory variable, it is hard to interpret this
result. In their cross-country panel study, Kapteyn, Kalwij et al. (2000) find a value of 1.15 for YA,
5 It is sometimes suggested that there is a difference between employer contributions and employee
taxes, see Muysken, van Veen et al. (1999). This difference is ignored in the present paper.162 Chapter
with a standard error of 0.21, suggesting that hourly wages increase proportionally. However, the
productivity variable is GNP per capita (with an elasticity of 0.98). Rewriting this in terms of GN
per hour worked, as in equation (7.1), the implied coefficient for y* is only 0.17 (= 1.15-0.98
suggesting only a minor increase in hourly wages, contrary to their conclusion.'
7.3.2 Hours determination
Turning to the determinants of hours worked, the bulk of the literature focusses on labour suppl
models. Using a log-linear specification this would yield something like
/r- = ao-a„w„ + a/jr„ (7.:
where V is labour supply and w,(=w,-s) is the net real consumer wage. The vector*, capture
other factors that may affect the individual labour supply decision, such as non-wage incomes, soci;
norms, etc. To explain the downward trend in hours worked, these type of models have to assum
that the labour supply curve is backward bending, implying a» > 0 in equation (7.2). A problei
with this approach is that most (cross-section) estimates of labour supnjv elasticities find small hi
non-negative wage elasticities, indicating 0C„ < 0. This is inconsistent with the observed secular
decline in hours. Within the labour supply model, there does not seem to be another obvious
candidate for explaining this trend in hours worked, as for the bulk of workers non-wage incomes
are typically rather low or non-existent. The only alternative would be to recur to an autonomous
shift in preferences or social norms.
Another explanation may be that the estimated labour supply elasticities are biased. The reason
could be that workers are constrained in their choice of working hours. For example, Dickens and
1 -undberg (1993), Osberg and Phipps (1993) and Tummers and Woittiez (1991) present evidence
lor the importance of hours constraints in the labour market. Osberg and Phipps (1993) conclude,
for example, that the desired labour supply is slightly backward bending for much of their (Canadian)
sample. If suppliers are indeed constrained in their choice of hours, an alternative model for
explaining the actual development of working hours is needed. Chapter 6 provided an overview of
the alternatives. W ithin union models the two extreme alternatives are: hours set by monopoly unions
and hours set by firms. Intermediate cases allow for bargaining between unions and firms.
To start with the monopoly union case. Calmfors (1985) has shown that unions tend to demand
working times (/r") that are shorter than considered optimal from the viewpoint of individuals (/r").
The idea is that unions take into account the impact of hours worked on the demand for labour(i.e.
6 Alternatively, their estimates appear to be consistent with a specification of annual wages and
annual productivity, without a separate term for hours worked.Hourly Wages and Working Time in the Dutch Market Sector 1962-1995 163
the number of workers). Unions thus have an incentive to cut down hours to reduce the probability
of unemployment. However, the loss is less if the outside option for union members is higher. Hence
union hours A" increase with the outside option, see Chapter 6. This implies that union hours will
increase with the benefit level and decrease w ith unemployment. The latter effect corresponds to the
work-sharing hypothesis, (ieneralising the labour supply equation (7.2). union hours can be written
as
Unfortunately, the wage elasticity of union hours can not be signed a priori, although it is argued in
Chapter 6 that union hours are more likely to fall with net real wages than individual labour supply.
The vector x. consists of the labour supply factors x,, and also of factors related to the labour
demand elasticity of the firm, see Chapter 6. But as long as the labour demand elasticity is not
affected by productivity increases, there is no direct role for the hourly productivity variable u*-
Nevertheless, equation (7.3) does incorporate elements of productivity-sharing hypothesis, but in tlw
same indirect way as for the labour supply model: a permanent productivity shock affects the wages
determined in (7.1), which in turn influence union hours. Accordingly, CC„>0 is consistent with the
productivity-sharing hypothesis.
A rather different approach would be to assume that working times are determined unilaterally by
firms. In labour demand models distinguishing between workers and hours, there is a trade-off
between the extensive margin - the number of workers - and the intensive margin the number of
hours worked per worker. As long as fixed costs per worker exist, an increase in hourly wage costs
leads to a relative cost increase for the intensive margin, reducing optimal hours A'', see e.g. Hart
(1984b). In a log-linear specification, this leads to the following simple demand for hours,
A^ = <XQ ~ a„ We + ttj/x,/. (7.4)
The demand for hours depends negatively on wage costs w, and not on net real wages w„ as in the
labour supply model (7.2) or the monopoly union hours equation (7.3). The vectorx^captures other
factors that may influence the demand for hours, such as factor prices like the user costs of capital,
and non-neutral technical progress, see Chapters 2 or 6 for the comparative statics.
Finally, a bargaining model of hours would combine the determinants included in the monopoly
union model (7.3) and the labour demand model (7.4), see Chapter 6. In a log-linear specification
this yields the generic model
A = ao-a„w, + a,,&-a,,u + a,.y +cc/x. (7.5)164 Chapter?
Table 7.3 Reduced form wage and working time elasticities
</M> </* </(W + *)
[f_>0 - °'*° <0
«.-«wY„
ßy appropriate choice of the a-parameters and forcing variables in x, this equation encompasses all
three previous models. The forcing variables will be ignored in the empirical application. The
monopoly union model (7.3) then leads to the restrictions a, = a„, as net wages determine hours.
Further omitting the outside option a^ = a, = 0 yields the labour supply model (7.2), whereas the
joint restrictions CC» = a» = a, = 0 give the labour demand model of equation (7.4). Kapteyn, Kalwij
et al. (2000) include the hourly before tax earnings and the employment rate in their cross-country
study. This is another mixture of the above models. Their corresponding estimates are a» ^ 0.16
and a, 0.18.
7J.J Reduced form
The equations (7.1) and (7.5) jointly determine hourly wages and working time, at given
productivity, benefit levels, unemployment and wedge. To focus on the work-sharing versus
productivity-sharing hypothesis, consider the reduced form elasticities of working time with respect
to productivity and unemployment. They are given in Table 7.3.''
An increase in hourly productivity directly affects wage setting (7.1), but does not directly
influence working time in (7.5). Given the expected signs of the parameters. <x„ > 0 and y* > 0. the
induced increase in wages reduces hours worked, which in turn may lead to an additional pressure
on hourly wages. As a result, hourly wages increase more than the initial impact Yo-* and working
hours decline more. Total remuneration (H;+/J) increases, as long as the wage elasticity of hours is
inelastic (a. < 1). So the model supports the productivity-sharing hypothesis that increased
productivity leads to reductions in working time.
7 The following discussion assumes the benefit level A to be given. An alternative assumption could
be that the net replacement rate p ~ /> - (w. + A) is given. This yields more complex expressions,
but the qualitative results tend to work in the same direction.
8 At least as long as a» Y« < ' - which needs to hold to solve the model.Hourh. Wages and Woridng Time in the Dutch Market Sector 1962-1995 165
An increase in unemployment has a direct impact both on wage setting and on hours
determination: wages are moderated (y. ^ 0) and hours worked arc reduced due to the work-
sharing motive (a. > 0). The indirect effects, however, work exactly in the opposite directions. Hie
wage moderation leads to an upward pressure on hours worked (if 0t, "* 0), whereas the initial
reduction in hours through the work-sharing motive leads to an upward pressure on hourly wages (if
Y» > 0). The final impact is ambiguous for both variables. This is an empirical matter.
7.4 DATA AND ESTIMATION PROC EDI RE
The model was estimated with annual data for 1960-1997 for the Dutch market sector. The last two
years have been retained to test for predictive failure. The sources are described in the Data
Appendix. The development of the main variables has been outlined in Section 7.2. Table 7.4 gives
the time series properties of the data. All but one series appear to have unit roots. Most series are
l( I). although real wage costs w, seem to be 1(2).' Given the well-documented low power of unit
root tests in small samples, however. I have the impression that this is due to the rather short sample
period. Moreover, net real wages H„ and the wedge .? arc both l( I). which would imply that iheir
sum (w,.) should also be 1(1). Similarly, the labour share <p^ and labour productivity per hours
worked a* are 1(1), so their sum - again corresponding to w, - should be 1(1). From these
observations, 1 proceed as if real wage costs are 1( 1). The only series that seems to be stationary is
the difference between the replacement rate p and the labour share (p^. As both series individually
are 1(1), this suggests that both variables are cointegrated.'"
An alternative to the hypothesis of non-stationarity of our series could be that the series are
stationary, but with structural breaks. The obvious candidates for such breaks could be the oil crises
of the 1970s and 1980s or the Wassenaar Agreement of 1982. Experimenting with such breaks did
not change the conclusion, however, that the variables appear to be non-stationary.
To account for this non-stationarity of the data, the model was estimated in error-correction
form. This has the additional advantage of allowing flexible dynamics in the process of wage
formation and hours determination, as the theories presented in the previous section give no
information about the dynamic adjustment path.
Before analysing the structural error correction model for wages and working time, I applied
Johansen's procedure to test forthe number of cointegrating relations in the system of six variables.
9 There is some evidence in the literature that nominal wages and prices could be 1(2), but typically
relative prices, and thus real wages, are found to be I( 1), see e.g. Banerjee, Cockerel! et al. (2001).
10 The economic logic might be that higher benefits lead to higher taxes, leading in turn to an increase
in the labour share, but this is speculative. Alternatively, a high labour share might increase the
demands for relatively high benefits.166 Chapter 7




























































u. Standard deviation between parentheses.
b. The characteristics of the (adjusted) Dickey-Fuller test statistic (ADF) are given between brackets
[/.H|: / {n.c.lj indicates neither constant or trend, constant included or trend and constant included,
respectively; « corresponds to the number of significant lags included. Significant rejection ofnon-
stationarity is indicated by asterisks (* at the 5%-level and ** at the 1%-level).
AVAR of order 2 with constant and trend was specified." In order to exclude the possibility of a
quadratic trend under the hypothesis of one or more unit roots, the linear trend was restricted to
appear only in the cointegrating relations. Table 7.5 reports the two usual likelihood ratio statistics
for cointegration, see Johanscn and Juselius (1990).'- Neithertest statistic rejects the null hypothesis
of three cointegrating relationships, whereas the null hypothesis of at most two relations is rejected:
at a 1% significance level for the trace statistic and at 5% significance for the A.„„ statistic.
Accordingly there appear to be three cointegrating relations within the system of six variables.
Since the main interest lies in modelling wages and working time rather than in deriving
empirical models for productivity, benefits, unemployment or the wedge a conditional approach
seems appropriate." Such an approach only yields valid inferences if the conditioning variables are
weakly exogenous for the short-run and long-run parameters of the wage and working time model.
This will be tested for.
11 With annual data two lag's appear to be reasonable, but because of a lack of degrees of freedom 1
did not test for the number of significant lag's. But. as the unrestricted reduced form of the
conditional model docs not seem to be misspecified, sec Table 7.6 in the next section, the number of
lags included appear to be appropriate.
12 l"he results were obtained using PcFiml 9.0. see Doomik and Hendry (1997).
13 Sec Urbain (1995) for a discussion of the relative merits and pitfalls of modelling eointegrated
systems in conditional or in full system models.Hourly Wages and Working Time in the Dutch Market Sector 1962-1995 167






















Likelihood ratio tests defined in Johjftscn «nd Juscliui
(1440) Significance levels: • at 5% and •• at IS. Trend
included.
Within the conditional model a maximum of tuocoinlcgrating relations can be identified, which
will be identified as wage setting and hours determination, respectively. As there arc three
cointegrating relations within the system, no unique long-run relations can be found, however. Table
7.4 suggests that the third cointegrating relation may be that between the replacement rate and the
labour share, as their difference is stationary. This involves five of the six variables of the system,
with only the unemployment rate not included. This relation could be used to eliminate the benefit
level from the long-run cointegrating relations.
7.5 ESTIMATION RESULTS
As argued by Spanos (1990), the statistical adequacy of a structural model should be assessed by
misspecification tests of the unrestricted reduced form (URF). Therefore, I started with an
unrestricted model of w, and A, conditional upon a^, A, w and 5. As with the V A R of the system, the
maximal lag length was a/v/o/v set to 2. A constant and a trend were also included. The trend may
capture the omitted exogenous variables in the model, especially in the hours equation. It is highly
significant in the URF-model, with a p-value of 0.006.1 tried to include other explanatory variables,
but failed to get rid of the trend. In particular, 1 used the share of female employment, the incidence
of part-time employment and a crude measure for quasi-fixed labour costs. The first two variables
were intended to capture changes in preferences, the latter variable should influence the demand for
hours. Neither variable had a significant effect.
Table 7.6 provides some statistics for the two reduced form equations. There is clear evidence of
first-order auto-correlation in the wage equation. However, transforming the dependent variable
from hourly wages w,. to annual wages w^+A (see the third column of the table),168 Chapter 7






























































Ö is the equation standard error; RSS is the residual sum of squares; PP97 is a Chow test
for parameter constancy up to 1997; LMA is a Lagrange multiplier test for first-order
residual autocorrelation; ARCH is a Lagrange multiplier test for first-order autoregressive
conditional heteroscedasticity; NORM is WinGive's normality test of the residuals; RESET
is Ramsey's specification test; WNC is a Wald statistic for no-cointegration; CDF is a
Dickey-I uller lest with constant but no trend for non-stationarity of the cointegrating
vector. Significance levels test statistics: • at 5% and "at 1%.
0 is the correlation between the residuals; VLMA is a test for first-order residual vector
autocorrelation; VNORM is WinGive's vector normality test of the residuals; LMC is a
LM-test for weak exogencity of the regrcssors for the long-run parameters.Hourh Wages and Working Time in the Dutch Market Sector I %2-1995 169
seems to solve this problem. This suggests that the auto-correlation problem is an artifact of the
contemporaneous interaction between wage setting and hours determination." which will be taken
into account in the structural model. So no further lags were needed to avoid auto-correlation. None
of the other diagnostic tests indicate misspecification at the 5% significance level.
The table also includes the l-agrange multiplier test (l.MC) suggested by Boswijk and I Irhain
(1997) for weak exogeneity of the regressors for the long-run parameters. It tests the significance of
the lagged error-correction errors of the URF in the marginal model of the conditioning variables and
is not significant.'* Accordingly, the conditional approach can be used to provide valid inference on
the long-run parameters.
The next step in the analysis is the specification of a just-identified structural model (J1D). As
illustrated by Johansen and Juselius (1994), this includes identification ol the long-run und the short-
run structure. To start with the latter, the previous table already indicated that the contemporaneous
interaction between hourly wage setting and hours determination may be an important issue. There
are several possibilities: at one extreme, wages may be set with predetermined working hours, which
would implv that current hours A, influence current wages HV* but not vice versa; at the other
extreme, current hours are set with predetermined hourly wages in labour supply models, which
would imply that current net real wages vv„ influence hours A,, but not vice versa. Many intermediate
positions are possible, see Chapter 6. In the just-identified model, I allowed for interactions in both
directions, which required other identifying restrictions for the dynam ics. As there does not seem to
be any theoretical reason to pick a particular (lagged) variable, I used the least significant lagged
differenced variables in the URF. As a consequence, the lagged change in hours in the wage
equation and the lagged change in unemployment in the hours equation were omitted for
identification purposes. Using different short-run identification restrictions yielded the same
parsimonious results.
To identify the long-run parameters in the JID, I started with the assumption of a diagonal error-
correction matrix. This does not provide any structural interpretation, but allows for a simple test of
no-cointegration (WNC). This is a Wald-test for the joint occurrence of the lagged levels (the error-
correction terms) in each individual equation. Under the null-hypothesis of no-cointegration the
14 Moreover, the negative correlation p between the residuals of the two models almost vanishes
when w,. is replaced by w,.+/j.
15 The marginal system is modelled as an unrestricted VAR of the four conditioning variables with 2
lags, a constant and a trend.170 •-• : Chapter 7
distribution of the test is non-standard, but Boswijk (1994) has calculated critical values.'*
Table 7.7 gives the results for the JID-model, estimated by F1ML. For notational economy, the
table does not report the short-run dynamics, but only the cointegrating relations and the
corresponding diagonal error-correction terms. The standard errors of the cointegrating vectors are
calculated using the methods given in Bärdsen (1989). The no-cointegration tests give mixed results.
For the hours equation, the WNC statistic is significant at the 1 % level, rejecting the null-hypothesis
of no-cointegration. This is confirmed by a Dickey-Fuller statistic (CDF) on the cointegrating vector.
For the wage equation, however, the WNC is only significant at the 10% level. On the other hand,
the CDF statistic suggests that the cointegrating vector is stationary."
The ambiguous results for the cointegration of the wage equation may be due to the inclusion of
the trend in the equation. Single equation estimates of Dutch wage equations, see for example Broer,
Draper et al. (2000) and Muysken, van Veen et al. (1999), suggest that wages are indeed
cointegrated with the variables included in here, but that no trend is needed. The parameter estimates
of the cointegrating vector for wages in the J ID even correspond fairly closely to the results found
elsewhere: wages increase with productivity and benefits, their joint impact being proportional;'*
wages decrease with unemployment, the semi-elasticity being around - 1; and tax shifting is rather
strong. In view of this, I take the results of Tables 7.6 and 7.7 as evidence for the occurrence of two
cointegrating relations in the constrained model.
The next step was to identify structural long-run relations in the constrained model. In line with
equations (7.1) and (7.5), the following parameterization was used:"
(7.7)
16 Boswijk (1994) calls WNC an instability' test, but to avoid confusion 1 prefer to call it a no-
cointegration test. The $*-statistic was used to account for the trend in the model. With 4
exogenous variables, the 10%, 5% and I % critical values arc 20.76, 23.33 and 28.51, respectively.
17 A more or less similar ambiguity of the no-cointcgration test statistics can be found in the URF of
Table 7.6.
18 When the replacement rate is included instead of the benefit level, as in Broer, Draper et al. (2000),
wages arc proportional to productivity.
19 As the system of six variables contains three cointegrating relations, the two cointegrating relations
of the constrained structural model arc not uniquely identified.Hourly Wages and Working Time in the Dutch Market Sector 1962-1995 171






















































a. Standard errors between parentheses.
b. WNC is a Wald statistic for no-cointegration; CDF is a
Dickey-Fuller test with constant but no trend for non-
slationarity of the cointegrating vector. Significance levels
test statistics: * at 5% and *• at 1%.
c. Ö is the equation standard error and p is the correlation



































Figure 7.4 Cointegrating vectors
The first cointegrating vector r„ is interpreted as wage setting, therefore the coefficient on wages is
normalized to one and the identifying restriction is that the trend is excluded. The second
cointegrating vectors* is interpreted as hours determination, accordingly the coefficient on hours is
normalized to one and, in line with equation (7.5), the identifying restriction is that productivity is
excluded. As a consequence, the error-correction matrix is no longer diagonal in the structural
model.
Table 7.8 presents the final estimation results of the structural model. It is a parsimonious
specification that cannot be rejected against the URF, the p-value of the likelihood ratio test for the
20 parameter restrictions being 0.238. The no-cointegration tests of the model indicate that there are
indeed two different cointegrating vectors. Figure 7.4 plots the two vectors. Both series show
deviations of the actual values relative to their long-run targets of at most 4% in absolute value.
Visual inspection suggests that the series are correlated, and indeed their correlation coefficient is
0.48.
According to the cointegrating relation for wages z„, wage costs are proportional to the aspiration
levels, given by a weighted average of productivity (64%) and benefits (the remaining 36%).*° The
long-run semi-elasticity of unemployment on wages is around - 1 and the tax elasticity of wages is
0.6. Given the small standard error of the latter estimate, the tax burden is shared by both sides of
the market in the long run. The impact of working time on hourly wages appears to be negative,
although not significant (p-value 0.164). The results do reject that the long-run wage equation can be
written in annual terms, as the p-value of the restriction Y» ~ (' ~ YJ •* 0-035. The suggestion is, in
any case, that in the long run reduced working time leads to a small increase in hourly wages, but
certainly not sufficient enough to keep annual remuneration constant.
20 The p-valuc of the likelihood ratio test of the restriction that both coefficients in the cointegrating
wage vector sum to one is 0.896.HourN Wages and Working Time in the Dutch Market Sector 1962-1995 173













































































a. Standard errors between parentheses.
b. Ö is the equation standard error; p is the correlation between the residuals; LMO is a LM-
test for orthogonality of the regressors; the p-value URF is based on a X^-'es' against the
unrestricted model.
c. WNC is a Wald statistic for no-cointegration and CDF is a Dickey-Fuller test with
constant but no trend for non-stationarity of the cointegrating vector. Significance levels
test statistics: * at 5% and •* at 1%.174 Chapter7
So working time reduction unambiguously leads to wage moderation in terms of annual remuneratioa
as suggested in Chapter 5.
To test the U-shape between hourly wages and hours worked, I also experimented with lagged
hours squared as an additional explanatory variable. This did not improve the fit, however.
According to the cointegrating relation for hours z^, wages have a strong negative impact on
normal hours, the elasticity being almost - 1. However, as the wedge has only ä much smaller
positive impact, the long-run hours equation can not be written in terms of net wages only. The long-
run hours equation thus combines supply and demand factors with roughly equal weights: the
elasticity with respect to net wages being 0.44 and with respect to wage costs being -0.52 (=
0.44-0.96). Real benefits have a strong positive impact of hours worked in the long run. This is
consistent with the role of unions in hours determination, see equation (7.3). However, in that case
hours determination should also incorporate the work-sharing argument. But no significant role is
found lor unemployment in the cointegrating relation for hours in Table 7.8, the p-value of the
imposed restriction a. = 0 is 0.674.*' Finally, the cointegrating relation for hours, includes a
significant trend. In terms of a labour supply interpretation, this would essentially mean a shift of
preferences towards more hours. This seems rather unlikely, although one could argue that the
increased opportunities of part-time work allowed the over-employed individuals to switch from full-
time to part-time jobs. To test this hypothesis, I included the incidence of part-time employment or
the share of female employment as an explanatory variable, but without success. An alternative
interpretation of the trend comes from labour demand. A change in technology or change in relative
costs could also shift the demand for hours. I tried to include a rough measure of quasi-fixed labour
costs, but again without success. Further research in this direction is needed.
The error-correction matrix is triangular in the structural model. The lagged cointegrating vector
for wages z„ has an expected negative impact on the growth of wages, but has a positive effect on
the growth of working time. The error-correction of hours z* only affects the growth in working time
negatively.*" The size of the own error-correction coefficients illustrate that wages adjust more
quickly to a disequilibrium than hours. This seems in accordance with the notion that bargaining over
working time is not always on the agenda. Alternatively, it could be that social norms play an
important role in the adjustment of hours worked, see e.g., Bentivogli (1992) and Vendrik (1993).
The sign of r„ in the hours equation is slightly puzzling, as it works in the opposite direction of the
negative long-run impact of wages on hours. A possible explanation may be the intertemporal
substitution hypothesis. When hourly wages temporarily exceed the long-run target it may pay to
increase hours temporarily above its own target level, even though the long-run elasticity of hours
21 Moreover, when included in r^. unemployment has the wrong sign.
22 The p-value for the imposed restriction thai r,,, does not affect the wage equation is 0.114.Hourly Wages and Working Time in the Dutch Market Sector 1962-1995 175
with respect to wages is negative. Combining the effects of both error-correction terms in the hours
equation, lagged wages have a small negative impact on the growth of working time ( 0.186 •
0.280-0.485*0.962).
Next consider the dynamic adjustment of the parsimonious model. To derive valid inference for the
short-run dynamics, weak-exogeneity requires the regressors and the disturbances to be orthogonal.
see Boswijk and Urbain (1997). This is tested by adding the residuals of the marginal system of the
conditioning variables to the structural model. This variable addition test (LMO) is not significant (p-
value 0.161). Thus, the orthogonality restriction cannot be rejected and inferences on short-run
dynamics are valid.
The growth of wages is directly affected by the growth in productivity, benefits and the wedge.
These estimates corresponded rather closely to the corresponding coefficients in the cointcgrating
vector for wages multiplied by the error-correction coefficient. Testing for this joint hypothesis gave a
p-value of 0.804. Therefore. I imposed this restriction on the short-run dynamics of the wage
equation in the parsimonious model of Table 7.8.
Although the (»integrating wage relation is specified in hourly terms, the dependent variable in the
dynamic equation is the annual wage. The restriction imposed on the coefficient for the growth in
working time is accepted, with a p-value of 0.205." Notice, however, that the wage equation also
includes the growth of annual productivity as an explanatory variable.** Looking at the impact of a
reduction in hours, this means that in the short run annual remuneration is only reduced insofar as
annual productivity is reduced. In other words, hourly wages tend to increase almost proportionally in
the short run. The previously discussed long-run effects showed, however, that in the long run hourly
wages increase significantly less than proportional and may even remain constant.
Changes in working hours are endogenous in the model, though, and adjustments in hours take a
long time according to the estimates of the hours equation in Table 7.8. Again, this may be explained
by social norms and habits. The negative sign of the lagged growth of hours, suggests that the
adjustment path is oscillating, but to analyse the dynamic adjustment we should look at the whole
system." The growth in working time reacts negatively to the contemporaneous increase in net real
23 The alternative hypothesis that the coefficient of A/», equals 0, instead of - I, is strongly rejected,
with a p-value of 0.0003 against a free estimate ofthat coefficient.
24 Alternatively, I could have included the growth of hourly productivity, instead of annual productivity.
This gives rather similar results, the log-likelihood being slightly higher (363.848). On the other hand,
the correlation between the residuals of equations increases to 0.347 in this alternative
specification.
25 The characteristic roots of the parsimonious system are 0.682, -0.427, 0.271 and 0. The system is












































v 'ages,'* although the impa -t is much smaller than in the long run. So, whereas in the long run labour
supply and labour domard facK>rs affect full-time hours, labour supply effects appear to dominate in
the short run. Final y, tn; innovation in real benefits increases the growth rate of hours. It is hard to
find any interpretation for this result.
7.6 WORK-?<IARING OR PRODUCTIVITY-SHARING
The estimation results can be used to consider the determinants of the Dutch full-time working time in
some more detail. Table 7.9 gives the implied long-run reduced form elasticities for wages and hours
worked. It is the empirical counterpart of the elasticities presented in Table 7.3. The table also
includes the elasticities calculated under the assumption of a given replacement rate p.
At a given benefit level, the wage elasticities with respect to the exogenous variables are roughly in
line with the cointegrating relation r„ identified in Table 7.8. The reason is that the estimated
coefficient for hours y* in the wage equation (7.1) is rather small, so interaction effects via the hours
equation (7.5) are almost negligible. The small negative decline of 0.2% a year is due to the trend in
the hours equation, however.
For full-time hours, the reduced form elasticities at given benefits are a mixture of the effects
identified in the hours and wage equations, often with opposite signs. Consistent with the
productivity-sharing hypothesis introduced earlier, there is a clear negative impact of productivity.
This is due to the negative elasticity of working time with respect to wages, combined with the impact
of productivity on wages. Partly offsetting this is the positive effect of the trend in the hours equation.
26 The p-value for the imposed restriction on As, is 0.654.Hourly Wages and Working Time in Ac Dutch Market Sector I %2-1W 177
An increase in benefits has a similar negative effect via the wage equation as an increase in
productivity, but this indirect effect is dominated by the positive direct effect in hours determination.
With respect to unemployment, 1 did not find any evidence for the work-sharing hypothesis in the
structural model. Accordingly, there is only an indirect effect via the wage equation, leading to a
positive reduced form elasticity. As unemployment reduces wages, there is an upward pressure on
hours. For the wedge, the direct and indirect effects work in opposite directions, and the indirect
effect via wages appears to dominate. Finally, the positive effect of the trend is determined by its
direct impact on hours. As the implied increase in hours reduces hourly wages in the wage equation,
this feeds back to even longer hours in the hours equation.
These estimated long-run reduced form elasticities reinforce the conclusion from the Granger
causality tests in Table 7.2: the reduction in Dutch full-time hours should be attributed to productivity-
sharing, whereas work-sharing did not play a significant role.
Combining the elasticities on hourly wages and hours worked, the third row of Table 7.9 gives the
impact on annual remuneration. The surprise may be that productivity and unemployment luve a
rather weak effect, as the elasticities on w, and A roughly cancel each other out.
Turning to the elasticities at a given replacement rate, the results are rather similar. The sign
distribution is almost unaffected, except for the effect of the wedge on remuneration and the effect of
the trend on wages. The magnitude of the elasticities only change if total remuneration was strongly
affected at given benefits.
7.7 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The starting point for this chapter was the observation that full-time working hours have steadily
declined in the Netherlands. The two main hypotheses put forward for this behaviour are work-
sharing and productivity-sharing. In the former, one would expect hours to decline in times of high
unemployment, whereas in the latter productivity induced wage growth is the transmission channel.
This chapter developed a simple empirical model to assess the importance of both hypotheses. The
joint model for wages and working time is estimated using cointegration techniques to account for the
non-stationarity of the data.
I was able to identify two cointegrating relations in the data, which can be interpreted as wage
setting and the hours determination, respectively. The wage equation is quite consistent with earlier
work on Dutch wage equations, the novelty being that wage models specified in annual terms seem to
be misspecified. Indeed, full-time hours only appear to have a weak negative impact on hourly wages
in the long run. Soareduction in working hours leads to a significant decline in total remuneration.
The hours equation is not consistent with a simple labour supply model, but also seems to
incorporate union (benefits) and labour demand (wage costs) effects. With respect to the17* Chapter 7
determ inants of working time, the estimates provide clear evidence that the work-sharing hypothesis
does not hold. The decline in hours is mainly driven by increases in hourly wages (and hourly wage
costs), and thus by productivity-sharing.
Future work in the determination ofhours and the interaction with wage determination is needed
If full-time hours are not solely determined by labour supply considerations, as suggested by the
present analysis, alternative models are needed to investigate its determinants. From an empirical
perspective, this may allow us to dispose of the rather unsatisfactory trend in the current empirical
specification. Furthermore, it stresses that labour supply models should take into account hours
restrictions. Another strand of research may be to explain the different behaviour ofhours in a cross-
country study. Unfortunately, the availability of data may be rather restrictive in this respect.
Another extension to the model would be to incorporate labour demand for workers or price
setting in the analysis. This would strengthen the relation between the demand side and hours
determination. Moreover, it would provide the opportunity to analyse in more detail the relation
between working time and employment or unemployment.8 Conclusion
Every now and then, work-sharing returns to the policy agenda. In times of high unemployment left-
wing policy makers and unions tend to ask for a reduction in working time to spread the burden of
unemployment. The idea is sympathetic, but professional economists tend to be rather sceptical
towards the merits of such a policy. In this thesis I have taken an intermediate position: work-sharing
has pitfalls, but may also have some merits.
8.1 CONCLUSIONS
In the introductory chapter 1 presented a number of key relations between working time and other
variables such as hourly productivity, employment, unemployment, GDP per capita and union
involvement. The following conclusions with respect to these relations can be drawn from the thesis:
• Reductions in hours may tend to increase hourly productivity, but increases in hourly productivity
- for example through technological progress - provide room for increases in wages and
reductions of hours. The choice between the two depends on preferences and institutional factors,
such as union power and the bargaining structure. (Chapters 2 and 6)
• When investigating the employment effects of changes in working time, one should take into
account that working time will affect capital services. This reduces the scope for working-sharing.
In general, however, the employment effects of reduction in hours depend on the initial length of
working time. The same holds for unit costs, but there is a range of working times where
employment increases, whereas profits fall. (Chapter 2)
• Overtime is unlikely to affect the employment effects of work-sharing, as structural overtime does
not seem to be a predominant phenomenon in the Dutch labour market. Overtime is mainly used
to cope with demand uncertainty and absenteeism. (Chapter 3)
• Shiftwork limits the employment effects of work-sharing, as shiftwork tends to increase when the
workweek is reduced. Moreover, workers will have to work more at unpleasant hours. (Chapter
4)
• The employment effects of work-sharing depend strongly on the impact of reduced hours on
hourly wages and annual earnings. A wide range of union models predicts that earnings will fall,
whereas there is a U-shaped relation between hourly wages and annual hours. The estimated180 Chapterl
Dutch wage equation suggests that hourly wages were not significantly affected by hours worked
during the last decades. (Chapters 5 and 7) * ^ ' t!
• Incorporating the U-shaped pattern of hourly wages in the labour market equilibrium, equilibriun
unemployment exhibits the same pattern. Hence, for relatively long hours work-sharing may
reduce unemployment, whereas it may increase unemployment for relatively short workweeks
(Chapter 5)
• The labour supply model does not seem to be the correct model to use when investigating
changes in annual hours. Union bargaining models may be more useful, but the appropriate modd
depends on the institutional background. (Chapters 6 and 7)
• Unions have an incentive to bargain for work-sharing when unemployment is high. More generally,
increased bargaining power for unions tends to reduce hours. (Chapter 6)
• The decline in hours during in the period 1960-1995 is not due to work-sharing, but is the resuk
of increased wages, and thus of increased productivity. There is a large unexplained component,
however. (Chapter 7)
I did not derive any conclusions with respect to GDP per capita, but this follows from the previous
results. Followir(g the decomposition in van Ark and McGuckin (1999). GPD per capita dependi
proportionally on hourly productivity, hours worked, the employment rate - or one minus the
unemployment rate and the participation rate. So, the direct negative impact of work-sharing on
GDP per capita can be partially offset by increases in hourly productivity, increased employment, at
least if initial hours are long enough, and increased participation. The size of these effects is an
empirical matter.
8J FUTURE WORK
This study has a number of limitations, one may be that it is mostly theoretical. Some of the
predictions of the models need to be tested. This is certainly true for the U-shaped relations between
hours, on the one hand, and wages or unemployment, on the other hand. But one also needs better
empirical models on the determinants of normal working hours. The difficulty in both cases is that
standard hours do not show that large variations. A possible solution could be to use cross-country
data, but unfortunately the availability of international comparable data on hours worked is limited.
Alternatively, one could use pooled time-series and sectoral data, or even better, matched employer-
employee data.
A major limitation of the study is that it does not deal with heterogeneity. There are a number of
issues at stake here. First individuals are not homogeneous, but they differ in their skills and
productivity. This may have serious impact on the effectiveness of work-sharing policies. When the
skills or productivity of unemployed workers do not match the skills and productivity of theConclusion I SI
employed workers, work-sharing has additional detrimental effects on unit costs and may also lead to
labour shortages for certain types of labour.
Second, individuals also have different preferences. This might explain the low incidence of
overtime: only workers with a low valuation for leisure may be willing to supply overtime hours. This
then leads to the issue how to incorporate overtime incidence in labour demand models. Theoretical
and empirical work in that direction is needed.
Another implication of heterogeneity in preferences is the occurrence of part-time labour. I fully
ignored the issue, even though the Netherlands is the world champion in part-time employment.
Incorporating part-time labour raises a number of interesting issues. I-mm the labour demand side,
the question is how firms deal with part-time: under what circumstances will they use part-time
workers; (how) does part-time work affect the organization of work; will part-time work influence
the operating time of firms, etc.? But part-time employment also influences the equilibrium of the
labour market: how are wages set in an environment with part-time labour; what is the role of unions
in this respect; how is unemployment affected by part-time work?
So, on the research agenda of labour economists there remain a large number ol questions dealing
with the future of work.AppendicesAr? ENDix A COMPARATIVE STATICS LABCHR DEMAND
This appendix derives the comparative static elasticities of various models in Chapter 2. For future
reference in Chapter 6. the production function includes technological shift parameters. I et ^ (.4,)
denote labour (capital) augmenting technological progress, then the production function (2.5) becomes
*//yv) (A.I)
A.I Long-run cost minimisation
Including the technological parameters, equation (2.7) becomes
4# /(*)-*/'(*)
(A.2)
To derive the comparative statics totally differentiate (A.I) and (A.2) to obtain
rftaAT l-o l-o
1 -(1-n/) -V 0 0 -r|'[l-(l-K)n/|
(A.3)
or in short-hand notation 5 <fe = G übt, where the endogenous variables are z = (In /L, In W)' and the
exogenous variables are * = (In £?, In ^, In /(,-, In Ä, In K, In W, In f/)'. The comparative static effects
are easily obtained considering the sign distribution of the matrix 5 'G, where
Ä"' =
-o(l-V) 1
on/ 11S6 Appendix A
A.2 Demand for hoars
Including the technological parameters does not change the first-order condition (2.10). To derive the






where t)' = —3—. The second-order condition for a minimum is
1*Y
, (A.4)
1 1 Let A„ • — - — > 0, then the inverse of the left-hand side matrix in (A.4) is
1 _1-(1-K)l/] Kt)'
V 1-r/ J 1-V
l-O
o 1-(1-K)T/
which can be used to derive the comparative statics of hours demand /r*.
A J Profit maximisation
Including the technology parameters, the first-order condition for profit maximisation (2.15) should
be replaced by
(A.5)
Differentiating the first-order conditions (A.2) and (A.5) again yields Ä <fc = G <fr in short-hand
notation, where the exogenous variables are x = (In P, In D, In ^y, In ^, In Ä, In K, In fF, In W)'. The
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0 0 -i^i 1 "
The long-run comparative static effects are obtained considering the sign distribution of the matrix
5 'G\ whereAPPENDIX B CRITICAL HOURS
The elasticity of employment with respect to working time is given by . + c^, where
As long as // £ //„^, the sign of e^r depends on T and K. Define !„ = '""f £ 1, then e^,. £ 0 for T
t-V
2: T„. Moreover, for T < T„ the sign depends on the value of K. Let K, = ——-—- < 1/T < 1, then
e^^^can be written as e^r = (K-Ko)(T-o)r/. SoE^,. £ 0 forK ^ K<,. So 6^,,^^ is only negative when
X < TQ and K < KQ. This Appendix further concentrates on the case where e^,- > 0, corresponding to
the intervals {X > T„} or {T £ To A K > K,}.
Taking limits, notice that Km e^ = e^,/,,. > 0 as qv = I in that case. Moreover, Km e^ = C^ < 0,
as t|' = 0 in that case. So when the elasticity £^„ is continuous in //, there is at least one positive root
#« £ (0. "•«) to the equation e„„ = 0. Moreover, 0 < //„ < /f as
^ _1-(1-KO)I/ Q
To obtain the characteristics of //„, (log-)differcntiate the following implicit equation for
(B.I)
After rearranging this yields
Using the identity K = »F//and noting that (1 - 9„) - (1 - K)T|'| = *** ^^* , this can be
rewritten as
"
-o)0- (TK-l)(l-O)(lTr0Critical hours 189
As O s 1 and y« > 0, the sign of the expression in brackets on the left-hand side is unambiguously
positive. The expression in brackets on the right-hand side is positive for O - I, or for O < I and K i
|/T, and for K < K, but the sign of the right-hand side is ambiguous for K, < K < l/t and O < I. In that
case it is positive as long as
which essentially gives a lowcrbound on the wage IF.
In conclusion, critical working time //„. as implicitly defined by equation (B.I), is decreasing in
wages If', unless the following conditions hold jointly O < I, K, < K < I/T and ft'relatively high. The
latter case may be relevant for the labour services specification K = 0.
Finally, consider the two limiting cases. For IP = 0 we have (p, - I and equation (R.I) implies T|' • 0.
so//. = //_. For fF - <» we have <p, = 0 and equation (B. 1) implies T|' = —*t' *rt"V—, However,
i IO-IKHH'
the share of capital costs Ty' depends negatively on hourly wages (at least for O < I). For a CES
production function we then have Hm r/ = 0, and according to (B. I) this implies that Hm T|' =
T/(T-1) > 1. This ensures that Hm //„ < //,,.
Figure B.I captures these characteristics of critical hours //„. Panel (a) illustrates the monotonous
case, for example for K = 1, whereas panel (b) may be relevant for the labour services specification K
= 0, as long as a < 1. If //„ = g(JF) is a monotonous downward sloping function of wages IT, as in
panel (a), the condition // ^ //„ can be rewritten as IF ^ >F„, where JF„ = g~'(//) is the inverse
downward sloping function of hours //. Panel (a) of the figure illustrates the critical values //„ and IF„
for the allocation £Q = (#o> ^o)- Working time reduction starting from £„ increases employment as //<,













Figure B.I Critical hoursAPTENDIX C CES-APPROMMAT1ONS
In this appendix I derive the approximate CES-solutions for the expected value for the minimum and
maximum of two lognormal ry distributed variables .V, and A\. 1*1 the expected values be )', - /•.' (A",),
for /= 1.2 and define >' - £ [min (A"„ ,V,)| and Z - £ (max (.V,. .V,)]. respectively
First consider ) In their analysis of disequilibrium models. Rooiman (1986) and I amhert (1988)
among others, have shown that the following expression holds for the expected value of the minimum
of two lognormal l> distributed variables
K = r, <&, + K, <J>, < min (K„ K,), (C.I)
with
where $(*) denotes the cumulative standard normal distribution function, v is the log-difference of the
expected values v ~ In (>',/*.) and O' •>> *"<•" variance of the log-difference r - In (.V,/.V,.).
Lambert (1988) and Sneesscns (1983) independently showed that (C.I) can be approximated quite
satisfactory by the CES-function
r« (7,""* + 7,-"*)"\ 0<x (C.2)
Although both authors use different approximation methods, the parameter T is a non-linear increasing
function of the standard deviation a in cither case. I will roughly follow Lambert's derivation, sec
Lambert (1988, Appendix A) for more details.
Differentiating (C.I), using the properties of the cumulative standard normal distribution function
and the definition of j>, yields dK/dX, = $,. Rearranging in log's, this gives'
7,«, *,
Thus f^, is a decreasing function of j- = In (^1/^), with O as the sole parameter. As An /> = 1,
in P = 0 and ^ = 14 for^ = 0, Lambert approximates the function />(y; o) by the logistic
1 +
1 In the aggregation by integration approach of micro-markets in Lambert (1988), ^ has a clear
interpretation: it is the weighted proportion of markets with A", < A^; a variable that might
correspond to business survey data on proportions of rationed firms.192 Appendix C
The parameter t is subsequently determined by equating the derivatives of (C.3) and (C.4), evaluated
= 0. This yields
t(o) =
4>(-o/2) - o/2*(-o/2)
where <{>(•) is the standard normal density function. As the denominator can be shown to be positive,
this equation implies T(O) £ 0 for O £ 0. A first-order Taylor expansion around o = 0 yields:
X « '/a *(0) / Q>(0) o = y/it/8 o = 0.6 o.
Finally, to obtain the CES-specification (C.2), the approximation (C.4) of/*, has to be integrated
over In K,.* The integration constant is found comparing the limiting properties of (C.I) and (C.2),
see again Lambert (1988).
Second, consider the expected value of the maximum Z. As
max (1^, -^ j = ^ 2 (^» 2).
the expected value satisfies Z= K, + Kj - J", or using (C.I),
z-r,(i-*,)+ r,o-«,). (c.6)
Differentiating the logarithm of (C.6), yields
r r, 1-
Comparing P, with />, in (C.3) and using the property that I - 4>(jt) = 4K-x), this implies />, = p(y; -0).
Hence, to obtain a simple approximation, the same procedure as above for Kcan be used, only 0
should be replaced by -0. Thus, defining the parameter £ = - X(-O) = 0.60 = t, equation (C.6)
can be approximated by the CES-function
o<5<i (C.7)
The upperbound for ^ follows from the non-linear specification in (C.5), as ht(-o) = - 1.
2 As is easily checked, log-differentiating (C.2) indeed yields (C.4).A LABOUR AGGREGATOR FUNCTION WITH TEAM*OKk
Consider the following CES aggregator function for labour services I
I - AT 1
0<T s l.0<Y * 1 (D.I)
Dividing by .V the function (D. I) is a generalised average of efficiency hours «•(//.) - //„*. let f '
denote the average labour services per worker. Kor T = I, f is the arithmetic mean, the limit for T - 0
would yield the geometric mean. However, to allow for zero hours, X is restricted to be positive.
The partial derivatives of labour services Z. are
(D.2)
a*L . , , V^ i i ..
-^-=- - -yl'"///' H(lY*)Z, - ".**•(!-Y)-",,*'] * 0. (D.3) •»•
0. w */M (D.4)
Longer hours obviously increase labour services, see (D.2), though according to (D.3) at a decreasing
rate due to teamwork (T < 1) and decreasing returns to hours (y < I). The cross partial derivatives
(D.4) illustrate the importance of teamwork: unless individual hours are perfect substitutes (T = I),
the productivity of worker n is enhanced by the working hours of worker m. This is a key
characteristic of teamwork, see Alchian and Dcmsetz (1972).
For large Af the generalised average in (D.I) can be approximated by its expectation, yielding the
approximate expression
l/T
As #„• is concave for a < 1, Jensen's inequality illustrates that P « £(//„**) ^ £(^„)^% so f ^ £(//„)^.
For example, ignoring absenteeism, suppose that working hours are lognormatly distributed with mean
H and variance o,/. Expected hours are // = £(//„) = e" * * °* and £(//„") = e'" *»" °" =
is to (D.5) yields194 Appendix D
The variability of hours combined with teamwork effects, reduces labour services below the certainty
equivalent level. Moreover, at given expected hours //, a higher variance of log hours reduces labour
services through teamwork effects.
To allow for absenteeism, assume that attendance /*„ of each worker is given by a Bernoulli
distribution with mean 0</< s 1. While attending, hours worked //„ are lognormally distributed as
above, whereas hours worked are zero when absent. As a result labour services (D.6) generalise to
1-JfclW •'*•"•< (D.7)
Increased attendance /4 raises labour services I more than proportionally, at least if teamwork is
relevant (T < 1).APFENDIX E THE COMPENSATION SCHEDULE
E.1 Spot market
Let the utility function of a (representative) worker be L^K £), where Kis income (and consumption)
and Z. is leisure. The utility function has the usual properties of positive marginal utilities. Due to risk
aversion these marginal utilities are declining. Moreover leisure is assumed to he non-inferior. Hence
the partial derivatives satisfy
0< </„ I/,; (/„, l/„ <0; and t/„ -%„»G.
Setting the price of consumption equal to 1, the budget constraint is K - £ •» &7/. where If is the
hourly wage rate, // hours worked and /? non-wage income. With 7" hours per period available,
leisure is simply given by £ = 7" - //.
individual labour supply /f is determined by the equality between the hourly wage rate >f' and the
marginal rate of substitution
—^ = JF, (E.I)
with the second-order condition for an interior solution
First, suppose the compensation schedule o(H)is determined in such a way that the utility of workers
is always equal to some outside option, the reservation utility £A Thus the compensation schedule
o(Ä) is implicitly defined as
£/(Ä+fF#<o(#). T-tf'/O = £/'. (E.3)
By appropriate choice of the wage rate IT, the compensation schedule may be normalised as o(l) = I.
Hence changes in the outside option IP, the non-wage income £ or standard hours /f will essentially
be reflected in the wage rate W.
Taking derivatives of (E.3) with respect to //, the compensation schedule satisfies
(E.4)196 Appendix E
°"W = "l^-A„>0. (E.5)
So the compensation schedule is an increasing and convex function of (relative) working time.
Moreover, the assumption o'(l) = 1 corresponds to the assumption that standard hours W* are equal to
the optimal level of hours supplied //", since in that case the wage rate equals the marginal rate of
substitution, sec equation (E. I).
Combining the above expressions for the derivatives, we also obtain
(E.6)
where £„«„, is the wage elasticity of compensated labour supply.
E.2 Implicit contract!
Second, consider the implicit contract theory with symmetric information and risk-neutral firms. As is
well known, sec e.g. the surveys by Rosen (1985) and Stiglitz (1986), the optimal contract with
symmetric information satisfies two conditions, productive efficiency and efficient risk-sharing.
Productive efficiency is obtained by the equality between marginal revenue of hours, say Ä,,, and the
marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption t/,/(/f, whereas efficient risk-sharing
equates the marginal utility of consumption (7, in all states of the world. Hence the compensation
schedule o(f/) seems now implicitly defined by
£/,,(*+»7/<o(#), r-#*£) = 1/Xy, (E.7)
where A,,, > 0 is the shadow price of the reservation utility (/. Without loss of generality, the
normalisation o( I) - I may once again be imposed. Taking derivatives of (E.7) with respect to //, the
compensation schedule now should satisfy
(E.8)
The upnerbound is due to the assumption that leisure is non-inferior, and the equality only holds if there
is no income effect on leisure. The assumption o'(l) = I now indicates that the marginal rate of
substitution exceeds the wage rate at standard hours /A, implying //" s /f. Hence the worker
isovcremploycd at standard hours.
Given the constant marginal utility compensation schedule (E.7). utility f decreases if working
time is increased, asThe compensation schedule 197
Figur« F.I Constant (margin*!) utility
compensation schedules
This is the familiar overinsurance result of (symmetric) implicit contract models with normal leisure.
Figure E.I illustrates the problem in the compensation-working time space (normalizing on W7A = I).
The curve labelled tA is an indifference curve, and L^ is a constant marginal utility locus. Increasing
working time along fyp reduces utility {/when leisure is a normal good. Therefore, Lf has a smaller
slope than C. More generally, the sign of the slope of the compensation schedule (E.7) depends on
[/„: it is increasing as drawn in the figure if (and only if) consumption and leisure are Edgcworth
substitutes (i.e. £/,-/. < 0). As the curvature o "(#) of the compensation schedule depends on the third-
order derivatives of the utility function, no sensible inference seems possible in this respect.
Figure E.I also depicts an iso-profit curve H, for a given state of the world (e.g. the demand for
goods). The slope of the iso-profit curve is given by the marginal revenue of hours /?„. As stated
before, productive efficiency requires the iso-profit curve to be tangent to the indifference curve.
Therefore, the implicit contract with symmetric information stipulates allocation ^,. However, given
the constant marginal utility compensation schedule (E.7), the firm could increase profits to 11, by
moving to allocation ^ where marginal revenue of hours equals marginal cost. As the iso-profit
curve II2 corresponds to a better state of the world, the firm has an incentive to lie in bad states.
However, this is impossible in the symmetric information case.
The obvious third alternative to consider is implicit contract theory with asymmetric information. The
predominant assumption is that the firm has private information on the state of the world. As workers
recognise that the firm has an incentive to overstate the state of the world, the first-best contract (E.7)ATM-NDLX F COMPARATIVE STATICS OVERTIME MODELS
F.I Certaiaty
Using the shorthand r 5
and (3.8a) to obtain








It is easily checked that do(#)/du, ^ 0, where the equality sign only holds for AT = 1.
The second-order condition for a minimum is that the determinant of the left-hand side matrix is
positive, implying
The inverse of the left-hand side matrix in (F.I) is
-1




>-1 for Ä$ 1.ArrcNDix F COMPARATIVE STATICS OVERTIME MODELS
F.I Ccrtaiaty
Using the shorthand r 5
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0 -—L




It is easily checked that 3o(^)/du £ 0, where the equality sign only holds for AT = 1.




The inverse of the left-hand side matrix in (F.I) is
-1
l-i/.
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Using the kinked compensation schedule (3.6) and production function (3.12), the expected values oi








The weight <i(y„) is increasing in v., with <^0) = 0 and Um </(y J ~ I. Using the expression for 6. to
substitute out 0„- 6, in (F.2) and (F.3) givesComparative statics overtime models 201
and
where A. - ——i 6(y J and
i«i> "^
{ .
DifTerentiating the latter expression yields
JS(a <
and *"(y.) < 0. As *'(0) > 0. fcn & '(y.) - » and *(0) - an fc(y^ - 0, this implies %,) > 0 for>. >
0. As a result A. > 0 for 6„ > 0,.
Next, I prove that Ä^ £ A(v+A^ r, 0^ p.) ^ ÄT^, where the equality signs only hold for 0„ = 0,.
For the first inequality notice that //^= A(v, r, 0„, |i). As öA/öv > 0, ÖA/Ö0 < 0, A„ ^ 0 and 0„ £ 0^
the first inequality follows immediately. For the comparison with ^, totally differentiate /»with
respect to 0„
30.
The first expression on the right-hand side is positive, the second negative. Using the partial deriva-
tives from Section F. 1 and rearranging, using the first-order condition —I— = * — , this total
derivative can be written as
-1
1-
o o202 Appendix F
So increasing the overtime premium starting from 6, reduces A. Hence for 6„ 2 6„
Consider the parameters 6 and 6. as defined around equation (3.15). Their ratio is given by Ö./Ö =
£(y)"V£(y"*). As the function >>"* is convex, Jensen's inequality implies £(y"*) > £(F)'\ hence 6. <
Ö.
As a and <y arc distributed independently, the parameter ö„ can be rewritten as
""
The function a<"Wi' is convex, as (t+JlVy > ' • Hence Jensen's inequality implies £(0<""**) > g*'*"^
Similarly, the function a •<"»»-ir»VT« is convex, implying £(a <"•* ^VY^) > ^-(I^-YXVY\ Combining these
two observations. ö„ < I, as in Ehrenberg (1970).
Using the independence of a and a, the parameter 6 can be written as
£[a ('•(
The function^"*' is strictly convex for H > 0, so Jensen's inequality then implies £(o'"''^)>
£(o"Y)''»». Accordingly, for a certain attendance rate a = ^,6$ 1. Demand uncertainty reduces
expected hours only if the overtime premium is increasing at the margin (^ > 0).
Finally, consider the impact of a stochastic attendance rate «. The function JC' '•* ** is concave for
|i < yt and this is assumed to hold as (i is small. So Jensen's inequality implies £(a""'*'~i'*>T*) <
£(a i/Ytyi«ii Y«). Accordingly
where the second inequality follows because the function o "** is convex, implying £(a ''**) > ^ "**.
Thus, ignoring the impact of demand uncertainty, that is for o = ^, 6 > 1 and stochastic absenteeism
increases expected hours.APPENDIX G DATA OVERTIME
Alt data refer to the Dutch manufacturing sector, unless stated otherwise All data come from the
following three organisations:
CBS Statistics Netherlands
CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis
SZW Ministry of Social A ffairs
Capital letters denote level, small letter denote logarithms or rates.
f Hours lost due to strikes. Source: CBS. .SocJoö/-£ro»rwn«rA<' M<w/w!rtfl//.TfVi various
issues.
F Hours lost due to short-time. Source: CBS. &>cia<j/-£fo/x>mur/Nr AAjcukAfttfu/wit, various
issues and SZW. private communication.
// Actual weekly hours operatives in reference week. Source: CBS. .<S<K-/aö/-£twK>m/Trto'
ASaarkfr/a/MM'A, various issues and CBS. private communication.
// Observed relative hours. Calculated as // - (// /f //ty/A.
/A Standard weekly hours operatives in reference week Source: CBS. &x*/oa/-£<Y»«jm/.w/N'
Afaa»<ftfaf»rie&, various issues and CBS, private communication.
W Weekly hours lost due to strikes. Calculated as /f = ^/(WTV).
W Observed weekly overtime hours per operative. Calculated as //" = //-/A.
W Weekly short-time hours per employee. Calculated as //" = P/(/fA').
W Normal number of weeks worked. Calculated as //* = //7/A.
//> Normal annual working time. Source: CBS, 5oc/aa/-£conoffj/jc/;e A/aa/K/r/a/irfieA, various
issues.
AT Employment measured in full-time equivalents. Source: CBS, A'a/zowa/ y4cco«n/j, various
issues.
(2 Utilisation rate. Source: CBS, Cow/unc/«ur-en^i/e/e, various issues. For the period before
1971, linked to a CPB series of utilisation.
z Rate of absenteeism, not sector specific. Source: CBS, 5bc/aa/-£co/io/wwc/»e
A/öa«t/.y/a/;?neyt, various issues.
Ax Growth rate of world trade. Source CPB, Ce«/raa/ £conoffi/.?c/; /Vaw, various issues.































































































































































































































































































































0.089ATTEND« H COMPARATIVE STATICS SHIFTWORK
To derive the comparative statics of the interior solution, totally differentiate the nwrtniM (4.11), (4.10)
and (4.4) to obtain 5 dt = G <Ar, where the endogenous variables arc r (In A'. In .V, In .V) and the


















First consider the short-run model, where AT is fixed. As the capital stock is not necessarily fixed at
its optimal level, (p^ should be replaced by ^ = ip^-^--!^- in the second row of the matrices ß and
G, where q> _ = corresponds to the share of capital costs in total costs and is only
equal to T/ in the long run, as implied by the first-order condition (4.11). Partitioning ß and G
appropriately gives the equation 5^, (d In JV, d In 5)' = G^ (</ In 0, </ In K, d In /4, </ In Z, </ In K, </ In fF,
rf In //)'. The inverse of the short-run Jacobian Ä^ is




The second-order condition is A^ > 0. It is easily seen that
TY in an interior solution.
< 0. Moreover, as 6 < I and206 Appendix
Hence a sufficient condition for the second-order condition is O < 1, which is assumed to be satisfiet
More generally, the second-order condition is always fulfilled for 6 large enough and for lower valm
of 6 it sets an upperbound O^ > I to the elasticity of substitution a.
The comparative static effects can be obtained considering the sign distribution of the matrix
^'Gas-
Similarly, comparative static results for the long-run model can be obtained from the sign







The second-order condition is A,, > 0, which implies a < o^, with
Equation (4.10) implies 8(l-«p^)(l-V) = (l-<p^)r/->i, so O^ can be rewritten as
0 = 1
Finaly some tedious algebra shows that O$ < OyAPPENDIX J BARGAINING
Consider the Nash-bargaining solution for the right-to-manage model with equal bargaining power ß
for both issues. Employment JV and the capital stock A" are given by equations (6.4) and (6.5).
Maximising the log Nash-maximand /n Q = /» F + ß /«II with respect to // and fF gives (6.11)
and (6.13), respectively. In short-hand, these first-order conditions can be rewritten as
Ä/I u) = [l, n,, and A., = n,..
The second-order condition for maximisation with respect to W(or K) only is A,, s a^+11,+ Yr ~ 1
> 0, where y, = —— > 0.' The second-order condition for maximisation with respect to //only
(given WO is
where A„ a„ + n,, + y„ + I and A<, = A.^ + £. Assumption (6.3) guarantees that A« > 0.
For joint maximisation the equilibrium implies O)|i, = n,,. The corresponding second-order
conditions are A, > 0 and
(J.2)
It is then easily checked that in the equilibrium (J.2) is stronger than (J.I). Figure J.I illustrates the
second-order conditions (assuming A., = 11,).
For effort bargains, the Nash-maximand is maximised with respect to //at given K. The
corresponding first-order condition is (6.12), or A^G) = |i„. Obviously, this equation can also be
obtained subtracting (6.11) from (6.13). For joint maximisation, nothing new is implied, but (6.12)
gives the expression for effort, i.e. // at given K instead of W. The corresponding second-order
condition for effort bargaining is A,, > 0. As a,, > 0, H„ > 0 and y„ * 0, this is always satisfied
and we even have A,, > 1.
For the comparative statics of the first-order conditions, it is easier to analyse them in terms
of Kand //. first. Partial differentiation of (6.11), (6.12) and (6.13) gives, respectively
-(1-»)-*£! • _L[Uü-
i/-ü* i, az az
!^/Z. (J.4)
As H, is a weighted sum of the elasticities Csj and e^ y, is a weighted average of their relative
changes y^ and y«. Using Appendix 1. this implies 9, s y* s y, s Yn < '•Bargaining 209
A.
«\ A. A,
Figure J.I Second-order condition»
{/-£/• «Z
(J5)
As these expressions do not use any cross equation characteristics, they give the single equation
properties of (6.11), (6.12) and (6.13), respectively. As ff = >7//, this can be easily rewritten in terms
ffand//. For (J.3) this gives






For fF, this implies
and
az210 Appendix J
For the sign distribution of the comparative statics, first notice that in the equilibrium A,, can be
written as A, = G),. + Yr + A<,. Hence A,. £ A<, for G),. + Yr £ 0- Second, A, £ (i)A„ corresponds to
0) $ W = 1 + (a), + Yr)/Ao. As A« > 0 according to (6.3), this implies 0)" $ 1 for u,. + Yr £ 0-
Moreover, rewriting yields A,. = 0)" A«, hence the second-order condition A,. > 0 implies that 0)" > 0.
Third, consumption being a normal good, i.e. <x„ > G>£, guarantees that A„ > G)A<,. Fourth, in
equilibrium A,, can be written as A„ = G)„ + Y// + k>A<,. Hence, A„ ^ A<, corresponds to O) ^ 0>* s
I (G>„ + Y«)/Ao, with ü)* < min (I, GV).
Rewriting, we have A,, = 0)" Ao and A„ = (1 - G>* + 0)) A„. Hence the second-order condition
(J.2) implies (or-l)u> + <i>"(l-G>*)>0. This is always satisfied for W * 1,but for ü)"<l(thus
<i>, + Yr *- 0) this gives an uppcrbound (larger than o>") for 0).
To derive the impact of the exogenous variables on hours, wages and remuneration, we need the
properties of |i, and H,,. They are given in the following table. The impact of K, Kand /L4^ A4^ on H,
operates through the dependence of the capital share T/ on the capital labour ratio A.
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For technical progress we have ^ = i^üS = 0 and - ÜÜZ - 15*1 - y^,, with y^ • H^T
0. Combining (K.I) and(K3), the impact of technical progress on Kand Wean be shown tobe
_ A,-A,
A*
with A* = (l-<p^)(l-T>Ö[Xii(Ay-Ao) + (A„-uAo)] = - e^fXn (w, +Yr) +w« +Y«l-This is
positive as long as (»),. + y,. is not very negative. The numerator of the last derivative for //can be
written as - (1 - Ty)(O)y + <p^), whereas the numerator of the last derivative for y can be written asAPPENDIX L DATA APPENDIX
The main source of the data is the so-called long macro series (1948-1995) of the Netherlands Bureau
for Economic Policy Analysis, CPB (1996). These data are, among others, based on the National
Accounts of Statistics Netherlands. When necessary, growth rates are used to deal with the breaks in
the National Accounts scries. The data arc available on request.
List of variables
In the following list capital letters are used to denote levels and small letters denote rates. In the text,
however, small letters arc also used to indicate natural logarithms of the corresponding variable.
/4 = K/W Labour productivity, market sector;
Hourly labour productivity, market sector;
5 Net real unemployment benefits;
// Contractual full-time annual working hours, market sector;
/V Employment in full-time equivalents, market sector;
/>,• Consumer price-index (1980 = 1);
Pjv Nominal wage costs, market sector;
/^ Nominal wage costs, whole economy;
/% Price-index (1980 = I) value added, market sector;
/?/? Net replacement rate at 80% of average wages, source CPB (1999);
S = ££_Lil_ Wedge;
/, Average direct tax rate on wage income;
fj Social premiums rate paid by employees;
/j Social premiums rate paid by employers;
u Unemployment rate;
W, • /V(P, //) Real hourly wage costs;
Net real hourly wages ;
Volume (prices 1980) gross value added, market sector.References
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Dit proefschrift behandelt de relatie tussen de arbeidsduur en de economic. At niim een ecuw
analyseren economcn de invloed van de jaarlijkse arbeidsduur op werkgelegcnheid. werkloosheid en
andere indicatorcn van economische bedrij vigheid. In net algemecn kan worden gcsteld dat de toon
van net economendebat over arbeidsduurverkorting voor het merendeel sccptisch is. N icttemin is de
jaarlijkse arbeidsduur sinds 1870 geleidelijk aan met /on 5Ü proccnt gedaald. Met ändert* woorden,
in de ogen van onze overgrootouders werken voltijd werkncmcrs tcgenwoordig nog slcchts in
deeltijd.
Een dergelijke forsc daling van de jaarlijkse arbeidsduur heeft /ich in alle ontwikkcldc landen
voorgedaan. maar de timing was wel verschillcnd. Zo waren Amerika en Irankrijk de eerste landen
waar de 40-urige werkweek werd ingesteld, en volgde Nederland bijvoorbeeld pas gedurende de
jaren zestig en zeventig van de vorige eeuw. In de jaren tachtig en negentig, is de jaarlijkse
arbeidsduur met name op het Europese vasteland nog verder gedaald.
In hoofdstuk 1 van het proefschrifl wordt deze ontwikkeling nader geschetst. Tevens worden in
dat hoofdstuk enige empirische verbanden gelegd tussen de jaarlijkse arbeidsduur cn andere
economische variabelen. In een cross-sectie van OESO-landen is er een duidelijke negatieve
samenhang tussen de arbeidsduur en de arbeidsproductiviteit. Evenzo is de arbeidsduur negatief
gecorreleerd met het ledental van vakbonden. Er blijkt echter geen duidelijk verband te zijn tussen de
arbeidsduur en het werkloosheidspercentage. Tenslotte hebben landen met een kortere arbeidsduur
in het algemeen een lager bruto binnenlands product per hoofd van de bevolking.
Het mogeduidelijk zijn dat deze empirische bevindingen niets zeggen over de eventuele causaliteit
tussen de verschillende variabelen. Is de jaarlijkse arbeidsduur bijvoorbeeld kort omdat de
arbeidsproductiviteit hoog is, of ligt de causaliteit andersom? Leidt een kortere arbeidsduur tot een
verandering van de werkgelegenheid of de werkloosheid, ofbeTnvloedt de werkloosheid de feitelijkc
arbeidsduur? Het doel van het proefschrift is dan ook om een beter inzicht te krijgen in dergelijke
verbanden tussen de arbeidsduur enerzijds, en enkele andere economische variabelen anderzijds. De
nadruk ligt daarbij vooral op de werkgelegenheid, de Ionen en de werkloosheid.
Het boek bestaat in essentie uit twee delen. In het eerste deel, wordt de invloed van de jaarlijkse
arbeidsduur op de werkgelegenheid geanalyseerd. Daarbij staat in hoofdstuk 2 de werkgelegenheid224 Samenvatting
in personen voorop, wordt overwerk nader geanalyseerd in hoofdstuk 3, terwijl in hoofdstuk 4
ploegenarbeid wordt behandeld. In hoofdstuk 5 wordt vervolgens geanalyseerd wat de invloed is van
de arbeidsduurop loonvorming en werkloosheid. In het tweede deel, vanaf hoofdstuk 6, wordt de
causaliteit vervolgens omgedraaid en wordt bekeken wat de determinanten zijn van de jaarlijkse
arbeidsduur. Hoofdstuk 7 bevat een empirische analyse van de uurlonen en de jaarlijkse arbeidsduur
voor de Nederlandse marktsector.
Een andere indeling kan worden gemaakt op basis van het niveau van de analyse. In de
hoofdstukken 2 tot en met 4 wordt de vraag naar arbeid bekeken zonder rekening te houden met
loonvorming en aanbod van arbeid. Het gaat hier dus telkens om een partieie analyse. In de
hoofdstukken 5 en 6 wordt echter gebruik gemaakt van evenwichtsanalyse op de arbeidsmarkt. Het
empirische slothoofdstuk sluit hierbij aan.
Deze structuur van het proefschrift komt in grote lijn ook overeen met de ontwikkelingen in de
literatuur. In de jaren zeventig en tachtig had men met name aandacht voor de invloed van de
arbeidsduur op de vraag naar arbeid. Vanaf medio jaren tachtig verschoof de aandacht geleidelijk
aan naar de invloed op de loonvorming. Recentelijk zijn enkele papers versehenen die ook de
determinanten van de arbeidsduur meenemen in de analyse.
Een belangrijk verschil met de bestaande literatuur is dat het proefschrift expliciet aandacht
besteedt aan de invloed van de arbeidsduur op de productiviteit van kapitaal. Naarmate de
arbeidsduur van het personeel afneemt, zal in het algemeen ook de kapitaalgoederenvoorraad minder
lang worden benut. Kortom, de bedrijfstijd daalt. Dit thema wordt in hoofdstuk 2 uitgebreid
geanalyseerd. Rekening houdend met de invloed van de arbeidsduur op de kapitaaldiensten en de
bedrijfstijd, wordt het effect van arbeidsduurverkorting op de werkgelegenheid in personen kleiner,
aangezien de productiviteit en de winstgevendheid dalen. Niettemin blijkt uit de analyse dat het effect
a (hangt van de oorspronkclijk arbeidsduur. Boven een bepaalde kritische grens neemt de
werkgelegenheid in personen toe, maar daalt de arbeidsduur onder die grens, dan leidt
arbeidsduurverkorting zelfs tot een vermindering van de werkgelegenheid. Het model uit dit
hoofdstuk wordt in alle volgende hoofdstukken van het proefschrift gebruikt.
In het model van hoofdstuk 2 wordt geabstraheerd van overwerk. In de praktijk wordt
daarentegen wel degelijk overwerk waargenomen. Modellen van de vraag naar arbeid die rekening
houden met overwerk, leiden in het algemeen tot de conclusie dat verkorting van de normale
arbeidsduur in een situatie met overwerk zelfs zal leiden tot een längere feitelijke arbeidsduur en
minder werkgelegenheid. Bezien we echter de lange termijn ontwikkelingen van de feitelijke
wekelijkse arbeidsduur. inclusief overwerk. dan blijkt deze de normale arbeidsduur vrijwel
proportioned te volgen. Een belangrijke vraag in hoofdstuk 3 is dan ook hoe we de modeilen in
ovcreenstemming kunnen brengen met de feiten. Een deel van antwoord is wellicht gelegen in
meettouten: er zijn aanwijzingen dat het waargenomen overwerk de feitelijke arbeidsduur overschaLSummary in Dutch 225
Als dit het geval is, zou de feitelijke arbeidsduur gemiddeld genomen best overeen kunnen komen
met de normale arbeidsduur. zodat de voorspellingen van de eerder genocmde modellcn niet lunger
relevant zijn. Een tweede en vermoedelijk belangrijker element is dat overwerk wellicht wordt
verklaard door factoren die normaliter niet in de analyse worden meegenomen. In hoofdstuk 3 ga ik
met name in op de rol van onzekerheid over de vraag naar eindprodiicten en onzekerheid over
ziekteverzuim. Het blijkt inderdaad dat beide factoren de gemiddeldc arbeidsduur verhogen.
Kortom. het waargenomen overwerk zou een gevolg kunnen zijn van wisselend /iekteverzuim en een
schommelende vraag.
Hoofdstuk 3 wordt afgesloten met een körte empirische analyse voor dc Ncderlandse industrie.
Daaruit blijkt inderdaad dat overwerk met name wordt bemvlocd door zicktcvcr/uim en de
bezettingsgraad. De normale arbeidsduur heeft daarentegen geen enkel cllect. /odut de feitelijke
arbeidsduur proportioneel is met de normale arbeidsduur. In lijn met dit resultaat. besteed ik in de
rest van het proefschrift geen aandacht aan het onderscheid lussen de normale en de feitelijke
arbeidsduur.
Hoofdstuk 4 behandelt een andere dimensie van de vraag naar arbeid. namelijk plocgcnarbeid.
Ofschoon de jaarlijkse arbeidsduur van wcrknemcrs sinds de jarcn vij f\ig beh(H>rlijk is gcdaald./ijn
er aanwijzingen dat de bedrijfstijd nagenoeggelijk is gebleven. In dit hoofdstuk analysccr ik dan (X)k
welke prikkels bedrijven hebben om ploegendiensten in te voeren. Inderdaad blijkt een kortere
arbeidsduur een van de factoren te zijn die ertoe kan leiden de bedrijfstijd los te koppelen van de
arbeidsduur.
Een belangrijke determinant van de effectiviteit van arbeidsduurverkorting is de invloed op de
Ionen. In hoofdstuk 5 wordt een vakbondsmodel geintroduceerd om dit te analyseren. I let model
voorspelt een U-vormig verband tussen de uurlonen en de arbeidsduur, terwijl de jaarlijkse bcloning
lijkt te dalen. Met andere woorden, arbeidsduurverkorting leidt tot matiging van de jaarlonen, terwijl
het effect op de uurlonen afhankelijk is van de arbeidsduur: bij lange arbeidsduren zijn vakbonden
zelfs bereid de uurlonen te matigen, maar bij een relatief korte arbeidsduur zullen dc uurlonen stijgen,
zij het minder dan proportioneel. Dit alles leidt ereveneenstoedat ereen U-vorming verband bestaat
tussen de arbeidsduur en werkloosheid. De effectiviteit van arbeidsduurverkorting hangt dus af van
de oorspronkelijke lengte van de werkweek. Bij te lange arbeidsduren helpt arbeidsduurverkorting
wel degelijk.
In dat kader is het van belang te begrijpen hoe de jaarlijkse arbeidsduur wordt bepaald. Dat
probleem wordt in hoofdstuk 6 behandeld. Er zijn vele modelten dienaangaande, met arbeidsaanrxxi
modelten als een veel gebruikte mogelijkheid en bedrijven die de arbeidsduur bepalen als ander
uiterste. Hoofdstuk 6 zet de alternatieven op een rij en gaat vervolgens met name in op de invloed
van vakbonden. Inderdaad blijkt dat vakbonden een prikkel hebben om een kortere arbeidsduurte
bedingen als de werkloosheid hoog is. Daarnaast blijken meer institutionele factoren, zoals226 Samenvatting
onderhandelingsmacht en volgorde van de onderhandelingsagenda, een belangrijke invloed te hebben
op de uitkomst.
Ondanks het feit dat er zo'n grote variSteit is aan modellen ter verklaring van de arbeidsduur,
kunnen de modellen uit hoofdstuk 6 ook gebruikt worden om te onderzoeken wat de invloed is van
producti viteitsgroei op de arbeidsduur en de Ionen. De algemene voorspelling is dat een toenemende
productiviteit leidt tot een kortere arbeidsduur en hogere Ionen, zelfs als het individuele
arbeidsaanbod licht stijgend verloopt.
In hoofdstuk 7 wordt tenslotte een simultaan model voor Ionen en jaarlijkse arbeidsduur geschat.
De data hebben betrekking op de Nederlandse marktsector. Gebruik makend van zogenaamde
coYntcgratie analyse vind ik geen significant lange termijn effect van de arbeidsduur op de uurlonen.
Op kortere termijn blijven de jaarlonen echter constant. Dit betekent dat arbeidsduurverkorting in
Nederland heeft geleid tot loonmatiging. zij het met enige vertraging. Uurlonen hebben op hun beurt
echter op lange termijn een vrij fors significant negatief effect op de jaarlijkse arbeidsduur. Dit kan
niet uitsluitend worden toegeschreven aan arbeidsaanbodeffecten, hetgeen erop wijst dat vakbonden
en bedrijven inderdaad invloed uitoefenen op de jaarlijkse arbeidsduur. Daar staat tegenover dat
werkloosheid geen invloed heeft op de jaarlijkse arbeidsduur. Al met al impliceert dit dat de daling
van de jaarlijkse arbeidsduur in de jaren zeventig en tacblig niel direct bet gevoJg was van de roep
om arbeidsduurverkorting, maar het gevolg van productiviteitsgroei.
In hoofdstuk 8 betfindig ik het proefschrift met enkele conclusies, die in deze samenvatting zijn
verwerkt. AI met al ontstaat een beeld dat arbeidsduurverkorting noch noodzakelijkerwijs goed noch
noodzakclijkerwijs siecht is, het hangt van de omstandigheden af.Curriculum Vitae
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